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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
THE WESTERN SAHARA AND THE SEARCH FOR 
THE ROOTS OF SAHRAWI NATIONAL IDENTITY 
by 
David Suarez 
Florida International University, 2016 
Miami, Florida 
Professor John F. Clark, Major Professor 
This work is a socio-historical study of the roots of Sahrawi national identity. The Sahrawi are a 
community of people who live in the Western Sahara, a former Spanish colony. Most of its 
territory has been occupied since 1975 by Morocco, which denies the existence of a distinctive 
population inhabiting the Western Sahara. In contrast, the POLISARIO Front, vanguard of the 
Sahrawi nationalist movement, argues that the Western Sahara belongs to the Sahrawi and seeks 
its full independence. It bases its claims on the notion of a distinctive history, language, and 
culture for the Sahrawi, separate from that of Moroccans. 
The central question of this study asks, “What are the origins of Sahrawi national 
identity?” This study provides a detailed account of Sahrawi identity formation and how it has 
developed in intensity and scope. It renders a clear understanding of the Sahrawi phenomenon, 
useful to the international community in its deliberations on the validity of their nationalism. This 
study examines the foundation of Sahrawi identity through three different theoretical lenses, 
namely, primordialism, instrumentalism, and constructivism. The study analyzes arguments 
derived from each of these theoretical approaches, acknowledging the diversity of arguments 
about the sources of national identity. This study also demonstrates how a national identity can 
develop over a long period of time as a succession of layers. This study locates the final moment 
of Sahrawi identity formation in the twentieth century, but adds that this conclusion utilizes 
  vi 
essential markers of differentiation that persist over time—the building blocks of any national 
identity. 
  vii 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation is a socio-historical study of Sahrawi national identity. The study aims 
to explore the roots of Sahrawi nationalism and discuss the arguments for independence of the 
Western Sahara. Although there have been several studies on Sahrawi nationalism, most have 
focused on the current territorial stalemate. Reports, memos, and other documents discuss the 
issue of the Western Sahara as an indeterminable conflict based on the intransigence of both 
parties involved: the Kingdom of Morocco and the Frente Por la Liberación de la Saguia El 
Hamra y Río del Oro (POLISARIO1). More meaningful discussions of the claims of the Sahrawi 
are found in passages or chapters that attempt to trace a historical account of Sahrawi nationalism. 
Despite these attempts, there is not one work that has evaluated the sources of national identity or 
contextualized them in any type of theoretical framework. Accordingly, this socio-historical case 
study will incorporate a theoretical framework that will be useful for approaching both the 
question of the Sahrawi and other nationalism studies. 
 
Socio-Political Background 
The problem of the Western Sahara traditionally seemed to be very isolated and largely 
disregarded by the international community. The geo-political environment has recently changed, 
however, even if the dilemma remains localized to northwest Africa. Over the last ten to fifteen 
years, the “Berber movement” has gained new ground in its quest for recognition in language and 
culture.2 The Sahrawi, who have claimed to be descendants of the Berber, have appropriated 
these goals for their own cause and have sought an independent land, separate from the Kingdom 
                                                
1 POLISARIO is the Spanish acronym for the Frente Popular de Liberación para Saquiat el-Hamra y Río de Oro 
(Popular Front for the Liberation of Saquiat el-Hamra and River of Gold). The POLISARIO is the former militant, now 
guardian entity spearheading the independence of the region, claimed and administered by the Kingdom of Morocco, 
called the Western Sahara. 
 
2 Berbers seek not only more autonomy in certain regions of North Africa (Kabylia, the Atlas Mountain region in 
Morocco, and across much of the Sahel) but also more protection for their cultural rights—specifically in language and 
custom.  
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of Morocco. In the last ten years, the imminent threat from Islamists groups affiliated to AQIM 
and MUJAO has transformed the Western Sahara from a narrow bilateral dispute to a trans-
border regional security dilemma. Reports from the Sahrawi refugee camps in Tindouf, Algeria, 
have indicated that militias fighting in northern Mali have recruited several youths. These militias 
are loosely affiliated with the Islamist networks that prey on the disgruntled and restless younger 
generation and may begin to threaten the security of not only the region but also the nature of the 
conflict over the Western Sahara. 
 
Prevailing Diplomatic and Scholarly Analyses 
Much of the discussion concerning the Western Sahara involves the POLISARIO movement, 
Morocco’s repression of the Sahrawi within its administrative borders, or historical accounts 
leading up to the current political stalemate. Intermittent work on Sahrawi nationalism has 
revolved around the origins of Sahrawi national identity. A few of these studies have criticized 
and questioned the origins of their nationality.  At the beginning of this endeavor, the present 
writer was told that ‘a lot had already been written about’ Sahrawi nationalism. Despite these 
claims, my research has discovered that of the several documents and volumes discussing the 
Western Sahara, only a handful focus on Sahrawi nationalism. The biggest issue among these 
authors has been the lack of theoretical analysis to support the claims of either the POLISARIO 
or those who cast doubt on the veracity of POLISARIO claims. Much has been assumed in the 
literature, and little has been offered as an explanation of how Sahrawi identity had been formed 
or how it evolved into nationhood. 
 The research corpus on the topic is small, especially from scholars in North America. 
Most of the work related to the Western Sahara can be found in European libraries. Almost all of 
those studies are either in Spanish or French. The scant research in English usually includes the 
Western Sahara as a sample among regional studies of the Middle East or as a case issue in 
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nationalism. American scholarship has been marginal. Although the most comprehensive recent 
writings concerning the Sahrawi come from scholars such as Zunes and Mundy (2010), American 
monographs or books detailing this topic are scarce. An even wider deficit in the literature exists 
in the theoretical grounding of these few works. Most discussion over the Western Sahara focuses 
on either legal (ICJ rulings, UNSC resolutions), political (Morocco’s policy of 
inclusion/development of the ‘southern provinces,’ UN-sponsored talks), and socio-economic 
features (Sahrawi demographics, the Sahrawi refugee problem, and the human rights dimension) 
of the conflict. Those involved in the dispute in Morocco, Europe and the U.S. consider it a 
political issue, not an ethnic, linguistic, or territorial problem. The overwhelming majority of 
writers approach the Sahrawi problem by ignoring or assuming incorrectly the origins of Sahrawi 
identity. Those who consciously consider the problem of Sahrawi nationalism tend to use the 
more popular constructivist notions of nationalism uncritically. Other approaches have largely 
been disregarded and therefore existing studies provide an incomplete picture. Thus, the intent of 
this study is not only to make this issue more prominent in North America and more accessible to 
English-speaking scholars, but also to provide an in-depth theoretical approach to Sahrawi 
identity.  
 
Problem of Sahrawi Nationalism 
The Western Sahara, located in northwest Africa, has been the site of one of the longest-running 
international disputes on the African continent. At the moment, there is a bitter, though non-
violent, stalemate between the Kingdom of Morocco and the region’s people, the Sahrawi.  The 
latter are represented by the leaders of the POLISARIO, who have claimed independence for the 
Western Sahara. This project investigates Sahrawi nationalism by answering a central question 
(CQ), namely: “What are the origins of Sahrawi national identity?” Most contemporary literature 
suggests that Sahrawi identity, as a nationalist movement, has been socially constructed through 
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variable subjective factors. However, the key players of the independence movement stress more 
objective elements to propel their independence struggle. Without understanding from whence 
and why parties to the conflict take these approaches to discussing the roots of Sahrawi national 
identity, it is difficult for scholarly analysts to get a clear picture of the real origins of Sahrawi 
nationalism. 
The struggle of the Sahrawi for control over the Western Sahara began well before 
Spanish colonization in the late 1880s. The European powers began to encroach on the coasts of 
Morocco and the rest of northwest Africa through commercial ventures and journeys of 
exploration in the mid-1800s. Spain, for instance, attempted to stake claims in various locations 
off the coast of the Western Sahara primarily to prevent other powers from gaining the upper 
hand in Africa. However, the 1884-1885 Berlin Conference gave the Great Powers a ‘justifiable’ 
argument to take not only coastal emplacements in Africa but also its interior lands so long as the 
original inhabitants acquiesced to their rule. Of course, these decisions were discussed without 
the consent of any African representatives. Thereafter, several treaties (1860, 1904, 1912) were 
agreed upon between the Great Powers and the Sultanate of Morocco delineating Spanish and 
French possessions in northwest Africa. By 1934, the Spanish zones were placed under the 
control of the High Commissioner for Spain in Morocco (López-Pozas Lanuza 2015, 69).  In 
1946, África Occidental Española (AOE) or the Spanish West Africa administrative unit was 
established to integrate all of its northwest African zones. Although intermittent revolts against 
Spanish and French rule were put down, the population of the Western Sahara once again began 
to rebel after Morocco won its independence in 1956. 
The crisis in Spanish leadership and the momentous ‘Green March’3 decision taken by 
King Hassan II of Morocco produced the Madrid Accords4 of November 1975. Spain formally 
                                                
3 The Green March (al-Massira al-Khadra) was “a well-coordinated procession by some 350,000 Moroccan civilians” 
and government officials “into Western Sahara” on 21 October 1975. “The Green March was instrumental in 
pressuring Spain into abandoning its plans for self-determination in its last African colony and to arrange for the 
  5 
withdrew from the region and ceded administrative control of the Spanish Sahara to Morocco and 
Mauritania in 1976. Morocco and Mauritania partitioned the Western Sahara between them, and 
the POLISARIO relocated to Algeria.5 However, before Spain committed itself to leaving the 
Western Sahara, Morocco had approached the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to adjudicate its 
and Mauritania’s claims over the territory. The UN had already determined in 1965 “that both Ifni 
and the Saharans had the right to freedom from ‘colonial domination’ and called on Spain to 
‘enter into negotiations on the problems relating to sovereignty presented by these two 
Territories” (Jensen 2005, 25).  The King of Morocco had offered Spain to jointly appeal to the 
ICJ in late 1975,6 but Spain “proved unwilling” (Jensen 2005, 27).  Nevertheless, Morocco 
presented the case to the UN in October of 1974. Subsequently, the UN General Assembly 
adopted a resolution to have the ICJ hear the case. The ICJ deliberated between 13 December 
1974 and 16 October 1976. The final ruling by the Court stated that, 
The materials and information presented to it [the ICJ] do not establish any tie of 
territorial sovereignty between the territory of Western Sahara and the Kingdom 
of Morocco or the Mauritanian entity. Thus the Court has not found legal ties of 
                                                                                                                                            
territory to be instead partitioned between Morocco and Mauritania with no role for either the POLISARIO Front or the 
[Sahrawi] people generally.” The March along with the domestic crisis caused by the terminal illness of Spain’s leader 
Generalissimo Francisco Franco led Spain to “accede to Rabat’s wishes and sign the Madrid Agreement on” 14 
November 1975, “which provided for Madrid’s full and final withdrawal from the Western Sahara by late February 
1976. Anthony G. Pazzanita, Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara, Third Edition, s.v., “Green March,” (Lanham, 
MD: The Scarecrow Press, 2006), 178-179. 
 
4 The Madrid Accords are also known as the “Declaration of Principles on Western Sahara by Spain, Morocco, and 
Mauritania.” United Nations Treaty Collection, Declaration of Principles on Western Sahara by Spain, Morocco and 
Mauritania, Vol. 988, No. 14450 (New York: United Nations, 1983), 259, accessed June 15, 2012, 
http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/MA-MR-
ES_751114_DeclarationPrinciplesOnWesternSahara_0.pdf. Also found in the UN Dag Hammarskjöld Library, UN 
Security Council Third Report by the Secretary-General in Pursuance of Resolution 379 (1975) Relating to the 
Situation Concerning Western Sahara, DAG Digital Library, S/11880, 19 November 1975, accessed May 25, 2016, 
http://repository.un.org/bitstream/handle/11176/71032/S_11880-EN.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y. However, “the full 
text of the agreement was never published, either at the time or at any point since.” Pazzanita, Historical Dictionary of 
Western Sahara, s.v., “Madrid Agreement (Of November 14, 1975),” 248. 
 
5 Previously, the origin and base of operations for the POLISARIO was in Mauritania (or along the border with 
Mauritania and the Western Sahara, but the group subsequently relocated to Algeria after the Madrid Accords 
 
6 The King of Morocco foresaw (incorrectly) that the population would join with the Kingdom if allowed to determine 
its fate. Erik Jensen, Western Sahara: Anatomy of a Stalemate (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Second, 2005), 
27. 
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such a nature as might affect the application of resolution 1514 (XV) in the 
decolonization of Western Sahara and, in particular, of the principle of self-
determination through the free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples 
of the Territory (ICJ Reports 16 October 1975, 162). 
 
 Both Morocco and Mauritania largely interpreted the 1975 ruling in their favor whereas 
the POLISARIO claimed that the judgment by the ICJ was undeniable proof of the right of 
Sahrawi self-government. Morocco’s King Hassan II did not waver in his attempt to claim the 
Western Sahara and despite the World Court’s ruling, pushed ahead with the Green March. The 
King declared on 16 October 1975, in one of his speeches: 
Yes, dear people, our law has been acknowledged and the International Court of 
Justice answered the questions ... the Sahara has never been "terra nullius" before 
the Spanish occupation ... It recognizes the existence of legal ties of sovereignty 
and allegiance between the kings of Morocco and the Sahara populations ... so 
there were legal ties and ties of allegiance ... Because the word allegiance is best 
suited to the period during which the Sahara was occupied ... the doors of the 
Sahara are legally open for us, everyone has recognized that the Sahara belongs 
to us since the dawn of time. so we have to occupy our territory7 (Portail Du Sud 
Marocain 16 October 1975). 
 
Thus, the King’s interpretation was grounded, not on the western conception of sovereignty and 
statehood, but on Islamic juridical tradition. This interpretation hinges on the use of ‘allegiance.’ 
“The act of allegiance made by subjects to the King was tantamount to a collective recognition 
that the king is the sovereign, the temporal leader whose legitimacy is at once hereditary and 
spiritual” (ICJ 2007, 2).  However, King Hasan II appeared to set aside the rest of the ICJ’s 
conclusions. Mauritania, for its part, agreed with the King’s sentiments as they had already 
colluded with Morocco to partition the Western Sahara. 
                                                
7 Translated from the French by the Dr. Maria Antonieta Gracia: “Effectivement, cher peuple, notre droit a été reconnu 
et la Cour internationale de justice a répondu aux questions …le Sahara n’a jamais été ‘terra nullius’ [belonging to no 
one] avant l’occupation espagnole…Elle reconnaît l’existence de liens juridiques de souveraineté et d’allégeance entre 
les Rois du Maroc et les populations du Sahara…Il y avait donc des liens juridiques et liens d’allégeance… Car le mot 
allégeance est le mieux adapté à la période au cours de laquelle le Sahara a été occupé… Les portes du Sahara nous 
sont juridiquement ouvertes, tout le monde a reconnu que le Sahara nous appartient depuis la nuit des temps. Il nous 
reste donc à occuper notre territoire.” Portail Du Sud Marocain, Discours de feu Sa Majesté Hassan II (Le 16 octobre 
1975 à Marrakech), accessed May 23, 2016, http://www.agencedusud.gov.ma/download/discours-SM-HassanII-75-
marrakech.pdf . 
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The ensuing conflict pitted the Moroccan Royal Armed Forces (FAR)8 and Mauritanian 
military against the military wing of the POLISARIO, the Ejército de Liberación Popular 
Saharaui (ELPS).9 The weaker Mauritanian military endured POLISARIO raids on their fragile 
iron ore mining facilities, attacks on their key Zerouate—Nouadhibou Railway line, and 
political/terror attacks in their capital, Nouakhchott, which damaged their mainly export-based 
economy. Even with French Air Force intervention, ethnic divisions, economic losses, and 
military setbacks led to the overthrow of the Mauritanian government by a military junta on 10 
July 1978 (Damis 1983, 86).  Mauritania withdrew from the Western Sahara after signing the 
Algiers Agreement with the POLISARIO Front on 5 August 1979 (Jensen 2005, 22).  With this 
agreement, Mauritania also renounced its claims to the Western Sahara and left Morocco as 
POLISARIO’s only antagonist. With military support from Algeria and Libya the ELPS managed 
to hold and, at times, take control of certain towns in the Western Sahara and southern Morocco 
until the construction of a massive sand berm was completed in 1987, which divided the land and 
brought the conflict to a stalemate.10 
 The Organization of African Unity (OAU), today reconstituted as the African Unity 
(AU), along with the UN had previously pressured Spain for decolonization of their possessions 
in Africa. The AU did not directly become involved until the war broke out between the 
POLISARIO Front and both Morocco and Mauritania in 1976. The AU unsuccessfully attempted 
to mediate and provide for a process of decolonization in 1979 and 1980 using a select Comité 
des Sages (Wise Men Committee) (Aggad and Toit Botha 2005, 70).  In 1982, the AU admitted 
                                                
8 Forces Armées Royales Marocaines. 
 
9 Translated into English as the Sahrawi People's Liberation Army or SPLA. It is considered to be the armed forces of 
the POLISARIO. 
 
10 In addition to construction of the sand berm by Morocco, the geo-political consequences brought about by the end of 
the Cold War (1989-1990) severely curtailed support for the POLISARIO Front. The disintegration of the Soviet Union 
in 1991 and the beginning of the Algerian Civil War with the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) diminished both 
diplomatic and direct military aid to the POLISARIO.  
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the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR)11 to its organization in response to Morocco’s 
inflexibility (Ohaegbulam 2002, 92). The SADR was formally seated at the AU Summit of 1984 
in Addis Ababa because of overwhelming support by member states, but the Kingdom of 
Morocco protested vehemently and became the only country to officially leave the continental 
organization that same year (Pazzanita 2006, 314). 
Since 1991, a cease-fire between the parties (Morocco and the POLISARIO) has been in 
place and is monitored by a UN mission called MINURSO.12 Direct UN intervention in 1990 
attempted to bridge the differences between the parties, and by 1991 the UN had resolved to 
organize a referendum13 over the territory’s future. Despite mediation efforts by several notable 
envoys appointed by the UN, the world organization has failed to reach an arrangement between 
the POLISARIO and Morocco that would allow for a referendum. Thus, instead of the 
referendum process clarifying the status of the region, the issue has become more contested and 
has opened the debate about who exactly is a true Sahrawi. Estimates of eligible Sahrawi voters 
have been muddled by Moroccan settlers in the Western Sahara and ‘Sahrawi’ who live in  
                                                
11 The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic was the government formed by the POLISARIO Front in 1976. Other 
notations define the SADR acronym as the ‘Saharan Arab Democratic Republic.’ In this study, the ‘S’ will be referred 
to as Sahrawi. 
 
12 MINURSO, Mission des Nations Unies pour l'Organisation d'un Référendum au Sahara Occidental (The United 
Nations Mission for the Organization of a Referendum in the Western Sahara), “was established by UN Security 
Council resolution 69 [sic] of 29 April 1991, in accordance with ‘the settlement proposals’, as accepted on 30 August 
1988 by Morocco and the” POLISARIO Front. “The Secretary-General's implementation plan, approved by the 
Security Council, provided for a transitional period during which the Special Representative of the Secretary-General 
would have sole and exclusive responsibility over all matters relating to a referendum in which the people of Western 
Sahara would choose between independence and integration with Morocco. The Special Representative would be 
assisted in his tasks by a deputy special representative and by an integrated group of United Nations civilian, military 
and police personnel, to be known as the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara.” United 
Nations, MINURSO—United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara: MINURSO Mandate, updated 
27 May 2016, originally accessed March 22, 2012, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minurso/mandate.shtml . 
 
13 Based on UN Resolution 621 (20 September 1988), UN Reports on The Situation Concerning the Western Sahara in 
S/21360 (18 June 1990), page 9, paragraph 23, stating that, “…a referendum will be organized in Western Sahara to 
enable the people of the Territory to decide their own future freely and democratically. The referendum will be 
organized and conducted by the United Nations, in cooperation with the OAU, during a transitional period,” and in 
S/22464 (19 April 1991), page 10, paragraph 37, it states that “the purpose of the referendum is to enable the people of 
Western Sahara to choose freely between integration with Morocco and independence.” 
	 9 
 
Map  1.1:  The  Western  Sahara  and  the  ‘Sand  Wall’ 14 
 
                                                
14 Map by United Nations, Geospatial Information Section: ICTD Department of Field Support, Western Sahara, Map 
No. 3175 Rev. 4, www.un.org, accessed May 27, 2016, http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/english/htmain.htm, 
October 2012. 
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southern Morocco.15  Morocco has stated that any decision on the fate of the Western Sahara must 
include those Sahrawi who live in southern Morocco; these former residents migrated after 
Moroccan independence in 1954. On the other hand, the POLISARIO suggests that guidelines for 
voter identification should be based on the last Spanish census of the region conducted in 1975. 
To reach any consensus on this issue, however, one has to reach beyond this question of 
‘eligibility’ and determine where the roots of Sahrawi national identity originate. As it stands, 
Morocco administers the area west of the sand berm (see map 1.1) and claims full rights to all of 
the Western Sahara, while the POLISARIO has access only to a sliver of the land east of the sand 
berm as well as the “camps” outside of Tindouf currently under the protection of Algeria. 
 
Academic Significance 
There is no debate that Sahrawi nationalism exists. It is evident in the POLISARIO’s pursuit of 
independence. There is, however, an implicit debate about the origins of their national identity. 
The international community has rarely been as divided over the claims to independence of a 
formerly colonized people. Contemporary scholarship has offered only but one solid account of 
the formation of Sahrawi national identity. By answering a series of subsidiary questions and 
ultimately the central question, this study will demonstrate the origins of Sahrawi identity. 
Answers to these questions will aid in understanding the origins of nationalism in post colonial 
states in general and the problematic stalemate in the Western Sahara in particular. 
First, this study will provide a detailed account of Sahrawi identity formation and how it 
has developed in intensity and scope. It will evaluate the claims that Sahrawi identity has existed 
                                                
15 Estimates vary. Freedom House states there are 567,000 (2015) and the CIA World Fact Book projections were 
570,866 (July 2013 est.). These estimates, however, include the whole of the population within the Western Sahara, 
with much of that demographic influx due to Moroccan immigration. These numbers do not include the Sahrawi 
refugee camps near Tindouf, Algeria. POLISARIO sources indicated that they harbored more than 165,000 (1980s) but 
the MINURSO mission had counted only about 150,000 eligible Sahrawi voters by 1998. United Nations, “MINURSO 
Background,” MINURSO, www.un.org/en/peacekeeping, originally accessed May 23, 2016.  
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minurso/background.shtml ,  
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from time and has been evident before the formal colonization of the Western Sahara. Second, 
this study traces the development of the Sahrawi debate from an implicit to an explicit 
conversation. Most formal studies have treated Sahrawi national identity in a constructed sense 
without any substantive explanations. These works either use the term “constructed” or assume 
that national identity has been synthesized through external (top-down) and internal (bottom-up) 
influences. 
Third, this study will render a clear understanding of the roots of the nationalist 
movement, to help forge a consensus in the international community about the validity of 
Sahrawi nationalism. It will outline the fundamental characteristics of Sahrawi national identity 
and will illustrate how the Sahrawi example correlates to the existing theoretical framework. The 
reader of this study will understand the different dimensions of national identity: primordial, 
instrumental, or constructed. This study may also narrow the distance between the conflicting 
parties and among interested international actors. Fourth, theoretical debates over the sources of 
nationalist movements will be able to use evidence from this case. To date, the case of the 
Sahrawi and the Western Sahara has not been analyzed along these lines. The use of these 
approaches demonstrates that there are varied sources that can establish the base of a nationality. 
 
Research Design 
To uncover the roots of Sahrawi national identity the theoretical framework has been structured 
around the three most prominent approaches to national identity: 1) primordialism, 2) 
instrumentalism, and 3) constructivism. These approaches offer alternative explanations to the 
rise of nations and nationalism. In this case, preliminary research for answers to the central 
question has resulted in four possible hypotheses. The four hypotheses below are derived from 
the three main approaches to national identity and from present scholarship. 
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 The first hypothesis argues that the Sahrawi are a distinct grouping of people separated 
from neighboring peoples by language, territory, and custom; the first two are ethnic 
characteristics, while the third is a cultural distinction. These distinctions set the Sahrawi apart 
from Moroccans and others. The POLISARIO seeks an independent state on behalf of this 
authentic national people. These distinctions are claimed to be socio-historically evident. This 
hypothesis is primarily derived from primordialism and presumes that the roots of Sahrawi 
identity are found deep in history. 
The second hypothesis claims that the Sahrawi struggle is an extension of anti-
colonialism. The Sahrawi rebellion (against French, Spanish, and Mauritanian intrusion), which 
was evident even before formal colonization, has evolved into a neo-anti-colonialist effort against 
Morocco. These socio-political and anti-colonial arguments support the establishment of a 
sovereign republic.   
 The third hypothesis has determined that foreign and domestic actors appropriated 
Saharan identity for their own purposes: prestige, political power, and practicality. This idea 
suggests that these actors gave rise to a Sahrawi identity and that in the absence of such actors no 
Sahrawi nation would have ever developed. However, because of the length of the study, the 
research will end in 1973, the year that the POLISARIO was established. This hypothesis is 
derived from instrumentalism. A fourth hypothesis is difficult to articulate since it is based on the 
idea of living freely—a purely ideological argument. Not very substantive, it would tend to be 
incorporated by the traditional views of resistance to foreign subjugation under the first 
hypothesis. 
These theories will aid in clarifying which hypothesis or hypotheses best explain the 
origins of Sahrawi national identity through a socio-historical methodology. In other words, the 
history of the Sahrawi will be chronologically outlined to produce a narrative of the Sahrawi, 
which will highlight the development of the nationalist movement from its ancient to pre-
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colonial, colonial, and post-colonial experiences. The choice for a segmented timeline is more 
appropriate because it would be difficult to insert topics of study within their extensive history. 
Thus, the project is divided as follows:  
Chapter One will present the problem, provide a brief background to the conflict, and 
explain its importance for studies in national identity and for scholars studying the origins of 
nations. This section contains a summary of the theoretical framework upon which the project is 
based and explains how the organization. Chapter Two details the theoretical structure that 
supports the research, namely describing the three approaches to national identity. After 
clarification of the theories for national identity, the three main hypotheses are expanded (from 
preliminary research), to spell out the possible origins of the Sahrawi nation. Thereafter, a 
literature review presents what past and current scholarship has demonstrated to be the roots of 
the Sahrawi nation. Consequently, I will make clear the theoretical gap(s) found among Sahrawi 
scholarship and the weaknesses that arise from this academic oversight. 
 Chapter Three analyzes ancient Sahrawi origins and assumes that Sahrawi history can be 
traced to the original Berber inhabitants) of North Africa prior to the takeover of the Spanish fort 
in Santa Cruz de Mar Pequeña (located in southwestern Morocco) by the Muslim army of the 
Sa’adian Dynasty in 1524. It traces the Berber lineage of the Sahrawi and provides glimpses into 
their cohesion and group development throughout this early period. Most of the analysis will 
draw on historical research of the region where evidence suggests that the early origins of 
Sahrawi identity may be based upon an ethno-cultural distinctiveness, as the first hypothesis 
suggests. Finally, the first (primordial-derived) hypothesis will be thoroughly investigated as it 
may only illuminate a sense of group cohesion for this one period and not answer the central 
question. Chapter Four focuses on the pre-colonial Sahrawi experience between 1524 and 1757. I 
will analyze the movements of the Sanhaja Berber and their involvement in the Shar Bouba War. 
I will research the territorial control by key figures during the Sa’adian and Alawite Dynasties 
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and the historical claims by Morocco to the territory of Western Sahara. In addition, my analysis 
will trace the origins of the Sahrawi in literature through library research at various Spanish State 
archives, including the Archivo General de la Administración in Alcalá de Henares and the 
Archivo Histórico Nacional (AHN) in Madrid, Spain.  The analysis in this chapter will evaluate 
whether the second (constructivist-derived) or perhaps third (instrumentalist-derived) hypotheses 
are more plausible reasons for identifying a national awakening in this period. 
 Chapters Five and Six involve library research as well as archival documentation 
conducted at the Archivo Histórico Nacional (AHN) and at the Biblioteca Nacional de España 
(BNE) in Madrid, Spain. Chapter Five evaluates the Sahrawi experience through 1758—1859. It 
features the Sultans of the period and their relationship with the foreign powers and actors 
‘outside’ their spheres of influence. It also introduces the ideas of boundaries (territorial and 
conceptual), literature, and ‘spiritual’ authority as markers of identity. In this section, I will be 
seeking documentation to establish the early frontiers of the Western Sahara. Chapter Six assesses 
the aggressive European encroachment by the Spanish and French and the reaction of the Sultans 
in the greater Western Sahara. This section describes the rise of several independent entities and 
assesses their link to the modern Sahrawi. I will search for the delineation of boundaries between 
the Kingdom of Morocco (under early French rule and later as an independent country) and the 
rest of the Saharan territory and attempt to discover the origins of Spanish and French boundary 
claims.  Were these claims conclusions based upon group identities or other political and 
economic reasons? Although hypothesis two and four (ideological argument) may provide the 
most obvious answers to the central question in this period, all hypotheses may be applicable. 
Chapter Seven examines the colonial period beginning in 1885 until the 1973. It will 
comment on the treaties settled by foreign powers and those agreements with the Sultan of 
Morocco. It will elaborate on European view of Morocco’s physical boundaries and interaction 
with other independent entities in the region. It will highlight the abundance of autonomous 
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groups that arose in the greater Western Sahara and if any of these independencies can be 
associated to the Sahrawi of today. The second, third and fourth hypotheses figure prominently in 
this last phase of the work. Finally, Chapter Eight assesses all four hypotheses for each period. 
The Chapter will add interviews16 with the representatives of the POLISARIO about their view 
about their origins. This section includes how well each hypothesis has fared and how they have 
answered the central question overall. A critical examination will then determine which ones 
answer the central question most effectively. This entire process establishes the usefulness of 
each theoretical approach, removes some of the weaknesses in analyzing Sahrawi national 
identity, and provides a better understanding of the Western Sahara conflict. Finally, this study 
hopes to lay a clearer, theoretical framework toward the study of any national movement today 
and hereafter and perhaps help break the stalemate in the Western Sahara. 
 
Delimitations 
One of the major obstacles faced in producing this study is the lack of sufficient literature on the 
topic of the Western Sahara. Most of the present day literature centers on the current events of the 
conflict evident in the CRS Reports (Migdalovitz 2006, 2008; Arieff 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014) or 
several UN documents dating back to 1964 (Pazzanita 2006, 421).  Other topics found on the 
Western Sahara involve the historical facts surrounding the conflict or the legal grounds and 
justifications for each party to the conflict. Discussions of Sahrawi nationalism are bountiful. Yet, 
among the small number of scholars who do detail Sahrawi nationalism, almost nothing is written 
about the approach taken for the study of the problem. The historical absence of a theoretical 
                                                
16 These questions asked what, in their opinion, are the roots of Sahrawi identity? What is to explain the rise of the 
Sahrawi nation? For those who may well deny that any such group actually exists, the same questions are pertinent but 
asked why they believe that such a national movement exists? What or how was it created? Being the most prolific of 
periods for the subject of the Western Sahara, ample information among articles, books, and UN documentation will be 
available. Interviews conducted by author with the assistance of Mohammed Omar, translator and guide, on 25 July 
(Madrid) and 11 November 2013 (New York), and 28 September through 02 October 2014 (Sahrawi ‘refugee’ camps 
in Rabouni and Smara, outside Tindouf, Algeria). 
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framework for this case presents the researcher with mapping problems. This study will offer new 
theoretical ground that may also be used in other case studies. 
 Literature on the Sahrawi is found in Arabic, English, French, and Spanish languages. 
The researcher is fluent in English and Spanish with a modest to a high degree of fluency in 
French. The literature in Spanish has proven to be valuable, but not without challenges. For 
example, investigating the archives in Spain includes not only deciphering the Spanish intentions 
of 200 to 300 years ago, but also navigating these documents solely with instructions and guides. 
French would be considerably more challenging at this level. 
 Third, as an investigator, it became evident that monetary resources to conduct interviews 
in Madrid, Algeria, Morocco, New York, and Washington, DC were stretched very far. The 
requests for interviews were many; the responses were few. In addition, the availability of many 
of the officials who responded did not often correspond to semester holidays or breaks in the 
teaching schedule. It was often difficult to schedule meetings, especially when locations were in 
distant countries. 
Finally, the security situation has dramatically changed since the fall of Qaddafi in Libya. 
Tuareg rebels in Libya joined the struggle against the Qaddafi government and were able to 
acquire and transport modern weaponry across the region to affiliate with Tuareg MNLA rebels 
in Mali. The conflict in Mali has subsided for the moment. It had, however, reportedly reached 
SADR territory where kidnapping of foreigners and recruiting of the young in its POLISARIO 
camps became a concern. The threat of militant Islamists has become more pronounced with the 
announcement of a reinvigorated AQIM and a new group in Morocco called Sham al-Islam 
(Crétois and Boudarham 2014; Roggio 2016). These threats did not deter the researcher from 
undertaking field work, but did influence travel arrangements and navigation of the region. 
 
 
  17 
Definitions of Key Terms 
I will make use of several terms in this study that have over time been interpreted in various ways 
and do not have clear definitions. Some of these definitions are modern concepts in the field of 
identity politics; a very recent subfield within international relations. Terms such as ethnicity, 
nation, nationality, and nationalism are all related to each other but have to be distinguished from 
each other to provide the reader with clarity and cohesiveness and to avoid conceptual confusion. 
“Ethnicity” is most commonly defined as that which pertains to or is affiliated with something 
‘ethnic.’ Ethnic by nature is generally associated with a certain social grouping and usually 
described in French as an “ethnie.” This grouping is defined “as a collectivity within a larger 
society having…[a] common ancestry, memories of a shared historical past, and a cultural focus 
[toward] one or more symbolic elements” (such as religious affiliation, language, tribal 
affiliation, or phenotypical features) (Hutchinson and Smith 1996, 6). In a separate work, Smith 
expands the meaning of ethnie to include the ethno-cultural characteristics or elements mentioned 
above as ones that are shared among these political communities (2002, 15).  In general, these 
political collectivities are considered ‘ethnic groups’ or ‘ethnic communities.’ 
A nation, however, is more than an ethnie. It is a socio-political collectivity, members of 
which, first, not only share ethnic or racial origins, but also possess those particular elements of 
the ethnie mentioned above (Op. cit., 15).  Secondly, this collectivity should not only possess a 
common economic life, a geographical location, a political base, but also a sense of common 
identity. The key to this definition resides not in the characteristic ingredients of nation, but in the 
use of the phrase, ‘a sense of common identity’ or belonging. Walker Connor has questioned the 
common international relations textbook definitions of nation because of their use of these 
ambiguous phrases for the social collectivesense of homogeneity, sense of belonging, feeling or 
even group intuition. Despite this criticism, even though a sense of or feelings of oneness can 
ultimately lead to broad interpretations, Connor emphasizes that what matters most “is not what is 
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but what people believe is” (Connor 1994, 93). Connor speaks of an intuitive conviction, which 
can give nations a psychological dimension, a feeling of common lineage. Third, and perhaps the 
most important difference between an ethnic group and nation, is that a nation has “the desire to 
control a territory that is thought of as the group’s national homeland” (Barrington 1997, 713).  
These beliefs define the composition of a group, a nation.  
These ‘unbreakable’ beliefs are not up for debate among the in-group. The value that is 
given to these objects of belief is transformed at the group level into shared perceptions of 
identity. These perceptions evolve into subjective particularities, namely those objects of belief 
that groups accept as realities (land, food, dress, history, language). These particularities are also 
recognized by those outside the in-group. There might be those among the in-group who do not 
recognize or simply decide to ignore these ‘collective’ notions. For example, Anderson has 
written, even among the in-group, there is no possible manner in which a member of such a 
socio-political entity can know “most of their fellow members,” in terms of desire and goals “yet 
in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (Anderson 2006, 6).  Whether or not 
these goals are initiated by the elite, the masses, or a combination of both, the goals for their 
political communities largely rely on the interpretation of these objects of belief. The author 
agrees that there are perceived ‘objective’ ethnic realities. As the group becomes larger, however, 
and the pursuits of such an entity become more wide-ranging in scope and degree, goals diverge. 
The difficulty in channeling, what was once viewed as objective, to the wider segment of the 
population, may become interpreted differently and consequently, far more subjective. 
This study agrees with Connor’s evaluation of the collective self-perception and 
acknowledges there is a degree of subjectivity to nationhood. However, this position underscores 
the need for a search for the source(s) of Sahrawi national identity, whether ambiguous or not. 
These are the notions that have to be discovered to begin to understand the nature of the conflict. 
This study further acknowledges that the concept of nation is associated with some type of 
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emotional attachment to those symbolic elements that are ethnic in origin: blood, language, and 
faith. Nation not only includes these ethnic elements but also expands them by adding domestic, 
political, and economic structures through the ‘sense’ of both common identity and “purpose: 
controlling the territory that members of the group believe to be theirs” (Barrington 1997, 713).  
A nation will not be equally associated with the term state. State implies a legally binding entity 
that has self-governing powers recognized by most global actors.17 It is evident that not all 
nations have self-governing powers. Some are subject to majority group powers, prefer a more 
cooperative structure with other nations, or are not recognized by global actors as legitimate 
political entities with which to collaborate with in formal diplomatic, economic, or socio-cultural 
terms. According to Connor, ethnic groups all self-differentiate themselves from other groups and 
are in fact already nations (Connor 1996, 40). 
National Identity is a complex term that can best be defined by asking what is its 
elemental composition. Smith summarizes that it is “composed of a number of interrelated 
components—ethnic, cultural, territorial, economic, and legal-political” (Smith 1991, 15).  These 
components fulfill the external and internal functions for groups and individuals. For instance, the 
territorial, economic, and legal-political dimensions serve as the external functions of groups. 
Groups search for ‘spaces’ within which to establish themselves as a cohesive society. They then 
seek the control of resources for their survival, and define the legal, structural framework for its 
individuals and lawmakers (ibid., 16).  Internally, the nation serves to socialize its ‘citizens’ 
through educational standards. National identity also provides for its members, common bonds 
via shared myths, symbols, and values. 
Finally, Smith adds that national identity “provides” for the individual a manner in which 
to place him/herself in the world by way of “collective personality” and “distinctive culture” 
(ibid., 17).  By understanding the external and internal dimensions of one’s shared culture, the 
                                                
17 Controversy exists with certain entities such as Palestine, Kosovo, Taiwan as they still have not been officially 
recognized by the major actors in the global arena such as China, Israel or in the case of Kosovo by Serbia. 
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individual discovers or becomes ‘self-aware’ of these associations. If an individual or social 
collective perceives a tie with other individuals or collectives because of certain common 
elements, then it ‘identifies’ itself with such groups of individuals. This identification process, in 
turn, creates conglomerates of individuals, groups, and social collectivities. These conglomerates 
may eventually constitute specific nations composed of common essential traits. Smith describes 
this as a “process of self-definition,” which is the ‘key’ to national identity (Smith 1991, 17).  
This key, the source of self-definition, pinpoints the time at which a group became self-defined, 
and the reasons why a group chose to self-define itself. This key is the most contentious issue 
among studies of nationalism. This study builds upon these definitions to determine the roots of 
national identity. It considers that both the internal and external dimensions of ‘self-
identification’ form integral parts of nationality. Thus, it is part of the ongoing conversation about 
national identity, and also as an important step in resolving the issue over the Western Sahara. 
 
The major objective of this study is to trace the origins of Sahrawi nationalism through 
the socio-historical analysis of the Sahrawi experience. It draws insights from all of the major 
theoretical approaches to nationalism in order to identify phenomena that should be explored. 
This three-fold theoretical framework will answer the central question by using, in historical 
order of origin, the three approaches to the study of national identity: primordialism, 
instrumentalism, and constructivism. Why choose these three? Certainly there have been other 
methods that have tried to explain the rise of nations. Perennialism, Ethno-symbolism, and other 
theories have attempted to seek the origins of nations and nationalism. Socio-economic, socio-
cultural, and ideological reasons are all part of this discussion. However, all these other theories 
and reasons are best understood and can best be placed in the first three approaches mentioned.  
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Primordialism 
Primordialism states that the origins of national identity are to be found in the distant past 
(historical). It holds that nations have existed at all times of human history and that modern ethnic 
groups have historical continuity into the far past. Nations, according to Armstrong, began when 
“ethnic identification” became “widespread” and “intense” in Mesopotamia. Their different 
attitudes towards territory and genealogy between sedentary agricultural populations and nomad 
groups also became prevalent (Armstrong 1982, 8, 21, 132).  Primordialism further states that 
national origins are an organic part of human development. National identity is found among the 
organic features of social existence. These cultural features are asserted to be part of the natural 
order and hence associated as natural ‘givens.’ These features are attached “to the ‘cultural 
givens’ of social existence” such as kin, race, language, and territory (Smith 2010, 56).  Finally, 
in more extreme versions, national origins are socio-biological extensions of the reproductive 
drives of individuals. (Van Den Berghe 1987) 
Primordialism locates the origins of nationality in the past, through kinship and in 
biological heritage. The participant perceives ethnic ties collectively, as an externally given, even 
coercive, social bond. In Shils’ study on primary groups, he found that, “modern society…is held 
together by an affinity of personal attachments, moral obligations in concrete contexts, 
professional and creative pride, individual ambition, primordial affinities and a civil sense which 
is low in many, high in some, and moderate in most persons” (Shils 1957, 131).  He concludes 
that these affinities to “another member of one’s kinship group is…because a certain ineffable 
significance is attributed to the tie of blood” (Shils, 142).  Geertz confirms this idea by adding 
that this tie is one that “stems from the ‘givens’…of social existence: immediate contiguity and 
kin connection...These congruities of blood, speech, custom, and so on seem to have an 
ineffable…coerciveness in and of themselves” (Geertz 1973, 259).  Personal attachments are the 
“ready-made set of endowments and identifications that every individual shares with others from 
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the moment of birth by the chance of the family into which he is born,” which Isaacs refers to as 
basic group identity (Isaacs 1975, 38).  Such attachments or affinities as “common territory of 
origin and residence, and biological connection,” entail beliefs about these cultural objects that 
transform them into (primordial) givens (Grosby 1996, 54).  The primordial givens or ‘objects’ of 
“family, the locality, and one’s own people,” are considered sacred because they “bear, transmit, 
and protect life” (Grosby, 1996, 56).  This, Grosby states, is why “human beings sacrifice their 
lives and continue to sacrifice their lives for their own family and for their own nation” (1996, 
54).  Primordialism then is the approach that recognizes specific and essential objects (blood, 
place, and language) that bind one to another and form the group. In a sense, extending these 
principal items creates a nation. 
 Yet, the origins of the theory did not begin with Shils, Isaacs, or Geertz. The main thrust 
of the conceptual approach was attributed to the works of Fichte (1762—1814) and Herder 
(1744—1803), and their ideals of German Romanticism. They believed that the most powerful 
characteristic in forging a nation was language. The primordialist version of nationality was given 
much more weight beginning with the French revolution. The nineteenth century saw European 
nationalist revolts, leading to and culminating with both world wars. However, the ideological 
conflict of the Cold War between the principles of democratic republicanism and communism 
began to marginalize nationalism. American pluralist ideology sought to convert all immigrant 
nationalities into ‘American’; communism would simply eliminate national identity altogether. 
The polarity of these views led to the decline of the primordialist interpretation. Decolonization in 
the late 1950s and 1960s brought a confluence of multinational states and instrumentalists argued 
that their creations were a product of power manipulation and resource consolidation by elitist 
groups. By the 1980s, modernists had largely discredited primordialism and absorbed 
instrumentalism. They developed a more eclectic approach to the study of national identity. 
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 Still, the end of the Cold War compelled academic scholarship to revisit primordialism to 
explain how the Soviet Union had crumbled into fifteen separate republics and why Yugoslavia 
had, in fact, several nations within its boundaries. Authors such as Smith, Kaufmann, Connor, and 
Armstrong have revitalized primordialism and relabeled it as ethno-symbolism or neo-
traditionalism. While ethno-symbolism agrees with the modernist analysis of nations as “active, 
purposive sociological communities embedded in particular historical epochs,” it tends to re-
emphasize the bond that ethnic identity and community has to the “formation” and “persistence” 
of nations (Smith 2009, 21).  Smith, the scholar who developed ethno-symbolism, states that, 
“although nations may be partly forged by political institutions, over the long term they require 
ethno-cultural resources to create a solidary community… We need to understand the often-
complex interplay between elites and various sections of the wider population whom they may 
seek to mobilize in terms of symbols, myths and memories that resonate with them” (ibid.).  
Despite these labels, I will continue to use the term primordialism, as it tends to reinvigorate old 
arguments, but in a new light. There is need, therefore, to pursue Sahrawi symbols, myths, and 
memories, rather than to rely only on first-degree explanations for primordialism, such as 
language, territory, and history. As noted above, there have been no real primordialist accounts of 
the Sahrawi national identity question, and this perspective needs to be examined for a proper 
interpretation of the rise of the Sahrawi nation. 
The primordial line of thinking has largely been neglected in delineating Sahrawi 
mobilization. POLISARIO and Sahrawi activists contend that Sahrawi identity is more essential 
than has been recognized. It originates from much earlier in history and can be traced through 
genealogy, ancient territorial affiliation, and tradition. Certain Sahrawi poets and writers-turned 
activists are utilizing literature to argue implicitly for a more primordial origin of Sahrawi 
identity. Furthermore, over the last two decades, a re-fashioning of primordialism by scholars 
such as Smith, Connor, Spear, and Huntington and revolutionary events such as the end of the 
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Cold War have reinvigorated their arguments and warrant a renewed look at the case of the 
Western Sahara. Primordialism may have as much value for the case as either instrumentalism or 
constructivism. Despite the claims, I question the degree to which Sahrawi activism relies on 
primordial justification. Still, the lack of a primordialist interpretation of Sahrawi identity leaves 
their case incomplete and in need of a more complete review of its origins. 
 
Instrumentalism 
Within the field of political science, instrumentalism began with discussions of ethnicity rather 
than over national identity, and primarily as a critique to primordialism. Primordialism was 
criticized for being too broad an approach to nation-building due to the complexities and 
dynamics of political, economic, and social hybridization. In addition, the ethnic characteristics of 
a nation described above were being viewed as subjective features and not ‘givens,’ or objective 
cultural attributes.  In the 1960s and 1970s, the debates arose in the context of how best to order 
society with the rise of multinational states in Africa and Asia after decolonization. Smith 
describes how, even in the United States, a debate had emerged between Glazer/Moynihan and 
Herberg over the role that ethnic identity had played in the formation of American society.18 
While Herberg wrote about the creation of an American melting pot via Protestant, Catholic, and 
Jewish groups, Glazer and Moynihan showed how “the various ethnic groups of New York 
adapted to an American lifestyle” (Smith 2000, 55).  This discussion fueled debate about what 
degree ethnic groups forge the formation of local communities, and whether these groups “should 
be seen as interest or pressure groups behaving instrumentally in the marketplace” (Smith 2000, 
55). 
                                                
18 See Will Herberg, Protestant, Catholic, Jew: An Essay in American Religious Sociology, (University of Chicago 
Press: Chicago), 1955 and Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan, Beyond the Melting Pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, 
Jews, Italians, and Irish of New York City Second Edition (The MIT Press: Harvard, 1963). 
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 These issues later became prominent among academic discussions of the ‘genesis of 
nations.’  In an often referenced debate, in 1979, Brass and Robinson applied this approach in 
attempting to explain the formation of Pakistan. Brass wrote that the creation of nations is a type 
of identity formation “defined as the process of identifying the subjective meanings of a 
multiplicity of symbols…to give subjective and symbolic meanings to merely objective 
distinctions between peoples”19 (Brass 1991, 20). He believed that these elements, language, 
religion, kinship, and homeland, are variable, can be multiple, or irrelevant and therefore 
subjective.20 Brass concluded that, “nation formation is the process by which elites and counter-
elites within ethnic groups select aspects of the group’s culture, attach new value and meaning to 
them, and use them as symbols to mobilize the group, to defend its interest, and to compete with 
other groups” (1991, 75).  Brass disagreed with the assumption “that distinct primordial groups in 
society are sufficient to predict the future development of ethnic communities or nations” and 
may be of no use “in predicting either the development or the form of ethnic movements” (1991, 
72-73).  Robinson generally agreed with Brass’ view, but in reverse, by arguing that Muslim 
elites in north India and the Bengal region drew from select cultural distinctions and the ideology 
of the umma by applying to them symbolic meaning in order to safeguard their Islamic heritage, 
resulting in the independent state of Pakistan (Smith 2000, 22). 
Instrumentalists also argue that the elements noted above are given non-rational or even 
irrational meanings. Thus, instrumentalists seek more rational explanations to nationalist 
mobilization. They seek the roots of national identity from its political and economic 
environment. Ethnic leaders and elites will use “their cultural groups as sites of mass mobilization 
and as constituencies in their competition for power and resources” (Smith 2010, 59).  Hence, 
                                                
19 The full quote includes, “and of striving to achieve multi-symbol congruence among a group of people defined 
initially by one or more central symbols, whether these symbols are ethnic attributes or loyalty to a particular state,” but 
has been purposely omitted for reasons of space. Brass 1991, 20. 
 
20 For instance, an individual can speak more than one language or convert from one faith to another. 
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“the political process determines the character of ethnicity and its role in the polity” (Robertson 
1997, 267).  This led to Brass’ conclusion that “a nation therefore is an ethnic community 
politicized” (Brass 1991, 20).  Furthermore, this politicization follows Barrington’s definition 
associating a nation with its belief in the right to territorial self-determination (Barrington 1997, 
73).  In brief, instrumentalism treats national identity primarily as an ad hoc element of political 
strategy, used as a resource for interest groups or one created “for elites in competition” for 
achieving secondary goals, for instance, an increase in political power and economic advantage 
(Brass 1991, 15).  In this sense, Brass regards nationality, in large part, as the study of politically 
induced cultural change (ibid., 75).  Breuilly expands on this view by declaring that nationalism 
can only be understood as a ‘form of politics,’ “as the expression of national consciousness, as a 
political doctrine elaborated by intellectuals” (Breuilly 1994, 1). 
 Instrumentalists critique primordialism for its objectification of cultural attributes for 
group identification, and in contrast, interpret them to be more subjective than objective in nature. 
Thus, instrumentalists will seek more rational or objective criteria for explaining the rise of 
nations. In this case, instrumentalism, which has been only informally used, suffers from a lack of 
in-depth application, or has been poorly articulated in explaining Sahrawi mobilization. For 
example, Moroccan authorities often state that the POLISARIO has manufactured Sahrawi 
national identity out of whole cloth and fully reject the notion of a Sahrawi nation. At the other 
extreme, it is doubtful that all Sahrawi still continue to regard POLISARIO leaders as their chief 
spokesmen for independence. Even if these claims were true, accepting the argument that such an 
elite group (or other such interest groups) has ‘managed’ the movement (for its own political 
reasons) may not alone answer the central question. Instrumentalist arguments are neither clear, 
nor fully explored. 
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Constructivism 
Constructivism rejects that nationality or even ethnicity is the essential human condition but 
rather approaches the study of nationalities as products of human social interaction, that is, 
socialization and historical forces. Smith writes that nations are viewed as a combination of 
cultural artifacts and social constructs. Elites fashion these artifacts by representing the past, 
upholding the importance of identity, and promoting them through cultural media and social 
ritual, a method of social engineering (Smith in 2000, 52 and 2001, 79).  This socialization is 
realized by way of political processes, normally labeled as ethnopolitics. However, ethnopolitics 
can vary in degree and depth because of “the structure of societies, and the political and economic 
institutions embedded in them, which limit and empower individual human agents who act to 
create ethnopolitics” (Robertson 1997, 268).  Consequently, constructivism is regarded as the 
“conjunction of [these] social processes and political action that creates opportunities for leaders 
to use nationalism and the incentives for followers to support nationalism” (Robertson 1997, 
274).  Ultimately then, one of the primary tenets of social constructivism is the assumption “that 
nationalism created and continues to create nations, rather than the opposite” (Smith 2000, 52.) 
Alexander Wendt introduced constructivism in the field of international relations and 
advocated that rather than explaining world politics through its epistemological assumptions, one 
should understand it through ontological eyes by asking, “what is it made up of or how is it 
structured” (Wendt 1999, 370).  Wendt summarized his “ontology of international life…[as] 
‘social’ in the sense that it is through ideas that states ultimately relate to one another, and 
‘constructionist’ in the sense that these ideas help define who and what states are” (Wendt 1999, 
372). In the subfield of national identity, his approach has been extended to the question of 
nations. Although modern scholarship has largely been credited for elaborating and articulating 
the constructivist approach, the origins of constructivism can be traced to the works of Herder, 
Renan, and Max Weber. Though Herder was previously mentioned when describing 
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primordialism, Ergang explains that he also saw “nationality as a product of nature and its growth 
as regulated by the laws of nature,” where nature “was the great architect who planned and 
constructed the group” (Ergang 1966, 95).  Herder believed that certain social (as opposed to 
natural) factors (education, physical environment, intermarriage, and tradition) influenced the 
national soul (Ergang, 112). Weber wrote that “naked prestige of ‘power’” transforms direct and 
material imperialist and ideological interests into the idea of the nation (Gerth and Mills 1946, 
172).  Although Weber mentions that language is the primary cultural element in the formation of 
national sentiment, he states that it is not a sufficient criterion for the creation of a nation. Instead, 
Weber treats nation as those “groups of men” exacting “a specific sentiment of solidarity in the 
face of other groups (ibid.).  National identity may be connected with ethnic elements but it may 
also, “above all, “be linked to the memories of a common political destiny” (ibid., 173).  Here 
then, one finds early writings attributing national identity to the product of both primordial 
(linguistic and natural) and instrumental (interests and power) elements. 
Thus, constructivism can be viewed as a hybrid approach to the study of national identity 
because it seeks its origins in both objective and subjective features. Renan had stated that a 
nation consisted on the one hand of, “the possession in common of a rich legacy of memories; the 
other [one] is the actual consent, the desire to live together, the will to continue to value the 
heritage which all hold in common”21 (Conference at the Sorbonne, March 11, 1882).  Scholars 
such as Hobsbawm (in his later writings) and Robertson have concluded that this approach is a 
fusion of the primordial and instrumental theories of national identity. Hobsbawm wrote that 
nations are “constructed essentially from above” but they “cannot be understood” without being 
                                                
21 Ernest Renan, “Qu’est-ce qu’Une Nation?,” Conférence Fait en Sorbonne, Le 11 Mars  1882, Deuxième Edition, 
(Paris: Calmann Levy, 1882), 23. “L'une est la possession en commun d'un riche legs de souvenirs; l'autre est le 
consentement actuel, le désir de vivre ensemble, la volonté de continuer à faire valoir l'héritage qu'on a reçu indivis.” 
Taken from John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 17, 
trans. Ida Mae Snyder. Original English translation used ‘remembrances’ instead of memories. Here, I will use 
memories as an easier, more palatable term. Memories are understood as an objective (or rational) feature while the 
will or consent to live together is a group characteristic that is dependent on subjective and non-- or irrational ones. 
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“analyzed from below” (Hobsbawm 1990, 10).  Robertson concurs, arguing that national 
mobilization is a “combination of a top-down political movement with the process of bottom-up 
social mobility”22 (Robertson 1997, 274). Anderson, in his most quoted of phrases, declared that a 
nation is imagined as a limited (because it has finite boundaries) sovereign (born in the Age of 
Enlightenment and revolution) community (conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship): “it is 
an imagined political community” (1983, 17, 19).  According to constructivists, the roots of 
national identity lie with the instruments of social control and they emphasize that nations are 
culturally engineered, constructed from ‘invented traditions’ (Hobsbawm) or are ‘imagined 
communities’ (Anderson). In general, then, constructivists search for such ‘inventions’ among the 
social instruments of ‘national’ education (and the retelling of its national history), in public 
ceremonies, monuments, and speeches, and religious iconography (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). 
If constructivism is a fusion of primordialism and instrumentalism, why then pursue any 
other framework for seeking the origins of Sahrawi national identity? Preliminary research has 
found that concentration on constructivism, as defined above, used often to explain the origins of 
Sahrawi national identity, has marginalized, with heavy critique, the other two approaches to 
national identity. Scholarship of the Western Sahara problem is dominated by this very 
contemporary view. It is rooted in the works of Kedourie, Gellner, Anderson, and Eriksen. If such 
a theoretical merger is sufficient, why have bottom-up and top-down examples of this fusion not 
been more readily evident in the literature? Even though there are several competing authors 
within the constructivist line of thinking, many only refer to this notion via popular constructivist 
terminology without adequately elaborating these “traditions,” “imaginations,” or social 
constructions. Sahrawi national identity and its origins, if it is rooted upon such social 
constructions, is certainly in need of a clearer understanding of these indications of synthesis. 
 
                                                
22 Robertson is actually describing nationalism with this quote. 
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 In summary, it is necessary to employ all these approaches to understand the origins of 
Sahrawi national identity. Since most explanations for the rise of the Sahrawi nation rely on 
constructivist ideas, it is apparent that such predominance is a weakness in the literature on the 
subject of the Western Sahara. Croucher wrote, at the beginning of her review of the ethnic 
conglomeration of Miami, that she would use all of the available tools in order to explain the 
“origins and processes that construct competing narratives and show how they change over time” 
(1997, 21).  I will follow this same route, not because these explanatory tools are available, but 
because academic study concerning the origins of Sahrawi national identity suffers from an 
inherently one-sided theoretical approach. Although constructivist notions of national identity 
will be applied, instrumentalist and ‘rekindled’ primordialist explanations are also employed to 
make the Sahrawi socio-cultural and geo-political past and present more clear. Utilizing all three 
approaches will explain when Sahrawi national identity originated and equip us with a better 
understanding of the Sahrawi and their pursuit of independence for the Western Sahara. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter will evaluate sources that deal first with the history of the region and its 
early inhabitants.  This section will include subheadings that deal with ancient, medieval, and the 
colonial period of the region touching upon how these sources viewed the population in the 
northwest Sahara. Next, it will review the literature that outlines how scholars view the Sahrawi 
as a nation. This includes the varying interpretations on how the Sahrawi have come to be, in 
terms of achieving a distinct national identity. A smaller subsection will attempt to divide such 
interpretations by the various scholars into the three approaches of national identity: 
primordialism, instrumentalism, and constructivism. The study will not include other material that 
involves the current political situation that speaks of current foreign (i.e., UN, AU, U.S., and 
France) or domestic (Morocco, Polisario) policies taken by the various actors on the Western 
Sahara unless it is directly related to the study. 
One of the weaknesses of Sahrawi scholarship has been the surprisingly small number of 
studies surrounding the problem, especially from American scholars. Most scholars that write 
about the Maghreb will not cross Arab political sensitivities. The Arab world, for the most part, 
has treated its minorities, not as co-equals, but as second-class citizens. Also, much of the 
academic discussion about the Arab world has been dwarfed by the Israeli-Palestinian issue and 
the surrounding security concerns stemming from the conflict for its neighbors. The recent and 
current Iraqi Wars, the present civil conflicts in Syria, Yemen, and Libya dominate Near East 
news media and scholarly research. Moreover, these conflicts, largely as a result of the 2011 Arab 
uprisings across the Middle East and North Africa have diverted attention from the Sahrawi 
problem and channeled it toward the domestic and political group divisions among Arab states. 
Despite the marginalization of the Western Sahara issue and the plight of the Sahrawi, these 
conflicts across the Middle East have highlighted the ethnic, religious, and racial divisions that 
plague the region. These groupings are present in Syria among Alawi, Kurd, Sunni, and even 
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Christian faiths; in Libya as territorial and tribal divisions among the areas of the Fezzan, 
Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and the Tuaregs; and in Algeria between Kabylie (Berber) and Arab. In 
addition, as this study will show, Arab predominance in northwest North Africa is also subject to 
ethno-linguistic divides between Arab, Berber, and Sahrawi23. However, the mere mention of 
another possible ‘nation’ arising within Morocco’s historical territory is contrary to Moroccan 
mentality. 
The subject of the Western Sahara is one that has not captivated many scholars for 
several reasons. Academic study about the region is weak; acquiring previous studies is 
challenging. In fact, North Africa as a region, with the Sahara to its south and the Sahel even 
further to the south, creates a geographic barrier that divides the ‘black’ or sub-Saharan Africa 
and its north.  This divide not only separates Africa socio-culturally, but also geo-politically, and 
leaves North Africa desolate, minimally populated, insignificant for study. The same can be said 
of northwest Africa the location of Western Sahara. Moreover, there has been very little 
archaeological investigation due to the conflict between Morocco and the POLISARIO and 
bureaucratic impediments for scientific study by both Algeria and Morocco. The inhospitable and 
barren nature of the land, not just in Western Sahara, but also further inland, across the whole of 
the Sahara, has stifled geo-political relevance for the region.24 There is very little protection for 
military basing (extreme temperature fluctuations and sandstorms can quickly destroy armament 
and weaponry. Camouflage is difficult. Accommodating soldiers in an inhospitable land is 
difficult). In addition, this area has no significant value since it is neither (at the moment) rich in 
valuable resources nor is it ideal for long-term investments of any kind—commercial, 
agricultural, or military. 
                                                
23 Sahrawi is actually translated as Saharan in Arabic 
 
24 An exception would be entry and maintenance of the Straits of Gibraltar, which is an important waterway for 
navigation and commerce. 
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The conflict between Morocco and the POLISARIO has become so polarized that it is 
increasingly difficult to conduct an objective investigation. The Kingdom of Morocco is opposed 
to any ‘homeland’ for the Sahrawi because it does believe that an argument exists for such an 
entity. Moreover, it characterizes those who oppose to the Kingdom and support the POLISARIO 
as ‘separatists’ rather than as nationalists. Morocco and the U.S. Department of State characterize 
the conflict as a political problem rather than an ethno-nationalist issue25. On the other hand, the 
POLISARIO claims that the Western Sahara is the rightful territory of the ‘Sahrawi’ and 
therefore continues to struggle for its independence. A small amount of compromise between the 
two parties has resulted in a stalemate that has lasted at least twenty-five years. Disagreement 
arises from the identification of a ‘true’ Sahrawi. Thus, most of the literature either supports one 
side or the other. Academic study that advances a middle ground is difficult to find unless it is 
documenting plans for the long awaited (and possibly never-to-be determined) Western Sahara 
referendum. 
The conflict has exacerbated Western Saharan isolation, limiting thorough studies of any 
kind after Spanish colonization. First, the POLISARIO insists there will be no oil exploration off 
the coast of the Western Sahara (or inland) pending resolution of the territory. Second, the 
Kingdom of Morocco has placed obstacles, both physical (Kingdom of Morocco’s length-wide 
sand berm) and procedural (requests to visit for research bog down into lengthy periods of 
‘review’)26. Foreign visitor movements require ‘monitoring.’ These impediments have dissuaded 
                                                
25 Based on discussions with the U.S. Deputy Chief of Mission and other local nationals working inside the U.S. 
Embassy in Rabat during my time as a U.S. State Department political intern in October—December of 2012. 
 
26 The author initially requested a visit to the Kingdom of Morocco in order to conduct research on the topic of Sahrawi 
national identity 02 January 2014. This request was sent twice. A reply arrived 20 January 2014. Email communication 
continued through February, including notification that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and Cooperation 
would provide the author with an itinerary that would include a trip to the Western Sahara and interviews with NGOs, 
academics, and ministers of government. However, via email on 24 March 2014, the Deputy Delegate to H.M. M’barka 
Bouaida, Khaoula El-Kasmi, stated that a few formalities were needed in order to have the research request approved. 
These formalities included a formal request to the Moroccan Embassy in Washington, DC, thesis statement, and a letter 
of reference from the university. All documents were sent via email two days later. A reply, on June 6, stated that “a 
request to establish a program of your visit to Morocco has been sent to our Ministry and we are waiting for their reply” 
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scholars and investigative journalists alike.27 Literature written about Western Sahara includes 
such topics as the women in the SADR camps, the refugee status of the Sahrawi, the structure of 
the SADR, the history of the region, the issue over the referendum, and of course, since 1975, 
descriptions of the most recent events in the conflict. Yet, despite these accounts, English 
language study of the situation has been overtaken by other, more prominent issues in the Middle 
East or on the continent of Africa28. A third problem with study of the conflict over Western 
Sahara has been the low level of interest among American scholars compared to European 
academic research. European scholarship tends to be predominately written in Spanish or French, 
leaving the unilingual American or British researcher at a disadvantage. There is literature about 
the subject in Arabic but even the author cannot identify how much has been written because of 
his inadequate and very basic understanding of Arabic. 
Yet, despite the limitations to the study of the subject, the author has uncovered an 
abundance of (hard-to-find) literature. Although there have been significant writings about 
Sahrawi nationalism and the origins of their national identity, this kind of information will 
occupy less than a half a bookcase shelf in any library. English-only researchers need not be 
disappointed at the relatively low numbers of books on the Sahrawi or the Western Sahara. This 
dissertation will provide an impetus to widening and enhancing not only the study of the Sahrawi, 
but also other such groups, who identify themselves as autonomous nationalities. In fact, the 
author feels that there is much more information about the Western Sahara and Sahrawi national 
                                                                                                                                            
(However, this reply was prompted by another email sent to the MOFA two days prior asking for one last opportunity 
for a research visit). Today, 26 August 2016, there has still been no reply. 
 
27 In fact, the author has been dissuaded from applying for certain fellowships because of the politically sensitive nature 
of the conflict. 
 
28 A recent Amazon search of new, in stock, twenty-first century titles in English produced 262 books on the ‘Arab 
Spring,’ while the same criteria applied for the Western Sahara that began forty years ago resulted in only 107 books. 
Another comparison can be made at the Library of Congress, where an online catalog search with the words ‘Arab 
Spring’ and ‘Western Sahara’ as a phrase gave 137 for the former and 119 for the latter. 40 years of conflict has been 
surpassed by the study of the five-year-old ‘Arab Spring.’ 
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identity, which can be found through un-translated Arabic sources and may be in other untapped 
African or European sources. Below, I will introduce several of the most important works about 
Sahrawi national identity and classify each under one of the three main approaches to 
nationalism. 
 
Theoretical Research 
Not only has the terminological use of “nation” evolved, but the methodological approaches to 
the study of nationalism have also changed over time. These approaches have created 
substantially more ideas as to how nationalism is interpreted. These approaches can be 
categorized into three main branches: 1) primordialism, 2) instrumentalism, and 3) 
constructivism. This triangular approach is not one that is readily accepted among academic 
scholars. For example, Phillip Khoury, has written that the “[u]nderstandings of a nation 
generally adhere to one of two schools: ‘primordialist’ and ‘modernist’” (2011, 13).  In fact, he 
further states that, “the primordialist approach is little adhered to anymore in scholarship or 
intellectual circles” (ibid., 13).  Khoury, in his comparison of Palestinian and Sahrawi nationalism 
states that the “modernist, or ‘constructivist’ approach…is both accepted and important for 
contextualizing the UN’s legitimation of nationalisms” (ibid., 13). He believes that these types of 
theories are ‘concurrent’ with “understanding nationalism as a modern political project in which 
nations are constructed, not given a priori.” (ibid.).  For example, he prefers to follow the line of 
thinking by Ernest Renan in describing nation building as a ‘spiritual’ project rather than one 
based on common features such as race, language, religion, or even geography (ibid.). For the 
most part, this statement is true.  
However, despite Khoury’s interpretation of Anthony Smith’s reformulation of 
primordialism into a more constructivist approach, academic scholarship usually slights the 
beliefs of those who are actually in the process of establishing their national identity. Those 
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members, who compose a ‘polis’ or political community, rarely, if ever, question how they have 
‘become’ a nation, how their claims to a national identity were “based upon certain shared ethnic 
and cultural characteristics” (ibid., 14).  Instead, these groups understand that their origins are tied 
to features that they believe are inviolable, have been eternally theirs, and reach deep in the 
past—a set known, perhaps not to others (in academia), but made absolute by observation unto 
them. Thus, despite Khoury’s misgivings about primordialism, it still clarifies a very important 
component of national identity. It is imperative to include these primordial works in such a 
literature review. Khoury does provide for a very good discussion of the modernist 
(constructivist) ‘conception’ of statehood of Sahrawi and Moroccan identity. 
One interesting West Saharan-Moroccan issue that exemplifies the primordial—
constructivist debate concerns the current stalemate over who is a Sahrawi. Perhaps the biggest 
matter of contention is deciding who is eligible for voting in this yet-to-be determined 
referendum. For instance, the Kingdom of Morocco has supported a policy of jus sanguinis (right 
of blood) in addition to “members of Sahrawi tribes with links to the territory (of the Western 
Sahara)” (Jensen 2012, 1). According to the POLISARIO, eligibility should be limited to jus soli 
(right of the soil) and closely parallel the Spanish national census of 1974. In 1991, after several 
broken cease-fires and informal talks, Morocco and the POLISARIO approved a UN settlement 
plan. At this time, an informal cease-fire has become permanent and both sides have sought a 
non-violent resolution.  The POLISARIO, in a surprise move meant to isolate and pressure 
Morocco, accepted James Baker’s 2003 Peace Plan, but Morocco rejected it.29 Thereafter, 
consensus to resolve the problem has been difficult. Consequently, Morocco has brought forth its 
own initiative of autonomy for the Western Sahara.30  
 
                                                
29 Peace Plan for Self-Determination of the People of Western Sahara, May 23 2003. Pazzanita, s.v., “Chronology,” xl. 
 
30 This initiative brought forth by the Kingdom of Morocco as the Autonomy Plan for the Western Sahara was 
presented to the UN in April 2007. 
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The  Primordial  Literature 
The works classified under this heading will be those who have theorized or through the 
empirical research, either explicitly or implicitly, that Sahrawi national identity is found through 
primordial arguments. To reiterate, primordialism states that national identity is rooted or can be 
found in the past, through kinship and biological heritage. Members perceive to have an ethnic 
tie, either from others (externally) or from the in-group (coercively), and in this sense form a 
distinct group—even a distinct nation. These affective ties are generated from ethnic 
characteristics, such as language (Johann Herder) and territory. Although the post-modern 
worldview would argue that the socio-political environment and other interests have created these 
nationalities, Anthony D. Smith emphasizes that these groups still necessitate ethno-cultural 
assets to create unitary communities. 
In Shil’s study on primary groups, he found that, “modern society…is held together by an 
affinity of personal attachments, moral obligations in concrete contexts, professional and creative 
pride, individual ambition, primordial affinities and a civil sense which is low in many, high in 
some, and moderate in most persons” (1957, 131).  He concludes that these primordial affinities 
or attachments to “another member of one’s kinship group is…because [of] a certain ineffable 
significance is attributed to the tie of blood” (Shils 1957, 142).  Clifford Geertz attributes this tie 
to one that “stems from the ‘givens’…of social existence: immediate contiguity and kin 
connection...These congruities of blood, speech, custom, and so on seem to have an 
ineffable…coerciveness in and of themselves” (Geertz 1973, 259).  The primordial givens or 
‘objects’ of “family, the locality, and one’s own people,” are considered sacred because they 
“bear, transmit, and protect life” (Grosby, 1996, 56).  This is one of the reasons why Steven 
Grosby states, “human beings sacrifice their lives and continue to sacrifice their lives for their 
own family and for their own nation” (1996, 54).  These essential objects — “common territory 
of origin and residence, and biological connection” — entail beliefs about these objects that 
  39 
transform them into (primordial) attachments (Grosby 1996, 54)].  These attachments or ties are 
the “ready-made set of endowments and identifications that every individual shares with others 
from the moment of birth by the chance of the family into which he is born” that Harold Isaacs 
calls basic group identity (Isaacs 1975, 38).  Primordialism then is that concept that qualifies 
specific and essential objects (birth, place, language) that bind one to another—forming the group 
and, in this sense, extending these principal items to a nation. 
Another form of primordialism, ‘soft primordialism,’ advanced by Anthony D. Smith, 
suggests that in order to understand ethnicity, one must “pay more attention to the subjective 
elements [ethnic memories, values, symbols, myths and traditions] in ethnic survival” (Smith 
1999, 130).  Moreover, these ethno-symbols “unite and inspire the members of an ethnic 
community over several generations” (Smith 1999, 130).  Yet, such a formulation of an ethnic 
nation is not natural but ever changing. This leads to a subset of primordialism described as 
“perennialism.” This modified primordial view holds that those groups that have been able to 
‘cultivate’ a mythic election via these national symbols “succeed” in “prolonging the specific 
collective life of their members over many generations” (Smith 1999, 130). 
Within nomadic groups, the primary attachment to the leading clans or families, even 
after they became sedentary, would be retained through ‘genealogical myth’ (Armstrong 1982, 
51).  The bonds of clan or family and territory via symbols (nostalgia, myth) were reinforced by 
“ancient polities and ecclesiastical” structures, which defined ethnic boundaries and thereby left 
an indelible mark on a (national) identity consciousness. John Armstrong explains that among 
sedentary populations, nostalgia became a “strong symbolic device” that transmitted attitudes, 
which were directed toward territorial attachments (1982, 50-51).  These ethnic formulations 
transcend time, extend over centuries or even millennia (continuous perennialism) but may 
fluctuate with importance and dominance or perhaps even disappear altogether (recurrent 
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perennialism31) but the “phenomenon itself is universal” (Smith 2000, 34-35).  There are certain 
Sahrawi symbols or objects, such as poetry, ancient historical stories or myths, and ties to old 
lineages promote the ethnic nationalist argument. In one sense, the question of Western Sahara 
identity suffers from an almost complete disregard of the primordialist application because of its 
decline in academia. Primordialism had been resurrected due to the past geo-political 
environment but continues to wane in this new century. In another sense, primordialism has not 
been relevant among North African scholars because of the biases in French and Arab 
scholarship, which take the side of Morocco and reflect their political and Arab nationalistic 
sensitivities. Those authors who have supported the Sahrawi right to independence usually have 
writings grounded in legalistic, political, and human rights terms. 
Only a certain few scholars, for instance Faten Aggad and Pierre du Toit Botha, have 
recorded some sort of perennial affinity, a subset of primordialism, within the Sahrawi narrative 
by pointing to territorial treaties32 that linked Western Saharan lands, and legitimized its 
sovereignty33. Still, few connections have been made about Sahrawi early history. The ancient 
history of a nation should indicate that the group in question had a certain beginning and therefore 
could be recounted from sources found through archaeological excavation and exploration. This 
is quite certain with groups such as the Assyrian, Sumerian, ancient Egyptian because of 
discoveries in art, script, and architecture. Others, for example, Greek, Roman, Inca, Berber, and 
Mongol also have very well documented sources, and more continue to be discovered in the 
                                                
31 Continuous perennialism sees nations in earnest existing for centuries, if not millennia, even if they do not exist 
under the same name or ruler. 
 
32 Treaties signed in 1727, 1799, and 1885 by Spain for the specific purpose of protecting these Saharan areas or 
presides that had been historically claimed by Spain. 
 
33 Such arguments may lead to recurrent perennialism, a more historically verifiable subset of perennialism that sees 
nationalism as a dynamic political force that changes constantly to serve varying needs for ethnic groups. Perennialism 
explains that nations and nationalism survive because they have always existed as a means to protect ethnic groups but 
it is not an organic process. Smith and others seem to attach ethnic identity with the historical survival of nations but 
nationalism is merely an expression of short-term goals for a certain generation of ethnic and social forces. 
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twenty-first century. However, there are several that, according to some scholars, transcend 
antiquity and are presented as nations that have had a perennial existence. The Jews are presented 
as one of the best examples of a perennial nation. Other such nations include northern European 
and Scandinavian groups, namely, the Anglo-Saxons, German, and Rus. It is in this latter 
category that some pro-independence supporters for the Western Sahara claim that the Sahrawi 
nation should be viewed because of its ‘ties’ to the Sanhaja Berber. The origins of the Sanhaja 
Berber date back to the Bafour. Still, much of this history is disputed because direct evidence has 
not been thoroughly examined to prove these links. The claim of a continuous or perennial 
national identity for the Sahrawi is based on certain assumptions and circumstantial hypotheses. 
Thus, the following sources for Sahrawi national identity are placed in the context of a still to be 
determined and verified Saharan history. 
 
Sahrawi  History 
The ancient history of northwest Africa has not been studied as thoroughly as perhaps other areas 
across the globe because of the nature of the Sahara Desert. In fact, there is still much to be 
explored and examined. The attacks of September 11 and afterward have placed limitations on 
tourists traveling for pleasure as well as for researchers conducting field work. Currently, the 
inhospitable landscape of the Sahara does not lend itself to long-term research and the threat to 
known foreigners discourages many from attempting research even under the auspices of 
government protection.34 For instance, the only country in the politically-defined region of the 
                                                
34 While the author of this work was conducting interviews with the leaders and elites of the Sahrawi in the camps near 
Tindouf, Algeria, I recall questioning my interpreter/guide during my time in ‘Rabouni Camp’ about an incident in 
October 2011 of three foreign aid workers who were abducted from their camps. Mohammed Omar, my guide, 
responded and stated that those three individuals (2 Spaniards and an Italian), who were taken by the Movement for 
Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), an AQIM splinter group, actually stayed in the same compound as I was 
being lodged. It came as a complete shock when he informed me only days after I had arrived. Despite my nervous 
apprehension, the feeling of utter isolation, and the decision to ‘think’ through how to escape the room I was given, in 
case I needed to flee those first few days, I remained calm and felt at ease by the following week. Still, these types of 
incidents are an inescapable part of risk and reality involved in choosing to investigate this topic. The trio was held in 
Mali and released July 2012. 
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Maghreb (excluding Egypt) that does not have a travel warning published by the U.S. State 
Department is Morocco.35 In addition, Americans wishing to investigate sources of information 
about the history of the northwestern Sahara will largely find most of the scholarly literature, 
specifically of the Western Sahara, in European depositories and libraries, and only in certain 
languages such as French, Arabic, or Spanish. The following should inform and guide the reader 
to some of these sources. 
The search for the origins of Sahrawi national identity led the author to sources that did 
not actually focus on the Sahrawi. Sources that cover the ancient history of the region or trace the 
Sahrawi to a period in antiquity are scarce. These sources were used to explore arguments derived 
from primordialism—that these ancient groups are associated to the Sahrawi. Many of these 
sources of information were difficult to find and obscure. For information deep in antiquity, the 
author relied on sources that were primarily about the history of northwest Africa. For example, 
Michael Brent and Elizabeth Fentress (1997) document the origins of civilization in North 
African but do not associate the Bafour or even the Berber to later groups. However, they wrote a 
history primarily of the Berbers and not about the Sahrawi. Encyclopedic sources were utilized 
for documentation of the group but these were primarily historical in scope. Other authors briefly 
commented about the Bafour such as János Besenyo (2009), Pierre Bonte (1981), Geneviève 
Désiré-Vuillemin (1962), Tara Duebel (2010), Zahra Hasnaui (2007), Pasqual del Riquelme 
(1991), and James L. Webb (1995). Although the majority viewed them as ancient inhabitants of 
northwest Africa, none directly linked the Bafour to the Sahrawi. In fact, Bonte, Pasqual del 
Riqulme and Webb place the Bafour in the sixteenth and seventeenth century. Lucas (1931) 
writes of the Bafour extensively but mainly to draw out their ancient and mixed ethnic 
composition. 
                                                
35 There are travel warnings for all or parts of the following countries: Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Mali, and Mauritania. 
U.S. Department of State—Bureau of Consular Affairs, “U.S. Passports & International Travel,” travel.state.gov, 
accessed June 07, 2016,  https://travel.state.gov/content/passports/en/alertswarnings.html .  
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Several Spanish authors detail the ancient history of the region as one that has been 
contested among the Berber and Arab dynasties with no concrete sense of limiting frontiers or 
agreements delimiting territory. Enrique D’Almonte describes the medieval period of the region 
as one of conquest, expulsion, retreat, and incessant movement of tribes (nomadism). For 
example, he describes in brief that the lineage of the Oulad Delim (one of the oldest tribes of the 
Western Sahara) can be traced back to those who were expelled by the followers of the Mahdi 
(divinely guided one) and ‘Abd al-Mu’min ibn ‘Ali (founder of the Almohad Dynasty), and fled 
to the Sahara. Those refugees included Arabs and Berbers who were marked as partisans of the 
dethroned Almoravid Dynasty. These people mixed, settled, formed the ed-Dala tribe, and 
became what is now the Oulad Delim tribe (sons of the delinquents). Chronicling the history of 
an area long mired in the ebb and flow of tribal affiliation and fragmentation (1914, 155).  
D’Almonte subsequently writes of another instance of historical significance in 1590-1591: an 
expedition led by Moulay Ahmad al-Mansur to take Timbuktu. “This warlike expedition, that 
momentarily was able to attract the attention of the Saharan tribes, left little permanent mark 
among those indomitable nomads, who promptly returned to their mutual and regular raids and 
quarrels”36 (D’Almonte 1914, 156).  Here, he briefly mentions the short-lived union of Saharan 
tribes for the purposes of defense, only to later continue their nomadic and “kleptomaniac” 
lifestyle (ibid., 155). 
Abadallah Laroui (2001), Jamil Abun-Nasr (1971), and Charles-André Julien (1970) all 
document early periods of North Africa but do not place the Sahrawi in any historical context and 
only served to document early groups in the general region of northwest Africa. Those who did 
make mention of specific groups that provided for some connection to Sahrawi lineage were 
obscure and relatively unknown in American academic circles. E.G. Bullard (2001), Steven 
                                                
36 From the Spanish and translated by the author: “Esta expedición guerrera, que momentáneamente pudo atraer la 
atención de las tribus saháricas, no dejó huella permanente entre aquellos indómitos nómadas, que volvieron 
prontamente á sus habituales y mutuas razzias y rencillas,” in Enrique D’Almonte, Ensayo de una Breve Descripción 
del Sáhara Español, Boletín de La Real Sociedad Geográfica: Madrid, 1914. 
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Danver (2014), Angelo Ghirelli (1942), William Smith (1854), Soler Subils (2007), and A. J. 
Lucas (1931) are all contributors to northwestern Africa or greater western Saharan history. 
Despite Laroui, Abun-Nasr, and Julien’s volumes of methodical research of the Maghrib, they do 
not make connections to the Sahrawi. However, they do provide important contextualization of 
the early period of the Maghrib. 
 
Instrumentalism 
Critics of primordial objectification (and perennialism) counter that these ethnic attachments to 
objects or ideas are not rational and do not explain why people become attached to certain groups 
and not others (Smith 2001, 54).  It fails to explain why nationalist fervor fluctuates at certain 
instances and why these core essentials—blood, kin, symbols or myth—produce mass 
mobilization. To answer some of these questions, instrumentalist arguments were provided 
primarily to shed light on the intensity and scope of national mobilization. Not only do 
primordialists incorrectly treat cultural attributes as objective criteria for explaining national 
consciousness but they are also given irrational explanations to nationalist mobilization. 
Instrumentalism is an approach that focuses on rational explanations to nationalist mobilization. 
Thus, considerations are presented that describe how ideas, artifacts or objects—such as land and 
poetry—history, and resources are manipulated by past and current interest groups either 
unknowingly or with direct intent. These instrumentalist considerations touch on geopolitical 
consequences, socio-institutional practicality, and the economic feasibility of such an 
(independent or nationalist) enterprise. 
Instrumentalism views nationalism as a “form of political behavior” (Breuilly, 1994, 1).  
It is “a political doctrine elaborated by intellectuals” or “a process created in the dynamics of elite 
competition within the boundaries determined by political and economic realities” (Breuilly 1994, 
1; Brass 1991, 16).  Ethnic leaders and elites will use “their cultural groups as sites of mass 
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mobilization and as constituencies in their competition for power and resources” (Smith 2001, 
55).  This approach regards nationalism as a concept that becomes manipulated or politicized “for 
elites in competition for political power and economic advantage” (Brass 1991, 15). More explicit 
instrumentalist lines of approach arise from Claude Bontems and Pablo San Martin. Bontems 
describes the creation of the SADR (Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic)37 constitution as one 
that would avoid the extermination of Sahrawi cultural identity and “reassert their independence” 
(Bontems 1987, 172).  This statement highlights what the POLISARIO has understood to be true 
all along—that at one point the people of the Western Sahara were once free.  
The POLISARIO example suggests that in one move both created and appropriated the 
anti-colonial struggle, and expanded it to include full independence ever since 197538. Others, 
such as Randa Farah, Greg Noakes and Janet McMahon39, including David Seddon, agree that 
what may have been considered as small glimpses of identity differentiation were transformed 
into certain ‘political realities,’ namely ethnonationalism, due to elitist group manipulation. They 
have argued that groups such as the Harakat Tahrir40 and the POLISARIO developed much of the 
Sahrawi consciousness. Other more extreme suggestions indicate that from the mid to late-1960s, 
international governmental organizations such as the UN and the AU were pushing for self-
determination of the Spanish Sahara (San Martin 2010, 61 and 64). Exaggerated as these ideas 
are, they have played a part in the push for Western Sahara sovereignty. What they do not show, 
                                                
37 The SADR is the government-in-exile of the Western Sahara proclaimed on February 27, 1976 by the Provisional 
Sahrawi National Council of the POLISARIO Front. 
 
38 This was the year that Morocco initiated the Green March and invaded the Western Sahara. 
 
39 Greg Noakes and Janet McMahon, “Sahrawi Broadcaster Describes Western Sahara Freedom Struggle,” The 
Washington Report on Middle East Affairs 11 (1993), 44. 
 
40 Anthony Pazzanita, Harakat Tahrir Saguia El-Hamra wa Oued Ed-Dahab (Movement for the Liberation of Rio de 
Oro and the Oued Ed-Dahab), Historical Dictionary of the Western Sahara, (Scarecrow Press: Lanham, MD): 2006, 
186. This was the first serious group to challenge the Spanish colonial presence since the Army of Liberation in 1958. 
It was created in December 1967 but lasted only through mid-1970 with the death of its leader, Mohammed Sidi 
Ibrahim Bassiri. 
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however, is that there have been a small number of elites before the nineteenth century that 
brought together the tribes of the Western Sahara. This study focuses on searching for those 
elites, group leaders that may have united ancestral tribes of the Sahrawi. Thus, instrumentalism 
encourages us to consider a group’s hold on Sahrawi national identity. 
The challenge for this study was locating specific works that wrote about the region and 
whose focus was on a particular leader or group of elites. There is work on the early Almoravid 
and Almohad dynasties recording their conquest in the greater Western Sahara. These works, 
however, do not make any association with the modern Sahrawi. Apart from the Cambridge 
History of Africa Volumes, Abun –Nasr, Julien, and Laroui, most of this history is found in 
reference or encyclopedic works that are mainly general in nature. The works that do refer to 
populations groups comment on tribes and their relationships with each other, emirates and with 
the Sultan of Morocco. Some of the history that refers to specific instances of leaders attempting 
to unite tribes is about the struggles of the Sultans. The Sultans of northern Morocco ventured 
from their bases in the capital cities of Fes and Marrakesh mostly to consolidate territory based on 
religious (conversions), economic (securing the trade routes) (Lydon 2009; McDougall 2012), 
and blocking foreign intrusion (European colonization). Little is mentioned about the unification 
of tribes. 
The nature of leadership, especially about the Sultan’s power, will be discussed. These 
details represent the limitations of power of the Sultan over the greater Western Sahara. The 
literature provides examples of historical territorial autonomy the POLISARIO claim make them 
distinct from Morocco. They provide elements of separateness from Morocco but little to the 
search for the origins of Sahrawi identity. The most important figure, claimed by both Morocco 
and the POLISARIO, that lends itself to instrumentalist arguments, is Ma’ al-‘Aynayn. He is 
perhaps the only personality that comes close to leading a diverse set of tribes. Although he 
figures prominently in Western Saharan history in the early twentieth century, he does receive 
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wide study. Only a handful of scholars (Mahmud Awa 2015; Ould Mohamed 2010; Pham 2010; 
Mundy 2008; Bank and Van Heur) comment on Ma’ al-‘Aynayn. These works, however, give 
few details of his exploits or briefly mention him as evidence in the 1975 Advisory Ruling of the 
ICJ in support of the Sahrawi. Apart from these few works, little else has been added supporting 
Sahrawi identity through instrumentalist arguments until the creation of smaller groups after 
Moroccan independence. 
 
Constructivism 
Constructivism, based on earlier ideas of J.G. Herder, Renan, and Weber, rejected that nationality 
or even ethnicity was the essential human condition but rather believed that nations were products 
of socialization and historical forces. Herder believed that certain outstanding factors (education, 
physical environment, intermarriage, and tradition) influenced the national soul (Ergang 1966, 
112).  Ergang explains that Herder saw “nationality as a product of nature and its growth as 
regulated by the laws of nature,” where nature “was the great architect who planned and 
constructed the group” (95).  Renan held that “un nation est un âme [soul], un principe spirituel.” 
(1882, 8) Two things constitute this soul, the spiritual principle “one is the possession in common 
of a rich legacy of memories and the other is the actual consent, the desire to live together, the 
will to continue to emphasize the heritage we have received undivided" (1882, 8).41 
Gellner extends Ernest Renan’s statement and writes that a nation can “be defined in 
terms both of will and of culture” only “when general social conditions make for standardized, 
homogeneous, centrally sustained high cultures, pervading entire populations and not just elite 
minorities” (1983, 54). Anderson in his most quoted of phrases declared that a nation is imagined 
                                                
41  Direct translation of Ernest Renan’s quote: “L’une est la possession en commun d’un riche legs de souvenirs; l’autre 
est le consentement actuel, le désir de vivre ensemble, la volonté de continuer a faire valoir l’héritage qu’on a reçu 
indivis” from Qu’est-ce qu’une Nation?, Conférence faite en Sorbonne, March 11 1882 in E. Renan, (Textes de Barrès, 
Daudet, R. de Gourmont, Céline), chapitre 2, 12-48. Paris: Pierre Bordas et fils, Éditeur, 1991, 128 pp. Collection: 
Littérature vivante, 50. 
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as limited (because it has finite boundaries), sovereign (born in the Age of Enlightenment and 
revolution), and as a community, (conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship): “it is an 
imagined political community” (1983, 17, 19).  This approach should help determine if socio-
historical conditions have constructed a Sahrawi movement that has been able to produce, if not, 
forge such a national soul—a Sahrawi nation. Eric Hobsbawm contended that nations should be 
analyzed not only from above “in terms of political, technical, administrative, economic, and 
other conditions,” but also from below “in [subjective] terms of the assumptions, hopes, needs, 
longings and interests of ordinary people” (1990, 10). 
Hobsbawm also tended to believe that nationalism produced nations in contrast to John 
Armstrong’s Nations before Nationalism hypothesis. This approach is the most difficult for 
evaluating Sahrawi identity. Scholarship over the issue of the Western Sahara and Sahrawi 
nationalism is most often depicted as an outgrowth of modernity, and it is usually characterized as 
a product of anti-colonialism. Most authors account for the rise of Sahrawi nationalism only as 
late as the 1960s or 1970s. Very few have noted any earlier periods of national mobility. John 
Mercer had written a study describing how cycles of invasion and unification had forged the 
Sahrawi nation. For example, David Seddon wrote that strong ultra-nationalism in the northwest 
region of the Maghreb began in 1944 with the Istiqlal (Independence) Party of Morocco (1987, 
39).  This later evolved into the 1956 ALS (Army of Liberation for the Sahara), which was a 
small group of ultra-nationalists who sought other “occupied” areas — Tangiers, the Spanish 
deserts of the South — “the Sahara from Tindouf and Atar and the Algerian-Moroccan 
borderlands” (Hodges 1984, 88).  Tony Hodges described the rise of Sahrawi insurrection 
stemming from Morocco’s independence movement in 1956, “which first inspired the ahel es-
sahel to rise in revolt—against the French in southern Mauritania and southwest Algeria as well 
as the Spanish in the Western Sahara” (ibid., 85).  These implicit notions indicate that they are 
more constructivist in nature. 
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In a relatively lesser-known work, Ramón Criado writing in 1977, designated the criteria 
of history, geography, and the structures of society as elements of differentiation of the Sahrawi 
from their supposed Moroccan or Mauritanian origins (67).  Criado develops the distinctiveness 
of the Sahrawi by tracing tribal affiliation to the territory approximating the area of Sequiet el-
Hamra y Río de Oro. By the sixteenth century, he states that there arose not only a certain 
hierarchy among the tribes, but also a strict territorial localization that is respected even today by 
the tribes of the SARIO42. He believes this proves that an independent and coherent nucleus 
existed both before Morocco constituted itself as a Kingdom, and before Mauritania splintered 
into emirates (due to the decline of the Negro empires) (Criado 1977, 78).  In contrast, within this 
historical context, Osama Abi-Mershed and Adam Farrar write that the lands, which constitute 
modern-day Western Sahara, have been under intermittent Sharifian (spiritual) authority that 
began in the eleventh century (Abi-Mershed and Farrar 2014, 7-9).  These writers attribute geo-
political and socio-cultural command of the region due to the ‘spiritual’ authoritative attachments 
given by the inhabitants to the Alawite Dynasty (ibid., 10). 
Joshua Castellino and Elvira Dominguez-Redondo state that Sahrawi national identity is 
difficult to establish because the distinctive claims of territoriality and spiritual authority by either 
side are blurred when faced with pinpointing the variable tribal allegiances throughout the long 
history of the area. The authors tend to lend credence to the ‘general’ idea of a monarchical 
division of rule between “a domain of sovereignty (Bled el-Makhzen) and a domain of suzerainty 
(Bled as-siba)” within the empire (2014, 32).  Castellino and Dominguez-Redondo state that the 
most controversial issue that surrounds the Western Sahara conflict involves the territorial limits 
of the Sharifian Empire. They write that the differences are not only territorial but also perhaps 
ethnic: The mostly Arab makhzen always struggled to maintain order in the mainly Berber as-siba 
                                                
42 From the Spanish and translated by the author: “proviene la localización territorial estricta que respetan hasta hoy las 
tribus del Sario.” The designation, ‘the tribes of Sario’ (Sp. tribus del SARIO) by Ramón Criado refers to the area of 
Saguía el Hamra and Rio de Oro. This is also the suffix abbreviation taken by the POLISARIO. Ramón Criado, 
Sáhara: Pasión y Muerte de un Sueño Colonial, Ruedo Ibérico: 1977, 77. 
  50 
lands. Thus, the author encountered not only literature that mentioned physical boundaries (ICJ, 
1975) but also literature that documents certain concepts of differentiation. Scholars in this area 
(Lopez Bargados 2003; Ould Mohamed 2010; Hodges 1983; Norris 1986; Criado 1977; Moya 
Fernández 2009) write about boundaries of governance: bilad as-siba, bilad al-makhzen, trab al-
bidan, and ‘Jat al-Jaof.’ These notions are historical distinctions of identity that soon became part 
of the debate over territorial autonomy in the Western Sahara. 
Others take a more legal approach to the construction of Sahrawi arguing on the basis of 
treaties. Of these, most mention the Treaty of Alcaçovas (1479) and the Treaty of Tordesillas 
(1494), where one finds the first documented evidence of recognition of dominion by the 
crown(s) of Spain and Portugal over territory in both the Americas and Africa. These offer little 
demonstrable proof of control over the areas inland from the coast of the Western Sahara. Other 
authors assert that the treaties of Marrakesh (1767), Meknes (1799), and Tetuan (1860) are key 
markers for identifying the possession or non-possession of areas now considered to be Western 
Sahara proper. Even though the early treaties that were presented to the International Court of 
Justice, there were still contentious issues over the interpretation of these written documents, after 
the ICJ ruling. Authors such as Zunes and Mundy (2010), Rézette (1975), Criado (1977), Alguero 
Cuervo (2006) all comment about these treaties in their respective works. With the exception of 
Rézette, the rest favor POLISARIO claims. 
Some authors have made the explicit argument that the origins of Sahrawi national 
identity are socially constructed. For example, Zunes and Mundy who have written a 
comprehensive analysis of the Western Sahara state that, “the ‘idea’ of a Sahrawi people…is 
recent” and “is the outgrowth of the colonial dialectic” (2010, 91).  In fact, they state that their 
book was written on “the premise that identities are made” and “not found” (ibid., 95).  They 
posit very strongly that all identities, speaking of Algerian, Moroccan, Mauritanian, as well as 
Sahrawi “are not given; they are the outcome of the historical interaction of dominant and 
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subordinate social forces” (ibid., 111).  Hodges much earlier had written that the “Western 
Saharans never constituted a nation in pre-colonial times, and their present-day nationalism is a 
very recent phenomenon, which took root only in the latter part of the Spanish colonial period” 
(1983, 28).  He declared that the Sahrawi had “no historical antecedent” but did raise a curious 
point by stating that they, “in a broad cultural sense, have a common identity vis-a-vis the 
predominantly Berber sedentary or semi-nomadic populations to their immediate north, in 
southern Morocco, beyond the Ouarkziz and Bani mountains and the Oued Draa” (Hodges 1983, 
28 and 30). 
Pablo San Martin has written along constructivist lines as well by attributing Sahrawi 
national development to Spanish colonial policy.  The 1960s and 1970s brought about many 
economic and administrative changes to the Western Sahara. The discovery of phosphates, the 
change in governance, and the subsequent social status of the inhabitants of the Western Sahara 
were all due to Spanish colonization. San Martin concluded that it was not the change of the 
asabiya43 to a more urban, individualized, capitalist society that allowed for more collective 
action among the Sahrawi but “new forms of collective solidarity and action” that had emerged 
from formal colonization (San Martin 2010, 56). For example, Martin stated that the new system 
of: “Representation of the native population of the Spanish Sahara was designed based on the 
assumptions that the tribes were still the main social institutions organizing the social life in the 
province and delineating the identities of its indigenous inhabitants (ibid., 61). The tribal 
institution as the primary social structure utilized toward some cohesive action, had been 
debilitated because of these above changes. San Martin described these colonial attempts at 
administering the Spanish Sahara as “Francoist strategies of control” (ibid., 65).   
                                                
43 Asabiya, in the modern period, the term is generally analogous to solidarity. However, the term is often negatively 
associated because it can sometimes suggest loyalty to one's group regardless of circumstances, or partisanship. 
Shelagh Weir, A Tribal Order: A Tribal Order: Politics and Law in the Mountains of Yemen (Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 2007), 191. 
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One of the few authors who assessed Sahrawi ‘nationality’ within any theoretical blend—
primordialism within the context of constructivism—was Sidi Mohamed Omar. He expressed 
that, “there is much evidence that prior to Spanish colonization there was a widespread sense of 
belonging to the Western Sahara as a distinctive territory with a distinct population” (Mohamed 
Omar 2008, 44).  Yet, in the very next sentence he stated that “the majority of the inhabitants 
‘imagined’ themselves as a sociopolitical community” and added later that the formative phases 
of Sahrawi national identity were forged in constructed or ‘performative acts’” (ibid., 44).  His 
comments are well placed within the constructivist notion, but they did not serve the primordial 
approach well with only one reference. In general, most modern scholars tend to contextualize 
Sahrawi identity through constructivist arguments. 
This literature review is in need of more scholarly work in the area of national identity, 
especially in the case of the Sahrawi. Most pro-POLISARIO or pro-Sahrawi scholars who claim 
that the origins of the Sahrawi are found in the past and are tied to distinctive features of their 
identity, place primordial arguments above all others to justify Sahrawi claims. However, they 
face an uphill battle because the theory has been absorbed in the popular approach of 
constructivism. A resurgence of energy surrounding primordialism did gain traction with the fall 
of communism but it has since begun to dissipate once again. Scholars pursuing instrumentalist 
arguments are few and of these, most will discuss the POLISARIO’s management of Saharawi 
identity. More research is needed. I hope to add to the academic field of identity politics and 
bring Sahrawi identity to more prominence with this study. I apply equal importance to all three 
approaches. I may, however, be labeled a proponent of primordialism because I agree with 
Anthony Smith’s notion that a nation may be constructed from socio-historical forces but founded 
upon ethno-cultural resources that have been developing for some time. 
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III. ARE THE SAHRAWI OF ANCIENT ORIGIN? INVESTIGATING THEIR ‘NATIONAL’ 
IDENTITY UNTIL 1524 
 
This chapter analyzes the possible ancient Sahrawi origins (assuming that Sahrawi 
history can be traced to its original inhabitants) in North Africa until the takeover of the Spanish 
fort at Santa Cruz de Mar Pequeña (located in southwestern Morocco) by the Arab army of the 
Sa’adian Dynasty in 1524. Most, if not, all of this part of the analysis will be based on historical 
research of the period in the western and southwestern Maghrib region.  It will trace the lineage 
of the Western Saharan population and provide insight to the claims of cohesion and group 
development throughout this early period. The hypothesis that the origins of Sahrawi identity can 
be traced to antiquity derives primarily from a primordial approach to the creation of nations and 
nationalism and is rooted in a connection to the past. Leaders of the POLISARIO44  movement 
and certain scholars who investigate Sahrawi identity have claimed that they are a distinct group 
of people separated by identifiable cultural markers. They conclude that the national identity of 
the Sahrawi is linked to the past and has distinctions that set them apart from present-day 
Moroccans. This chapter seeks evidence that sustains the argument that the Sahrawi have had a 
distinctive and continuous historical record. The search will include late antiquity, the beginning 
of the Roman period, the Arab incursion into North Africa, and later the medieval period. 
First, an extensive section will chronicle important events and information that discuss 
the markers of Sahrawi national identity and the arguments that sustain Sahrawi claims about the 
past. A second section centers on the deficiencies that emanate from primordial explanations and 
will focus on each historical period to provide some insight and criticism of the primordialist 
approach. This will link the primordialist discussion toward other considerations that resonate 
with instrumental and constructivist theories of Sahrawi national identity. Despite the paucity of 
                                                
44 Spanish acronym for the Frente Popular de Liberación para Saquiat el-Hamra y Río de Oro (Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Saquiat el-Hamra and Rio de Oro [River of Gold]). The POLISARIO are the liberation group seeking the 
independence of the region claimed and administered by the Kingdom of Morocco called the Western Sahara. 
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evidence for the primordial origins of the Sahrawi in this case, it is the objective of the author, not 
to discount Sahrawi links to the past, but to highlight these claims in order to understand their 
national origins. In essence, even if the primordial theory does not fully explain this case, it is 
important to look at the evidence, since political actors try to use this approach. 
 
The Lybico-Berbers: Proto-Sahrawi Nation? Ancient Origins — 1000 BCE 
It is difficult to pinpoint with historical accuracy the origins of any nation or national identity of a 
specific group. In general, it is easier to determine the establishment of a nation-state in our 
modern world with the criteria that are attributed to such an entity than to trace the lineage of an 
ethnic group. However, this study explores the origins of a putative national people, not of the 
political entity that claims to represent them.45 Although several scholars mention that the 
Sahrawi are the direct descendants of the Sanhaja Berber, most of the anthropological, 
ethnological, and geographical scholarship has not been able to agree on the point of departure for 
the settlers of North Africa. Some scholars believe these settlers were the product of migration 
patterns from the East, others from the South due to increasingly arid conditions, and still others 
from across the Mediterranean (Laroui 1977, 17).  These migration patterns are theorized to have 
originated from Asia through two routes. One route developed from the northeast via Europe and 
the other stemming from the southeast, which traversed East Africa. Scholars from the colonial 
period have theorized that their ancestors are of immigrant waves from the Mediterranean that 
included Celtic-Iberians and Semitic peoples [i.e., Phoenicians]46 (Bullard 2001, 184).  Bullard 
states there is yet another theory that posits that the Berbers together with the Egyptians formed 
the ‘white African race’ (Ibid., 184). However, according to modern scholarship, the tendency 
                                                
45 In fact, the establishment of such an independent entity, in this case the Western Sahara, cannot be appropriately 
discussed here because not only is its status unclear, but it also continues to suffer from the problem of qualitative and 
quantitative recognition by other nation-states. 
 
46 Reuben G. Bullard, “The Berbers of the Maghreb and Ancient Carthage,” in Africa and Africans in Antiquity, ed. 
Edwin A. Yamauchi (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 2001), 184. 
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now is to attribute the Berber to a composite of races where the distinct characteristic features of 
the Mediterranean-type predominate. These findings indicate that origins of the Berber are 
diverse, but nevertheless, maintain that they are indigenous to North Africa after settling those 
areas during 8000 and 7000 BC (Laroui 1977, 17; Bullard 2001, 184; Ilahiane 2006, xxxi; 
Ghirelli 1942, 8). 
Evidence for the rise of a proto-Sahrawi nation usually begins at the beginning of the first 
millennium (AD) and traces the forerunners of the Sahrawi to Sanhaja affiliation. These scholars 
believe that the ancestors of the Sanhaja were a branch of an ancient group of people known as 
Berber47 (or Imazighen48 ).  By 1000 BCE, the Berbers, who most agree are the direct ancestors to 
the Sahrawi, had successfully settled across North Africa and pushed another group termed the 
Bafour (or Bafots) to the south. According to these authors, the Berbers can be traced from before 
the Bronze Age (≈3300 BCE). However, a few authors locate ‘Berber ancestry’ much earlier in 
antiquity, deep into the Paleolithic period (>10,000 BCE). Mundy has written that the culture 
believed to “represent the direct ancestors of the Imazighen, the Capsians,” appeared 10,000 years 
ago during the ‘Wet Phase,’ which “allowed humans to return to the Sahara” after a long arid four 
thousand-year period (Mundy 2007, 305).  For instance, Ilahiane writes that the historical record 
demonstrates a group called the Siwa, who are of Berber origin, have been in existence since 
10,000 BCE (Ilahiane 2006, 112). 
Yet, Munene suggests that the “hierarchic identity of the Western Sahara” can be traced 
much earlier to the Bafour but around 5500 BCE (Munene 2010, 84).  Almost a century ago, 
                                                
47 The use of the word ‘Berber’ is one that has been applied externally and is not actually used by Berbers themselves. 
The actual denomination of ‘Berber’ is generally attributed to the Latin plural form of barbari (sing. barbarus) and the 
Greek use of barabaroi. Hsaine Ilahiane, introduction to Historical Dictionary of the Berbers (Imazighen), Historical 
Dictionaries of Peoples and Cultures, no. 5 (Lanham, Maryland: Scarecrow Press, 2006), xxx. Also see Angelo 
Ghirelli, El País Berebere: Contribución al Estudio de los Orígenes, Formación y Evolución de las Poblaciones del 
África Septentrional (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1942), 6. 
 
48 In the Berber language of Tamazight, “Berbers use the name ‘Imazighen’ to describe themselves (singular masculine 
is Amazigh; singular feminine is Tamazight).” “Today, Berbers use the collective designation ‘Imazighen,’ and 
Imazighen is the word that embodies the Amazigh sense of being the real and essentially human beings of their 
homeland, called Tamazgha.” Ilahiane, Historical Dictionary of the Berbers (Imazighen), xxx. 
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Lucas wrote: “One must admit that the base of the apparent Arab and Berber population had been 
preceded by Bafour elements, of [later] vanquished groups…”49 (Lucas 1931, 152). Others, such 
as Mercer (1976a, 498), Hodges (1983, 3), and Jensen (2005, 21) attribute the existence of the 
Bafour to oral history at this time in the region. Legal scholars, Castellino and Dominguez-
Redondo (2014, 39), Mwalimu (2010, 952-953), historical sources such as Webb50 (1995, 28) and 
Jensen (ibid.) suggest the Bafour were a group of people that migrated or ‘gravitated’ south into 
the Sahara. Yet, Pazzanita writes that the “black-skinned” Bafour apparently had emerged from 
sub-Saharan Africa, mixed with a northern (Rif and Atlas) mountain-living group moving south, 
and produced the ‘Amaziah’ (Imazighen) or, as mentioned above, Berber. (Pazzanita 2006, 383) 
There are conflicting views about the migratory patterns of the probable Sahrawi 
ancestors, but most scholars agree that over time a ‘Neolithic’ (≈10,200 – 3000 BCE) group from 
the eastern Maghrib or western Mediterranean began moving south and southwest, encroaching 
on the desert. Western Sahara scholars cite archaeological evidence of the Bafours moving and 
living in this area between 5500 and 2000 BCE. The depiction of domesticated animals began to 
appear in cave paintings51 5500 years ago throughout the Neolithic Age (an era that is marked by 
abundant wildlife, domesticated animals, and a complex culture) in the Sahara. Despite the 
contradictions in academic and archeological literature over the migratory patterns of the Bafour, 
most agree that they settled in the region now considered greater northwest Africa (including 
modern Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, the Western Sahara, and Algeria). By the second millennium, 
                                                
49 Taken from the French: “On doit admettre que le fond de la population apparente arabe et berbère a été précédé 
d'éléments Bafours, de groupes vaincus…” A.J. Lucas, “Considérations sur l'Ethnique Maure et en Particulier sur Une 
Race Ancienne: Les Bafours,” Journal de la Société des Africanistes, Tome 1 Fascicule 2 (1931), 152. 
 
50 Yet, Webb, in both his accounts on the Bafour describe them as a group who were still in existence only centuries 
before 1600-1850. How many centuries before then is not made clear. He speaks of the Bafour as surviving as villagers 
≈1450 – 1600 AD in the Gibla region (southwestern Mauritania near the Senegal River) but later “absorbed into the 
ethnic categories of Wolof, Berber, and Peul… and thus remains somewhat mysterious.”  James L. A. Webb, Jr., 
Desert Frontier: Ecological and Economic Change along the Western Sahel, 1600-1850 (Madison, WI: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1955), 15, 28. 
 
51 The most notable found in Tassili n’Ajjer (Plateau of the Chasms) in southeastern Algeria. 
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the available artifacts depict a Negroid people who were largely pastoral but later frescoes “begin 
to show elongated white men with characteristic long hair and pointed beards” (Brent and 
Fentress 1997, 19).  These and other groups from both the east and west of the Sahara came to be 
called the ‘Berbers,’ overwhelmingly agreed upon by scholars and through archeological 
evidence as the original inhabitants of North Africa. 
Unfortunately, there is very little written about Berber culture for the northwestern 
Sahara. Most accounts provide proof from frescoes, rock carvings, paintings, and settlement sites 
in the ‘highlands’ of North Africa in modern-day Algeria (Tibesti, Tassili, the Hoggar)52 to the 
Atlantic coast and into the Saharan Atlas Mountains. (Ilahiane 2006, 17) Beyond these areas, 
much remains to be explored, assessed, and recorded. There is a rich and diverse archeological 
record in the Western Saharan both in the administered areas by Morocco and in the ‘Free’ or 
‘Liberated Zone’ now under POLISARIO control. For instance, several stone structures (Tifariti, 
Bir Lehlou in POLISARIO-controlled Western Sahara, Bir Lemuesat in northern Mauritania),53 
rock paintings and engravings (Sluguilla,54  Bou Dheir and Erqueyez55 near Tifariti, Zug on the 
POLISARIO side of southern Western Sahara, and Wadi Zenta in the Zemmur of northeastern 
                                                
52 Tibesti are a set of mountains located in northern Chad well-known for rock and parietal art. Tassili n’Ajjer is listed 
as a World Heritage Site because “of its geological formations including ‘forests of stone’, biological diversity, 
archaeological importance and prehistoric rock art (24)…The art itself comprises paintings and engravings on exposed 
rock faces, and includes pictures of wild and domestic animals, humans, geometric designs, Libyc and Tifinagh 
inscriptions (ancient and recent Tuareg/Berber script) and a very few plants and trees (29)…Tassili n Ajjer is a 
Tamahaq name meaning ‘plateau’ of the Ajjer people, the name of the Kel Ajjer group of tribes whose traditional 
territory was here” (24). David Coulson and Alec Campbell, “Rock Art of the Tassili n Ajjer, Algeria,” Adoranten, 
Scandinavian Society for Prehistoric Art, 2010, Underslös Museum Tanum Rock Art Research Centre, accessed July 5, 
2016, http://www.rockartscandinavia.com/rock-art-of-the-tassili-n-ajjer-algeria-by-david-coulson-and-alec-campbell-
aa11.php. The Hoggar or Ahoggar is a mountain range in central southern Algeria where, along with Tassili, are found 
the richest concentration of prehistoric rock art. 
 
53 Many of these stone structures have been characterized as funerary monuments, comprising “tumuli, linear stone 
arrangements, and stone enclosures…isolated menhirs or standing stones” and others “with apparent astronomical 
functions.” Nick Brooks, “Cultural Heritage and Conflict: The Threatened Archaeology of Western Sahara,” in The 
Sahara: Past, Present and Future, ed. Jeremy Keenan (New York: Routledge, 2007), 285-291, Google Play Books. 
 
54 Sluguilla is located in a zone situated in the Hamada, a stony desert that extends along the Northern part of RASD 
and to the West of Algeria. 
 
55 Erqueyez has also been transcribed as Rekeiz Lemgasem or Erquiez. 
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Western Sahara), pottery, and tools have been found depicting domestication of animals, cattle-
grazing, and preoccupations “with astronomy” (Brooks et al 2003, 3-4; Keenan 2007, 285-291). 
These and many other forms of Saharan rock art investigated in the ‘southern provinces’ and 
High Atlas Mountains of Morocco as well as in sites in Mauritania (Tagant, Adrar) are dated 
2500-500 BCE based on its depictions of chariots, horses, saddled horsemen, dromedaries, and 
the appearance of the Lybico-Berber (or Tifinagh) alphabet (Soler Subils 2007, 16-18; Le Quellec 
2008, 72-73; 2016, 55-56). 
Most scholars of identity politics will agree that the major distinguishing features of an 
ethnic community are language, attachment to territory and a common culture. However, these 
ethnic distinctions are perhaps the most challenging in establishing a cohesive Berber identity. 
For example, according to Marçais, the principal difference between Arabs and Berbers is 
language. (Marçais 1955, 22) Yet, Berber scholarship in the area of deciphering ancient scripts 
used in North Africa is still challenging. McDougal writes that “samples of the ancient language 
that contemporary prehistorians and classical scholars term ‘Lybic’ or ‘Libyan,’ and which 
Berber writers… assert unproblematically to Tamazight [modern Berber] …, are general 
untranslated and frequently indecipherable” (McDougall 2003, 69).  The Berber script is based 
“on the assumption of a coherent social and linguistic continuum of the native population 
persisting from pre-Punic times to the present day . . ., [which] though not disprovable, extremely 
fragile” (Millar 1968, 128).  Millar adds that even though there is concrete evidence of an ancient 
‘Libyan’ (Berber) script distinct from Punic (Carthaginian), it “may, or may not, be the, or an, 
ancestor of present-day Berber” and “the precise connection between the two may perhaps never 
be known” (Ibid., 128-129).  
Secondly, the area of early Berber occupation has been difficult to establish—both its 
nomadic range and the “homeland” of its sedentary populace. Extensions of their historical 
homeland have reached even beyond the Sahara Desert. For instance, there are claims of Berber 
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populations 1) at the time of the Moorish56 invasion (711-719 CE) of the Visigoths and the native 
Romans of Hispania on the Iberian Peninsula; 2) as far eastward as Egypt in the Siwa Oases and 
the Nile River valley; and 3) off the coast of northwest Africa among the Canary Island 
inhabitants. The continual desiccation of the environment and, as a result, the migration toward 
the Atlantic coast, closer to water, resulted in the development of more a agro-pastoral lifestyle. 
There is evidence not only of irrigated cultivation but also of trade between the Fezzan (Lybia) 
and the western Sahara, especially in beads and slaves. Yet, “sedentism” may have been 
‘temporary,’ a seasonal symbiosis of nomadism and sedentary life (Challis et al 2007, 286, 290).  
Still, debates continue about the nomadic nature of much of the Berber population and thus how 
to differentiate them from other invading groups across North Africa.  
Third, much of the work that relates to ‘Berber’ culture is ongoing and unfinished. “By 
the middle of the second millennium the frescoes show men using horses to pull light war 
chariots, armed with spears and wearing kilts similar to those of the Egyptians…perhaps aimed at 
a perpetuating the social hierarchy” of a priestly caste. (Brent and Fentress 1997, 19-20) The 
domestication of horses seems to have taken place giving these groups more mobility, increasing 
“nomadic pastoralism” in “the now arid steppe areas of the Sahara” (Ibid., 20).  Brent and 
Fentress add that the depictions of wall art and evidence from physical anthropology represented 
a more mobile, ‘whiter’ Berber populace that acquired new technology and a more stratified 
society which “enabled them to subjugate their existing black population” (Ibid., 20).  This ‘white 
invasion’ of the Sahara was the beginning of Berber domination, displacing the Negroid race57. 
                                                
56 The invasion of the Moors was led by an African Berber general named Tariq ibn Ziyad who after an eight-year 
campaign brought most of the Iberian Peninsula under Islamic rule. New World Encyclopedia, s.v., “Moors,” accessed 
June 23, 2016, http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Moors. 
 
57 However, the rise of the Berber did not entirely eliminate blacks from North Africa. In fact, Brown adds that “there 
have always been blacks in Northern Africa. The blacks have never, however, really represented a group or nation and, 
consequently, they have never constituted a threat to the non-Saharan Northern Africans.” For instance, Brown includes 
a quote from Raymond Mauny from “Tableau Geographique de L’Ouest Africain au Moyen Age,” Memoire IFAN, no. 
61 (Dakar, 1961), 397, who estimated that during the Middle Ages at least twenty thousand black were sent each year 
from West Africa into North Africa, or at least two million per century. Additionally, Brown adds that blacks ’returned’ 
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Nevertheless, Soler Subils concludes that because “very few archaeological excavations have 
been done in the Western Sahara, we still have no clear and safe sequence of the prehistoric 
cultures that occupied the region. As a consequence, it is difficult to link any of the rock art 
remains with a prehistoric culture” (Soler Subils 2006). 
Today, there are still many questions about Berber origins. Anthropologists and 
ethnologists differ on the exact genealogical identification and characteristic quality of Berber 
ethnicity. Brent and Fentress stated that “the only certainty is the [Berber] population by the 
second millennium was extremely heterogeneous, with a range of Mediterranean types mixed 
with some descendants of the original, possibly indigenous ‘Meka’ type” (1997, 17).  Marçais 
stressed that “[t]he few clues so far obtained from prehistory lead one to believe that the Berbers 
do not constitute a homogeneous race…From an anthropological point of view, therefore, North 
Africa shows great diversity, which has been further accentuated by numerous interminglings 
between different types of Berbers as well as of Berbers with many other racial elements” 
(Marçais 1955, 22).  Ilahiane added that there has been an “ethnocultural symbioses [of the 
Berbers] with the conquerors” over the centuries (Ilahiane 2006, xxxii).  What is more than 
certain is that the Berber had been tribal “from the earliest known periods of their history” and 
that “their final allegiance was to a tribe, or to a real or imagined ethnic bond uniting the 
individual to a part of the race but never to the whole. Thus a Berber consciousness [had] never 
existed” (Abun-Nasr 1971, 8, 58).  Nevertheless, anthropological and historical scholars have 
consented that a composite group of Lybico-Berbers had established themselves across North 
Africa from the Red Sea, across the vast Saharan interior, stretching to the Atlantic Ocean and 
into the Western Sahara. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
to “Northern Africa as detribalized individuals, usually as slaves” in great numbers and “as random individuals soon 
scattered over Northern Africa” that were easily absorbed or ignored. Leon Carl Brown, “Color in Northern Africa,” 
Daedalus 96, No. 2 Color and Race (Spring 1967): 466-467. 
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The Gaetulian Berbers of Northwest Africa — 500 BCE to the Arab Invasion 
Modern scholarship, at this stage in history, agrees that the Berbers, labeled as ancestors of the 
Sahrawi, begin to divide into separate social and political entities. The natural course of 
discussion about Sahrawi history moves to identify these North African groups that can be used 
as reliable sources for tracing their own national identity. In addition, the discussion now begins 
to narrow its geographical scope from the huge region of North Africa to the more specific areas 
of modern-day southeastern Morocco and Western Sahara proper, including parts of Mauritania. 
Still a relatively pastoral people, the eastern (from the relative domains of present-day eastern 
Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya) Berbers of littoral North Africa mimicked the agricultural 
and politico-military status of the Roman Empire.  Most information about the western and 
southwestern Berbers include the Mauri and the Numidae58, who despite gravitating toward a 
more sedentary existence, retained a thriving nomadic lifestyle, and established kingdoms to the 
west of Carthage (mentioned briefly in the previous section). These groups (mentioned below), 
unlike those farther east, did not rush to emulate the flourishing Roman and Carthaginian 
civilizations 
The peak of the Carthaginian Empire took place in the fifth century BCE and for the next 
400 years, became preoccupied with Roman competition. Carthaginian control in the region had 
been limited to its vassal city-states along the North African coast, a few inland territories in 
northern Tunisia, and (modern-day) northeast Algeria. Carthage59 did not extend its control 
                                                
58 Numidae or Numidia is “the region that stretches west of Carthaginian territory between the Tusca and Ampsaga 
rivers, today part of eastern Algeria. The Greeks interpreted the name of the Libyan people of Numidia living in this 
area in the sense of nomádes (νοµάδες, ‘people who roam’) and so called this region Nomadía. However, most of the 
Numidae had already been settled for a long time. The plateau of Numidia is bordered in the North by the foothills of 
the Tell Atlas and in the south by the Sahara Atlas.” Werner (Bamberg) Huß, Brill’s New Pauly, German Version, s.v. 
“Numidae, Numidia,” accessed 22 August 2014, in BrillOnline Reference Works, eds. Hubert Cancik and Helmuth 
Schneider, (Koninklijke Brill NV, 2012), http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/brill-s-new-pauly/numidae-
numidia-e826540. 
 
59 Carthage apparently had a mix of ethnic communities beginning with the founders of the city the Phoenicians and 
‘Lybians.’ Since Carthaginian Empire extended itself extensively along the coast and found itself rivaling Greece and 
then Rome, many of its colonies, and as a result, subject people were “required to provide troops” such as the 
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beyond these immediate dominions because it preferred to “cultivate friendly relations with the 
[Berber60] chiefs, who included intermarriage between them and the Punic aristocracy…[and] for 
the purposes of trade and recruiting mercenaries from among their tribesmen” (Abun-Nasr 1971, 
320).  However, as the Carthaginian Empire grew stronger, three Berber Kingdoms arose to 
counter its rise: 1) the Massylii (Tunisia—Algeria), 2) the Masaesyli (northwestern Algeria), and 
3) the Mauri (northern Morocco) 61. Massylii and Masaesyli were later incorporated into the 
Numidian62 Kingdom under King Massinissa. These Berber Kingdoms flourished “between the 
destruction of Carthage and the establishment of effective Roman control over the Maghreb63 ” 
(Encyclopedia Britannica, 15th ed., s.v. “North Africa”).   The Mauri Kingdom was established in 
present-day Morocco and the Western Sahara and was ruled by several Berber kings until it 
                                                                                                                                            
Numidians, Mauri and Iberian, Celto-Iberians from Spain These latter were comprised of several Berber tribes—
Garamantes, Gaetulian, Nasamones. Encyclopedia Britannica, 24, 15th ed., s.v., “North Africa,” (Chicago: 
Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 2010), 956. 
 
60 According to Ilahiane, early Greek writers had used barabaroi for those groups that were “non-Phoenicians within the 
Carthaginian state” or for those who neither spoke Greek nor Latin. Pazzanita, Historical Dictionary of the Berbers, 
2006, xxx. Abun-Nasr writes that the Romans had labeled the non-Greek and non-Latin speakers as barbari. Jamil M. 
Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghreb, 2nd ed., (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 7. Ghirelli states that it 
was the Byzantines that had Hellenized the name to barbaroi and fashioned it to such an extent that it became common 
among city-dwellers to identify it with non-urban tribes. El País Berebere, 6-7. It is also possible that the connotation 
barabaroi came from the Greek for barbaros, which meant ‘foreign’ or ‘strange.’ Bullard, “The Berbers of the Maghreb 
and Ancient Carthage,” in Africa and Africans in Antiquity, ed. Yamauchi, 183. 
 
61 The Mauri (Latin, Gr. Maurusii, and given by Romans as Mauretani) provided their name to modern Mauritania and 
originally lived between the Atlantic Ocean and the Wadi (river or dry river bed/valley) Moulouya (or Muluya) or the 
Chelif River. The Moulouya is located in modern-day northeastern Morocco and the source of its waters originate in 
the Middle Atlas and empties into the Mediterranean Sea. The Chelif River or Wadi ash-Shalif is the longest and most 
important river of Algeria and is located along the northeastern Algerian coast whose source originates in the Saharan 
Atlas and also empties into the Mediterranean Sea. 
 
62 Bullard, Ilahiane, and Abun-Nasr all agree that the Greeks employed ‘Libyan’ as another name for the North 
Africans or non–Punic peoples and Numidian or “nomad” for the manner in which pastoralism was practiced. 
 
63 The term Maghrib, spelled occasionally as the Maghreb, is Arabic for ‘west’ and is referred to in Arabic as al-
Maghrib or Tamazgha (‘land of the Berbers’) in the Berber language. It is the region of north and northwestern Africa 
between the Atlantic Ocean and Egypt that comprises the coastal plain and Atlas Mountains of Morocco, together with 
Algeria and Tunisia and sometimes Tripolitania (Libya). Oxford Dictionaries: Language Matters, 2014 ed., s.v. 
“Maghreb,” Oxford University Press, 2014, accessed July 24 2014, 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/Maghreb?q=Maghrib . This text will use the 
‘Maghreb’ spelling unless there is another spelling from a quote or in a title of a work that was cited or referenced in 
this study. 
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became a Roman client state in 33 BCE.64  After Rome’s defeat of Carthage in 146 BCE 65, it 
maintained nominal control over North Africa. At this time, Roman North Africa was divided 
into four provinces: 1)  Africa Proconsularis 66 (the northern portion of Tunisia), 2) the Kingdom 
of Numidia,67 as a Roman client state, 3) “[t]o the west, in Mauretania68…, [and] 4) the 
Gaetulians69 ” (Brett and Fentress 1997, 41).  
The Berbers had not only founded kingdoms prior to Roman control, but had also 
established formal relations (including intermittent alliances) and initiated several revolts against 
the Roman Empire. These Berber kingdoms had, in general, transformed most of their nomadic 
people into a semi-pastoral or agricultural society. Mercer attests that, beginning in the first 
century BCE, the Saharan Berber had “been independent of the Maghreb” (Mercer 1976a, 498).  
One of these large Berber groups was, according to the ancient texts of Hanno, Pliny the Elder, 
and Ptolemy, called the “Gaetulians,” who resided to the south and east of Roman control. Smith 
(who refers to German scholars Ritter et al 1817, 1034; Hornemann and Konig 1802, 223)70 
                                                
64 The Mauri (or Mauretania) Kingdom traditionally was located in present-day Morocco and although literature is 
scant surrounding their origins, there is mention of the Mauri and of an early King Baga (≈225 BCE) in Livy’s Ad Urbe 
Condita Libri (History of Rome), Book 29.30 and in other ancient texts. The more notable rulers of the Kingdom of 
Mauretania were Bocchus I, Bocchus II, Juba I, and Ptolemy. 
 
65 Rome conquered the Carthaginian Empire, wiping out the city of Carthage and its inhabitants in the third Punic War 
of 146 BCE. 
 
66 Africa Proconsularis or Africa Vetus, governed by a proconsul (Roman provincial governor), was Rome’s first 
African colony. 
 
67 This kingdom was previously divided between the ancient eastern and western Numidian monarchical tribes of 
Massylii and Massaesylli before uniting under King Massinissa (202 BCE) as a client of Rome with as much autonomy 
as possible in order to balance the power of Carthage. 
 
68 Mauretania had largely been an independent tribal Berber Kingdom since the 3rd century BCE but Rome had 
indirectly influenced Mauretania’s politics through its neighboring wars with Carthage and Numidia. However, 
Mauretania did not come under Roman suzerainty until after the death of Bocchus II in 33 BCE. 
 
69 The Gaetulians were perhaps the largest of the Berber groups that dominated much of the interior of the Sahara. They 
were non-urban dwellers, thought to be pastoral-nomadic but archeological research has found they adapted irrigated 
cultivation but traveled considerably by horseback across the great Sahara to the Atlantic coast. 
 
70Carl Ritter and Georg Friedrich Hermann Müller, Die Erdkunde im Verhältnisse zur Natur und zur Geschichte des 
Menschen, (1817) Vol. 1 (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1822-1859), 1034. Friedrich Konrad Hornemann and Karl Konig, 
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writes that the Gaetulians “appear to be the chief ancient representatives of the great aboriginal 
people of modern Africa, who call themselves Amazygh or Amazergt, and to whom belong the 
Berbers of M. Atlas” (Smith 1854).  Pliny wrote that Gaetulia extended as far west as “the 
Atlantic Ocean; and on the S. [sic] to a margin of the great basin of the river NIGIR [sic],” or, 
according to Pliny, “to the river Nigir71 [sic] itself” (Smith, 1854).  The Gaetulians were 
“primarily nomadic herder”72 tribes, who wandered in an undefined territory on the “southern 
slopes of the Atlas Mountains from the Aurés Massif westward as far as the Atlantic; southward it 
extended to the oases in the northern part of the Sahara” (Encyclopedia Britannica, 15th ed., s.v. 
“Gaetulian”). Mundy states that in the first century of the new Christian millennium: “The 
nomadic Gaetulians of the northern pre-desert, distinguished themselves by the fact that they 
lived ‘outside the two great [Amazigh] kingdoms of Numidia and Mauritania, and resisted any 
attempts to tax or control them’” (Mundy 2007, 306). 
According to Pliny, writing in the first century AD, the two most powerful of the 
Gaetulian tribes were the Baniurae and the Autololes. The Baniurae occupied a more northerly 
area along the coast of then-Mauretania. The Autololes73 were the more powerful Berber tribe and 
although their exact dominions are difficult to identify, Idjennaden believes that their control was 
                                                                                                                                            
Tagebuch seiner Reise von Cairo nach Murzuck, (Weimar: 1802), 223. Bayerische StaatsBibliothek Digital, accessed 
November 12, 2014, http://www.mdz-nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn=urn:nbn:de:bvb:12-bsb10467058-2. 
 
71 It is not known with certainty which river basin of the Niger River Pliny was referring to. “As the limits of Gaetulia 
have not been settled, either by Ptolemy, or any of the other ancient geographers, it is impossible for us to define 
them…but notwithstanding the indefinite terms in which the ancients have laid this region, by comparing their several 
accounts and description…and, by consulting the observations of the moderns, conclude, that it could not have reached 
to any great distance in the Sahara.” George Sale, et al, An Universal History: From the Earliest Accounts to the 
Present Time, Vol XVI, Part I (London: Printed for C. Bathurst [etc.], 1780), 166. 
 
72 Bob Idjennaden, The Forgotten Civilizations of Africa: The Gaetulian Warriors 3 (March 29, 2012), Kindle Edition 
for Mac. 
 
73 Translated from the French by the author, “Pliny the Elder describes them as barbarians particularly dangerous and 
always ready to pillage and massacre, but also seeking the alliance of less powerful tribes, the Darae and Daratitae of 
the Dra Valley, the Pharusi on the western slope of the High Atlas, the Masathi on the banks of the river Masath today 
oued Massa.” Gabriel Camps, Les Gétules: Guerriers Nomades dans l’Africa Romaine, July 2002, accessed July 26, 
2016 https://www.clio.fr/BIBLIOTHEQUE/les_getules_guerriers_nomades_dans_l_africa_romaine.asp#biblio. 
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delimited by the Bou Regreg River in the north, to the south beyond the Sous region and in the 
Valley of the Dra’a74 (or sometimes spelled ‘Draa,’ now all areas of present-day Morocco) 
(Idjennaden 2012, 3.1).  Farther south, in the vicinities of southeastern Morocco and the Western 
Sahara, stretching southwest toward modern Mauritania, there were other smaller groups such as 
the Canarii, Nigritae, Perorsi or Pharusii (see map 3.1) but they seem to have either disappeared 
or intermarried with other Gaetulian groups. Today, scholarly consensus indicates that the Gaetuli 
were a confederacy of tribes that included the groups75 mentioned above (Challis et al 2007, 290; 
Law 1978,143).  Apart from the descriptions above, little else has been extracted about ancient 
Saharan Berber culture, history, and their territorial domain. 
Any distinguishing characteristics between the Mauretanian (now modern Morocco and 
Algeria) and the Gaetulian Berbers is challenging. However, it has been determined that the 
kingdoms on the coast were more sedentary than those outside the Carthaginian and Roman 
sphere of influence. The Gaetulian Berbers were nomadic or semi-nomadic “part dwelling in 
tents… wandering about without settled abodes, and under no settled government” (Dictionary of 
Greek and Roman Geography, s.v., “Gaetu’lia,” 
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.04.0064:entry=gaetulia-
geo&highlight=gaetulia ),with evidence of horse-rearing, essential for traveling and trading over 
 long distances, and depicted as barbarous and warlike by classical writers (Challis et al 2007,
                                                
74 One source indicates that there was perhaps a legendary Kingdom of the Dra or a people mentioned as the ‘Darae’ or 
‘Gaetuli-Darae,’ in the steppes of the Great Atlas [Mountains] and of the ‘Melanogaetuli,’ a black race resulting from 
the intermixture of the Gaetuli with their southern neighbors, the Nigritae.” Henry Immanuel Smith, Course of Ancient 
Geography, (New York: D Appleton and Co) 1861, 309. Another text describes that this kingdom was perhaps first 
populated by the black Koushite, ‘descendants of the Biblical Cushites, but were later invaded by Jewish Palestinian 
immigrants, intermarried, or were pushed aside, with some converting to Christianity. D. Jacque-Meunié, Le Maroc 
Saharien des Origines a 1670, Vol 1 (Paris: Librarie Klincksieck, 1982), 61. 
 
75 “…les Gétules Autololes pourraient être les ancêtres des Guezoula et des Ilalene – Berbères qui occupent aujourd'hui 
l'Anti Atlas occidental et ses environs...Peut-être est-ce dans la même région que vivent … aux temps de Polybe ou 
d'Agrippa … les Gétules Dariens et les Éthiopiens Daratites qui pourraient être les uns et les autres les lointains 
ancêtres des gens du Dra parmi lesquels se côtoient des Blanc et des Noirs, sans beaucoup se mélanger entre eux en 
dépit d'une longue coexistence.” D. Jacques-Meunié, Le Maroc Saharien des Origines a 1670 (Paris: Librarie 
Klincksiec, 1982), 167. 
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Map  3.1:  African  Antiqua  Showing  Ancient  Groups  in  Northwest  Africa 76 
 
289).  The Berber tribes communicated “with at least four different alphabets found in Libyan 
inscriptions” stretching from the Atlantic coast to modern Libya and practiced ancestor worship, 
adopting pagan gods, such as the frequently mentioned Libyan god, Ammon (ibid., 289). A few 
authors (Smith 1854) and other ancient scholars, the most recognizable ethnic feature was skin 
color. The coastal cities along with the interior peripheral lands of the Gaetulian and Garamantes 
                                                
76 Map from Dr. Samuel Butler, “Africa Antiqua” (1838), An Atlas of Ancient Geography, (Philadelphia: Le and 
Blanchard, 1840).  
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were associated with white or whiter skin color while those south of these Berber groups were 
described as black. For the most part, the essence of the Gaetulian Berber seems to indicate that 
they were a diverse set of tribes living and traveling across a vast North African landscape, using 
several scripts, and intermarrying with northern (whiter) and southern neighbors (Nigritae), 
adopting various gods. 
Despite these obstacles of lineage, the Sahrawi concede that they are of mixed blood—
Black, Berber, and Arab. In fact, to the surprise of the author, in most interviews conducted in the 
Sahrawi camps outside Tindouf, Algeria, many POLSARIO representatives touched upon this 
mixed race idea matter-of-factly. In the words of Brooks, since “it is widely accepted that modern 
and historical Berber and proto-Berber populations …are in large part descended from the pre-
historic Saharan pastoralist groups” and “the cultural continuity evident between the 
archeological records of the central and western Sahara,” extends to the Western Sahara, it gives 
the traditionally nomadic Sahrawi “a particular affinity with prehistoric pastoralists,” countering 
the claims of a sedentary Moroccan society (Brooks 2007, 249).  He also notes how “areas rich in 
in prehistoric burials” in the free zones of the Western Sahara have been used by POLISARIO 
fighters to bury their dead closely resembling the practices of the pre-historic period—re-
enforcing their identity with the land and their ‘ancestors’ (ibid., 250).  Finally, in the search for 
examples of such primordial connections, there is evidence (although small) that the Gaetulians 
were the ancestors to a group called the Gudala. Camps wrote that “[i]t seems that the 
descendants of the Gétules [Gaetulians] are found in Guedala – also called Godula and Guezzala 
–—great Sanhadja confederation in which the reformist movement arose of the Almoravids who 
were to conquer Morocco and create an empire stretching from Senegal to Ebro” (Camps, s.v., 
“Les Gétules,” 
https://www.clio.fr/BIBLIOTHEQUE/les_getules_guerriers_nomades_dans_l_africa_romaine.as
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p#biblio ). Still, these statements are based on speculation and they assume that for almost 2500 
years (500 BCE – 2000 AD), these tribes have remained in the same location and of pure blood. 77 
The idea behind all of this history is to give the reader a unique perspective on the 
patterns of migration and cycles of invasion that characterized North Africa, specifically the area 
covering Mauritania, Western Sahara, and Morocco, including parts of southeast and southern 
Algeria. In order to extract the origins of the Sahrawi from the ancient past, the process 
necessitates visiting several periods of demographic change due to cyclical power structures and 
climate. It also demonstrates how Berber society had become diffuse as they migrated farther 
south. This pattern continued in the period leading up to the seventh century Arab invasions. The 
previous section ended with the mention of the Gaetulian-Berbers because they have been 
regarded as the most direct ancestors to Sahrawi identity. However, as these Gaetulians absorbed 
tribes and then sub-divided into others, a pattern of tribal diversification persisted. This pattern of 
change hinders the search for a group, tribe, or socio-political entity that can be tied to the 
modern Sahrawi. The following section details further difficulties. 
 
Sanhaja Berber and Early Islamic Dynastic Rule — From the Fourth through the Eleventh 
Century 
 
Three huge confederations of Gaetulian-Berber tribes came to dominate the Maghrib in the first 
centuries AD: The Sanhaja, Masmuda, and Zenata (Mercer 1976a, 499).  According to Pazzanita, 
the Sanhaja Berbers are the primary ancestors of the Sahrawi and therefore the study will focus 
on tracing their descendants (Pazzanita 2006, 383). They are the forebears of the Berber people of 
                                                
77 Another problem lies with the labeling of these tribes. Norris asserts that two different tribes of similar name existed, 
the Gudula and Gazula. He mentions that the ancient Arabic texts confuse both. He distinguishes between the two, but 
only nominally, by implying that both survive today, with the Gazula inhabiting “the region between the Wad Nun and 
the Anti-Atlas in Morocco” and the Gudala, are “the most westerly and southerly of the mulaththamun [of the veil] 
Sanhaja in the Western Sahara.” H. T. Norris, The Arab Conquest of the Arab Western Sahara (Harlow [Essex], UK: 
Longman and Librarie du Liban, 1986), 245-246. 
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the Rif78 and the Middle Atlas of Morocco, the Kabyles of Algeria and the Tuaregs of Mali, 
Algeria, and Niger. The Sanhaja (also known as the Zenaga or Azenaya/Azenaga) held and came 
to dominate the triangular desert area of the Western Sahara—from the Moroccan Sous, “the 
Trarza, now west Mauritania” to Timbuktu, Mali—between 50 BCE and 400 AD (Mercer 1976a, 
499).  They were originally an agricultural group “who were forced by the encroaching desert 
tobecome nomadic, warlike, caravan raiders” (Munene 2010, 73).  These Berbers became 
powerful through their control of the trans-Saharan trade routes that extended south to 
Aoudaghost (modern Tedgadawast, Mauritania) through the collection of taxes and tribute, and 
“acting as paid guides and sentinels” (Page 2001,187).  Their ‘capital’ seems to have been the city 
of Aoudaghost (or Awdahgast), which was a flourishing oasis located at the south-western end of 
the caravan trade routes used by the nomadic tribes of the Sahara. 
At the same time, the Islamized Berbers began to permeate the caravan routes of the 
Sahara and spread Islam farther south and west to modern Mali. Between the first and eighth 
centuries, the primarily pastoral, nomadic and semi-nomadic, ‘white’ Sanhaja Berbers controlled 
the northwest region of Africa and by the eighth century had converted to Islam only 
superficially. They came to be characterized by resistance to control, but were confined to the 
north by their Berber rivals, the Zenata79, and the black Soninke people of the Ghanian Empire80 
 
                                                
78 This “geographical notion refers to the northern zone of Morocco formerly under Spanish and international control.” 
People of the Rif region recognize three main confederations as well as territorial divisions: Rif, Ghommara, and 
Sanhaja.” Ilahiane, Historical Dictionary of the Berbers [Imazighen], s.v., “Rif,” 106. 
 
79 The Zenata were a rival Berber group that contested the domination of the Sanhaja. At one point they had pushed the 
Sanhaja “out of the Oued Draa” and Tafilalet and “came into control of the north-south caravan routes,” restricting the 
free movement of the Sanhaja between the Sahara and the Atlas Mountains. Pazzanita, s.v., “Sanhaja,” 2006, 383-384. 
 
80 The Kingdom of Ghana was composed of Soninke and Zenata Berbers and located in modern-day southern 
Mauritania and northern Mali. In 990 AD, it recaptured Aoudaghost (a city that became a critical trading center in the 
Ghanaian kingdom) from the Sanhaja Berbers. 
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Map  3.2:  Northwest  Sahara  81 
to the South (Munene 2010, 73).  The Zenata pushed the Sanhaja Lamtuna82  Berber tribes to 
Atari in the Adrar Mountains (modern Mauritania) and away from the Oued (River) Dra’a and 
Tafilalet (now present-day Morocco) (Pazzanita 2006, 383-84). Mercer states that the first Arab 
wave did not directly penetrate the desert and the Berbers themselves, from the east, spread Islam 
south and to the west across much of North Africa (Mercer 1976b, 72).  Perhaps the first to arrive 
                                                
81 Map adapted from T. Lewicki, “The Role of Sahara and Saharians in their Relationships between North and South,” 
in General History of Africa III: Africa from the Seventh to the Eleventh Century, 3rd edited by M. El-Fasi and I. 
Hrbek (Berkeley: University of California Press,1988), 279. 
 
82 Other spellings include Lemtuna or Lemtouna. Lamtuna was chosen to eliminate confusion from Lemta sub-tribe.  
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with his Arab armies, Ogba (or Okba) Ibn Nafi, governor of the province of Ifriqiya and a caliph 
from Damascus, arrived in the Sous “as far as the sources of the Seguiet el Hamra” in 681 
(Rézette 1975, 37).  However, despite the wave of Arab Muslims that engulfed the whole of 
North Africa, the Berbers resisted.  If there were any conversions, they were nominal at best, even 
among the Sanhaja (7th through 9th centuries). The Arabs designated the Sanhaja first as anbiya, 
but that was later changed to Sanhaja in the tenth century (Page 2001, 187). By the ninth century, 
three of the four leading Sanhaja tribes in the western Sahara were the Lamtuna, Massufa 83, and 
the Guddala84 (see map 3.2), who had “inhabited the Sahara from Mauretania to Hoggar and to 
the south as far as the Sudan…were joined loosely in a confederacy” (Abun-Nasr 1971, 92).  
D’Almonte wrote that among these several fracciones (fractions), the Lamtuna fraction (or sub-
tribe) was not only the most powerful and most important of the Sanhaja tribes but had actually 
peopled the Oued Nun85 (Nun River) Valley (which lies north of ‘Wadi Dar’a in Map 3.2) 
(D’Almonte 1914, 150).  By 990, the Sanhaja had lost their ‘capital’ to the Soninke. Pressure 
from the Ghanian Empire, the Arab north, infighting between the Lamtuna and Guddala, two 
powerful tribes, had debilitated their once formidable power. 
Anti-authoritarian aversion to royal or sovereign control became a more salient 
characteristic of the Sanhaja Berber in the Western Saharan regions. The Arab conquests of the 
Maghrib did not completely eradicate the strong sense of ethnic identity among the Berbers. 
Rezétte writes that the although the Romans had left ‘frontiers’ with their ‘limes,’86  “true 
occupation of the country by Arab conquerors who settled in with their families, only dates from 
                                                
83 Other spellings include Messoufa. 
 
84 Other spellings include Gadala or Juddala. 
 
85 Translated from the Spanish, “Son las tribus que actualmente pueblan el Uad Nun,” Enrique D’Almonte, Ensayo de 
una Breve Descripción del Sáhara Español, (Madrid: Patronato de Huérfanes de Intendencia é Intervención Militares, 
1914) 160. This river is located in present-day Morocco. 
 
86The ‘Roman Limes’ represented the borderline of the Roman Empire at its greatest extent in the 2nd century AD. 
UNESCO, Frontiers of the Roman Empire, accessed October 15, 2014,  http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/430. 
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the arrival of the Hilalian Bedouins beginning with the XIth century… [and was] bounded by the 
Bou Regreg River which empties in to the Atlantic between Rabat and Salé, was for long a real 
frontier. Beyond it, the country becomes empty” (Rezétte 1975, 37).  The Arab march into North 
Africa only superficially converted the indigenous population. Many of the inhabitants fled to the 
hills and left the settled countryside. According to Monès, this was true, but later, many Berbers 
willingly accepted Islam because of its attractive message (Monès 1988, 243).  Several sources 
reveal that although Islam was accepted as the new religion, many of those converted males 
would be conscripted to the Arab armies in their eventual domination of the entire Maghrib. 
However, harsher Arab policies toward the Berber were met with strong resistance. The struggle 
was based not on religion, but on the Ummayyad administration of the Berber communities and 
their complaints of inequality and discrimination.  Grievances were also voiced by those Berber 
allies that had cooperated with the Arab armies: especially Arab ‘ungratefulness’ in the aiding 
and capture of the Iberian Peninsula (Monès 1988, 244; Abu-Nasr, 1971, 10). 
There has been an immense amount of pressure attempting to establish Sahrawi lineage to the 
Berber people. Far from being descendants of a pure line of people, specifically in the Western 
Sahara, evidence shows the modern Sahrawi are quite the opposite. In fact, if a strict primordial 
explanation of nation were to be followed here, one would have to find genealogical (DNA) links, 
however small (qualitatively or quantitatively). These links should establish a historical thread 
that stretches back to the Bafour. For example, figure 3.3 above depicts a possible genealogical 
tree for the Sahrawi through the ninth and tenth centuries AD.  However, 
based on the evidence and literature in this study, including absorption by manner of war, slavery, 
intermarriage, and nomadic transhumance, the linkages to the past are subjective and open to 
breakages in the genealogical line. 
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Figure 3.3:  A  Possible  Sahrawi  Genealogical  Tree 87 
                                                
87 In reality, the Western Gaetulian Berbers were comprised of more than three tribes pictured above. They were a 
diverse set of independent tribes outside the control of the more agricultural, sedentary, coastal, North African 
Mauretanian and Numidian Kingdoms that included the Awarba, Berghwata, Houra, Kutama, Masmouda, Sanhaja, and 
the Zenata. 
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For instance, beginning with the Bafour, the scholarly consensus has determined that they 
settled in North Africa but there is no agreement about where they came from. In fact, most of the 
scholarship tends to point to the arrival of different sets of Neolithic Berbers from all directions 
into North Africa, endangering the hope of a pure continuous connection to the Lybico-Berber. 
Second, the Berbers seem to be an amalgam of confederate tribes that stretched all along North 
Africa. The semi-nomadic to nomadic lifestyle based on the prehistoric rock art found scattered in 
and around the Sahara is very similar and points to parallel cultural features (horse rearing, cattle 
herding, ancestor worship, and warrior-like depictions). Still, ancient historians and modern 
scholars of today agree the Berbers were composed of dozens of tribes that spoke several dialects 
and wrote in at least four different scripts. Some built agricultural kingdoms along the coast while 
others preferred to roam the interior. Still other confederations of tribes had a close relationship 
with the Carthaginian and later Roman Empire, while others chose to remain aloof or rebel 
against their authority. 
Third, further southwest along the coastline, Gaetulian Berber tribes of the Western 
Sahara “were independent and had the authority to make territorial decisions” (Danver 2015, 
643).  Thus, despite a narrower regional scope as the study moves forward, the ‘bloodlines’ are so 
mixed with disparate tribal history that it is nearly impossible to develop a formative line of 
descent to the Sanhaja. Fourth, the Sanhaja historically begin as a mixed collective from among 
several tribes (see footnote 61). Any one of these Sanhaja tribes could be a genetic ancestor to the 
Sahrawi but more anthropological research needs to be undertaken. Thus, the primordial approach 
in this case runs into a huge ontological obstacle. It is difficult to hold to the argument, at this 
point, that the Sahrawi are direct descendants of the Bafour, the Lybico-Berber, Gaetulian, or 
even the Sanhaja Berber.  
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The Great Berber Dynasties –– From the Eleventh to Thirteenth Centuries 
The eleventh and twelfth centuries saw the development of two of the Berber’s greatest dynasties, 
the Almoravid [≈1061/62-1147]88 and Almohad [1147-1269]. At their height, they encompassed 
most of the Maghrib, as far East as Tripoli, northward to southern Spain and the Balearic Islands, 
and deep into the southwest commercial routes of Niger and Mauritania, including the Western 
Sahara.  The Almoravids, a mostly Lamtuna Berber-speaking minority that led a dynasty of 
majority Arabs could have been forerunners to the modern Sahrawi. In 1041-42, Yahya Ibn 
Ibrahim, chief of the Guddala tribe, on his return from Mecca, lamented at the poor observance of 
Islam among the Sanhaja Berbers, and invited “a fierce and austere preacher,” Abdullah Ibn 
Yacin, a Sanhaja of the Jazula tribe, to evangelize the people (Pazzanita 2006, 20).  Ibn Ibrahim 
had hoped that this ‘pure’ form of Islam would improve the fortunes of the inobservant Sanhaja. 
The Guddala (sub-tribe of the Sanhaja) rejected Ibn Yacin’s message and expelled him. However, 
he traveled with a handful of armed disciples to establish a ribat89 in northern Mauritania (see 
Map 3.4).  Initially, his following grew among the Saharan nomads and may have numbered from 
one to three thousand. Ibn Yacin’s followers were called al-Murabitun90  (“those of the ribat”), 
 
                                                
88 Dates vary as to the beginning of their dynastic rule. Qantara-med.org states 1056; Ilahiane begins with founding of 
Marrakesh but in 1061; Historyworld.net posts 1062; The Encyclopedia Britannica establishes a start date upon the 
establishment of Marrakesh as well but in 1062; The author will suggest a general consensus of 1061-1062 based on 
the Britannica (Vol 1, 15th Ed.) and Ludwig W. Adamec, Historical Dictionary of Islam, s.v., ‘Almoravid,’ (Lanham, 
MD: Scarecrow Press, 2001), 43. 
 
89 Ribat has come to mean either ‘fortified convent,’ ‘religious retreat,’ or ‘military fortress.’ Most scholars tend to 
agree that it was a term used for denoting religious fortress. See Pazzanita 2006, 20; Rézette 1975, 40; Abun-Nasr 
1971, 95; Mercer 1976b, 72. 
 
90 Al-Murabitun, which may also be stated as al-Murabitin and translated as ‘Those Dwelling in Frontier Fortresses’’ is 
the Arabic plural form of al-murabit, which means an ‘inmate’ of the ribat. Encyclopedia Britannica, 10, 15th ed., s.v., 
“Almoravids.” 
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Map 3.4:  The  Almoravid  Empire  and  Environs  91 
                                                
91 Map adapted and translated from the French by author. “The Empire of the Two Shores: The Conquests of the 
Almoravids until their Apogee,” http://aworldofmaps.free.fr/, 11 Aug 2009, accessed July 28, 2016, 
http://aworldofmaps.free.fr/fr/?showimage=32. 
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from where the Spanish corruption ‘Almoravides’92 originates. Eventually, the Murabitun or 
Almoravids came to dominate the southwestern Sahara and subject the Guddala, the Lamtuna, 
and the Massufa—all tribes that form part of the Sanhaja Berbers—to their strict form of Sunni 
Malekite Islam. 
It is at this juncture that an interesting socio-political divergence of Sanhaja history takes 
place. Ibn Yacin, now allied with Yayha Ibin ‘Umar, succeeding the deceased Ibn Ibrahim as 
head of the Lamtuna, led the newly militarized Sanhaja and indoctrinated the rest of the regional 
tribes under the Almoravid umbrella. Circa 1043, two militant Sanhaja streams—north and 
south—developed as an outgrowth of its strength and extended from its ‘base’ in southern 
Mauritania (see map 3.4 above).  Abu Bakr Ibn ‘Umar (who assumed control after his brother 
Yahya Ibn Umar perished in battle) defeat the Ghana Empire,” take present-day provinces of 
Morocco, western Algeria, and “reunify Muslim Spain” (Pazzanita 2006, 384).  According to 
Mercer, the southern militant stream descended as far south as the Senegal until the death of the 
Lamtuna Emir Abu Bakr Ibn ‘Umar in 1087. Under Abu Bakr, the ‘southern’ Sanhaja had chosen 
his cousin, Yusuf Ibn Tashfin, to take control of the northern force while he ventured south to 
quell the unrest among the Sanhaja. This period initiated the Almoravid93 Dynasty (Mercer 1976, 
499).  The ‘people of the ribat’ used a more austere and “radical form of Islam to motivate the 
Berbers and consolidated Islam (only as an elite religion; the masses remained animist), moved 
civilizational focus south, which came “to evolve into the Mali Empire of the mid-thirteenth 
century, and [shifted] trans-Sahara trade…eastwards to routes, from Timbuctoo and Gao, through 
more stable zones” (Mercer 1976b, 73). 
                                                
92 Almoravid is the transcription of the Arabic al-murabitun, inhabitants of a ribat, a kind of monastery. Abdallah 
Laroui, The History of the Maghrib: An Interpretive Essay, trans. Ralph Manheim (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1977) 158. 
 
93 The Almoravid or Al-Murabitun Dynasty, originating in the mid-eleventh century, encompassed the area of present-
day Mauritania and parts of northern Western Sahara. 
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The break among the Almoravids into north and south makes the search for origins of 
Sahrawi national identity much more difficult. First, the divergent Almoravid streams fracture 
considerably the number of Sanhaja Berber tribes that can be followed with any historical 
accuracy. Secondly, the nomadic nature of these tribes challenge the social and political scientist 
in associating a specific Saharan territory to a specific group. The only identifiable settled 
‘nations’ in the proximity of the Western Sahara94 (apart from the Idrissid Dynasty) beginning in 
the tenth century were those, according to historical accounts, of the trading mecca and later 
principality of Sijilmasa, the Confederacy of Barghawata95, predominantly along the northwest 
Atlantic coast (modern Morocco) and then across the Sahara, approaching the mostly black 
Sahelian ‘states’ of the Takrur and Ghanaian Empire. The lack of research as a result of yet-to-be-
discovered and untranslated literature, inaccessible manuscripts (due to conflict), and the harsh 
environment prevent proper study of the historical development of nation building in the Western 
Sahara. Finally, the only notion of a cohesive identity was tied to the tribe but there is no 
evidence before or as follows for a distinct ‘Sahrawi’ tribe. 
 
The Great Sanhaja Divide 
The northern portion of the Sanhaja, along with their marabout96 Islam, retook the important 
trading city of Sijilmasa (1056) from the restive Guddala, successfully founded the city of 
                                                
94 The Idrisid Dynasty (789-921) was founded well north of modern Western Sahara in Fes (Morocco) by the Arab 
Idriss I. It did extend southward to the frontiers of the Barghawata tribal confederation but was only able to reach the 
pre-desert regions of Sijilmasa and possibly into the Sous River Valley. However, after Idriss II’s death, the ‘Kingdom’ 
fragmented upon the division of its territories to his sons. The provinces never re-united and “caught in the crossfire of 
the conflict between the Fatimid and [Spanish] Umayyad Empires, their territories finally fell” to the Zenata. “The 
Umayyad victory over the last Idrisid, al-Hasan ibn Gannun…marked the definitive end of the dynasty in 974.” 
Encyclopedia Britannica, 6, 15th ed., s.v., “Idrisid Dynasty,’ 244; “The Idrisids (789-974),” Qantara: Mediterranean 
Heritage, accessed July 28, 2016, http://www.qantara-med.org/qantara4/public/show_document.php?do_id=867., 
There are discrepancies over the end date of Idrisid dynastic rule. 
 
95 John Ralph Willis, ed., Studies in West African Islamic History, Vol 1, The Cultivators of Islam, (New York: 
Routledge, 2012), 81. 
 
96 Marabout “is the name given, especially in North Africa, to a Muslim saint or to his descendants.” Eds., H.A.R. Gibb 
and J. H. Kramers, Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam, s.v., ‘marabout,’ (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1965), 325.  
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Marrakesh (1062), captured Fes in 1069, and established the kingdom of Morocco. Ibn Tashfin 
had begun construction of the new capital of Morocco Marrakesh (1070), which would become 
one of the most beautiful cities in all of Morocco. By 1082, the northern Almoravid forces had 
taken control of northern Morocco and northwestern Algeria (as far as Algiers). The northern 
parts of the Sanhaja Berber-led Almoravid Dynasty were to emulate Andalusian civilization in 
culture—including art, architecture, and construction of buildings and monuments. These 
developments were supported by the resources of gold found in the southern regions of Sanhaja- 
dominated Senegal and the western Niger. Still, the division, between the northern and southern 
areas of the Almoravid Dynasty remained due to the vast desert landmass of the Sahara. These 
northern Sanhaja were able to defend the region from the Eastern Fatimites, Hilalian Bedouin, 
and the Zenata (another sub-tribe of Sanhaja) who were pushed north earlier by the southern 
‘desert Sanhajas.’ 
 These ‘desert’ or southern Sanhaja merit further historical detail because 
geographically they may offer a connection to the modern Sahrawi. The southern portion was 
beset by ‘internecine warfare’ and preferred to remain independent—maintaining traditional ways 
of living (Pazzanita 2006, 384).  Despite there being Sanhaja confederations, not all were under 
an overriding, governing entity. Moreover, this becomes the constant dynamic among the tribes 
— a fluctuation of loyalties and tribal animosities. Even among the ruling elite, certain 
distinctions take place. For example, when Abu Bakr, returns from the south after defeating the 
Soninké (Ghana) to take his place as ruler of the northern Almoravids, he is told to “return to the 
desert,” after negotiating with his cousin via enticements and favors. Pazzanita comments that 
Abu Bakr was then detached from the Almoravid’s northern branch that conquered and settled in 
present-day Morocco and southern Spain (Pazzanita 2006, 384).  Several authors noted that there 
was a division, not based on any cultural or ethnic separateness but on the route of conquest and 
trade. For example, Mercer briefly states that “the long-established Sahara crossing had been 
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Sijilmasa—Tindouf—Kedia d’Ijil or the Ourane Desert—Aoudaghost but the troubles allowed 
Timbuctoo [sic] and Gao (see map 3.5 below) to continue to increase in importance, the former  
 
 
Map 3.5:  West  Africa  in  the  Eleventh  Century 97 
                                                
97 Map adapted and taken from F. De Medeiros, “The Peoples of the Sudan: Population Movements” in General 
History of Africa III: Africa from the Seventh to the Eleventh Century, 3rd edited by M. El-Fasi and I. Hrbek (Berkeley: 
University of California Press,1988), 124. 
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for those caravans still going to Morocco and the latter for Tripolitania. This isolated the [desert 
or southern] Sanhaja from the Maghreb” (Mercer 1976b, 74). 
By 1147, the Almoravid Dynasty was replaced by the Almohad98 Dynasty consisting of 
Masmuda Berbers of the High Atlas, controlling much of what is now the Kingdom of Morocco. 
The Almohad Dynasty arose in the Sous99 River Valley of southern Morocco. Mohamed Abu 
Abd’Allah Ibn Tumart defeated the Wali (governor) of Sous100 in 1132 and began to neutralize 
his surrounding Almoravid enemies. After the death of Ibn Tumart, ‘Abdul-Mu’min Ibn ‘Ali, a 
Berber from the Zenata tribe, became the successor to the Almohad movement and would later 
take the title of khalifa (caliph) and Amir al-Mu’minin (Prince of the believers).101 By March 
1147, the Almohads were able to break the weakening northern Sanhaja capital of the Almoravids 
in Marrakesh. This conquest relegated the Sanhaja Berbers to the sands of the Sahara once again 
(Mercer 1976a, 500). The Almohads ordered a general massacre of the Lamtuna Berber (tribal 
power of the Almoravids) and declared Marrakesh (see map 3.6 below) as their new capital. A 
great number of the Lamtuna disappeared; some fled to Tuat (Algeria). Many of the Guddala (see 
map 3.5 above) were dispersed and ended up in the Sahara. “[T]he forced migration of the 
                                                
98 The Al-Muhawiddun (Unitarians) or Almohad (Sp.) Dynasty (1113-1269) crushed the Almoravid Dynasty and for 
more than a century controlled an empire that encompassed the entire Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and 
al-Andalus (Islamic Spain). Ilahiane writes that, “by virtue of its religious ideology, military power and political 
organization, and economic and cultural development, the state still fires the imagination of contemporary attempts at 
North African unity.” Ilahiane, Historical Dictionary of the Berbers, s.v., “Almohads,” 14. 
 
99 The Sous or Souss River valley (also known as the Sus in the Berber dialect of Tashelhiyt) of southern Morocco rises 
from several headstreams in the High Atlas Mountains and flows westward for 112 miles (180 km) to the Atlantic 
Ocean south of Agadir. Its alluvial basin, protected from the Sahara by the Anti-Atlas Mountains, has been one of 
Morocco's most fertile regions. Fruits, cotton, vegetables, sugar, and olives are grown, much of them for export. 
Encyclopedia Britannica, 11, 15th ed., s.v.,"Sous Wadi," (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 2010), 30. 
 
100 The Almoravid governor of Sous was Abu Bakr Ibn Muhammad al-Lamtuni. 
 
101 Amir al-mu’minin is also usually translated as “Commander of the Faithful” or Leader of the Faithful.” ‘Abdul 
Mu’min was the first non-Arab to be given this title. Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib, 111. 
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nomadic Arabs of the southern Maghreb was almost complete”102 (D’Almonte 1914, 154).  
According to Pazzanita (2006, 384), it “left the desert southern peoples as the only surviving 
remnant of the once-flourishing [Almoravid] empire.” Consequently, the Sahara Desert became 
not only an outlet for escape but also a refuge because of its inhospitable geographic nature. 
D’Almonte describes it well when he states that “the Great Desert and its steppe confines 
protected them from the fierce Almohads, whose voracity preferably attracted…on the other 
hand, the cities and the orchards situated between the Atlas and the Sierra Morena”103 (ibid.).  
D’Almonte also mentions, in his interviews with those elders of the Oulad-ed-Delim about the 
origins of their tribes, that “[t]he ferocity of the partisans of the Mehdi and Abdul-Mu’min had 
launched, to the Sahara, many Berbers and Arabs branded with fondness to the black banner of 
the Almoravids” (Ibid., 155). Many, according to the accounts in D’Almonte, were of the 
Guddala tribe, “(descendants of the ancient Gaetulians), and not many Arabs, more or less mixed 
with the Berbers, and native of Yemen (Qahtanites)”104 (ibid). From this short review of the 
Almoravids and Almohads, one finds that inter-tribal conflict and dynastic cleansing of ‘odious’ 
tribes only undermines the possible relationship theorized by claimants to a Sahrawi past. The 
Sanhaja tribes slowly began to change culturally — via Arabization of language and Islamization 
of religion — and purged demographically and historically through conquest. The early Gaetulian 
Berbers had been dispersed leaving only confederations of tribes along the northwestern Atlantic 
littoral and throughout the interior northwestern Sahara. Several groups, such as the Lamtuna, 
 
                                                
102 Translated from the Spanish by the author: “…la forzosa emigración de los árabes nómadas del Mogreb meridional 
fué casi completa…” D’Almonte, Ensayo de una Breve Descripción del Sáhara Español, 154. 
 
103 Translated from the Spanish by the author: “…el Gran Desierto y sus confines esteparios los reguardaron de los 
feroces Almohades, cuya voracidad atraían preferentemente, por otra parte, las ciudades y los vergeles situados entre el 
Atlas y la Sierra Morena.” The Sierra Morena is a Spanish mountain range that generally marked the extent of the 
Almoravid reach into southern (Andalucian) Spain. Ibid. 
 
104 Translated from the Spanish by the author: “… (descendientes de los antiguos getulos), y no pocos árabes, más o 
menos mezclados con los berberiscos, y oriundos del Yemen (Kahhthaníes).” Ibid., 155. 
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Map 3.6:  The  Western  Maghrib  and  Northern  Sahara 105 
Guddala, Arabs, even Blacks106 were killed, expelled, or fled farther south into the Sahara. These 
groups were displaced by Zenata and Masmuda Berbers, rival to the Sanhaja from the northeast 
                                                
105 Map from Roland Oliver, “Western Maghrib and the Sudan,” in The Cambridge History of Africa 1050 to 1600, 
Volume 3, Cambridge Histories Online (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 332. 
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of modern Morocco (the Rif, Fes, and Marrakesh). Thus, possible ancestral candidatessuch as the 
Lemtuna, Guddala, and various smaller groups of Sanhaja dispersed or were forced to migrate 
deeper into the Sahara (see map 3.5 above) as far as the Senegal River regions. As such, 
narrowing any one ancestral tribe or confederation of tribes to the Sahrawi remains elusive. 
 
Arab Dominance and the First Europeans: Thirteenth to Sixteenth Centuries 
‘Almohadic’ rule, as interpreted through their puritanical form of Islam, had already begun to 
divide both Berber and Arab, settled and nomadic people alike, including those of Sanhaja 
extract, from those city-dwellers who became allies of, and benefitted from, the Almohads. 
D’Almonte describes how, thereafter, the Maqil Arabs had begun to drive a different, more 
geographical, wedge between the Berbers of the Atlas Mountains and the Berbers of the Sahara. 
The Banu Maqil are important in this section of the study because they are considered the next 
promising tribal forefathers to the Sahrawi. The Maqil were an Arab Bedouin tribe whose origins 
were probably from Yemen. They reached the Oued Dra’a (W. Dar’a in Map 3.6 above) in 1281, 
assisted in the overthrow of the Almohads in ‘Morocco,’ and helped establish the Merinid 
Dynasty of the Zenata. Despite the aid, the Maqil were a warrior class that was a menace to the 
Merinids (and at times allies to Merinid adversaries). Moreover, several branches of the Banu 
Maqil fragmented even further and would become both allies and enemies of the Merinid, 
complicating the geo-political situation for the fledgling dynasty. 
The newly found Merinid107 Dynasty (1248-1465) pushed the Banu Maqil southward 
toward the desert-dwelling Sanhaja Berbers (Pazzanita 2006, 385).  Eventually, the Banu Maqil 
                                                                                                                                            
106 “The Almoravids, and in particular their leader, Abu Bakr b. ‘Umar, are credited by oral traditions in Mauritania 
with the final dispossession of the Blacks from their strongholds in the Sahara. In fact, the Almoravids’ exploits marked 
a decisive state in a long process in which black sendentaries retreated south to the Sahel as the Berber nomads 
advanced.” The Cambridge History of Africa, Vol 2, from c. 50 BCE –AD 1050 (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1978) 665. 
 
107 The Merinid are descendants of the Banu Marin tribes. 
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merged with and absorbed the Sanhaja Berbers. On many occasions, expeditions were mounted in 
order to push them southward and away from the (Moroccan) Sultanate. Another invasion from 
the east comprised of the Beni Hassan or Awlad Hassan,108 a branch of the Maqil Arabs, had 
arrived to support the Moroccan Zenata Berbers. They clashed with the Sanhaja in the south and 
southwestern Sahara. By the thirteenth century, the Beni Hassan had invaded the Oued Dra’a and 
Oued Noun regions, mixing with the Sanhaja Berber. Gradually, the Sanhaja began to disappear. 
Their language was replaced by the Hassaniya109 Arabic dialect. This migration gave rise to the 
Tekna tribes and the Oulad ed-Delim (one of the purest of Arab nomadic groups). 
According to Norton, the Banu Maqil, wedged between the more southerly Berber 
Saharans and the northern Merinids based in Fes, Kingdom of Fes, "found the Sus [sic] to their 
liking" (Norton 1986, 174). In a very interesting comment taken from Ibn Khaldun in his History 
of the Berbers, Norton states that the Maqil "subdued" and levied taxes on the subject people in 
the Sous and the Valley of the Nun (ibid.).  According to research conducted among the national 
archives in Madrid, the Sous River Valley and its adjacent Oued Dra'a Valley, along with the 
Atlantic coastal points from Santa Cruz to Cape Nun and further south to Sequiet el-Hamra, was 
an area of contention and little governmental structure for the next five hundred years. The 
Sahrawi nationalist movement argues that this area, the northern-most part of the Western Sahara, 
is not and has never been the domain of the Kingdom of Morocco. Thus, the Banu Maqil, 
independent of the Kingdom of Fes, began to establish its own governing entity through the 
collection of taxes. Laroui mentions that between the years of 1384 and 1411, the southern part of 
                                                                                                                                            
 
108 The Beni Hassan (or Awlad Hassan or Banu Maqil) tribes plus the Banu Hilal migrated from Yemen westward. 
According to Pazzanita, the Beni Hassan was an Arab warrior caste, 385. These tribes, sent as a punishment from the 
Fatimid Caliphate in Egypt, were pushed westward and south into present-day Mauritania and the Western Sahara. 
Stephen Zunes and Jacob Mundy, Western Sahara and Conflict Irresolution (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press: 
2012), 145. 
 
109 Hassaniya is the Arabic dialect spoken by present-day Sahrawi, which originated from the Arab Bedouin tribes of 
the Beni Hassan and later became the dominant language in Northern Mali (Azawad), most of Mauritania, the Western 
Sahara, and parts of southern Morocco between the eleventh and fourteenth centuries. 
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the Merinid Kingdom (Kingdom of Fes) "had declared its independence..." because "of the 
increasing power of the Ma'qil, "who had become the main power on the central Maghrib before 
extending their domination southward to the Western Sahara" (Laroui 1977, 231).  In fact, in one 
instance in 1387, Ahmad al-Mustansir, when he recovered his throne from a rival Merinid vizier, 
"with the help of the Maqil who controlled the Sijilmasa region...rewarded the Maqils by 
allowing "them access to the Atlantic plains while leaving them their privileges in southern 
Morocco" (Laroui, 230). 
These domestic squabbles, the rise of small fiefdoms, and the Banu Maqil encroachment 
diminished much of the power and influence of the Merinids. The Merinid 'Dynasty' was, in 
effect, of nominal influence in the region. The Christian princes of Iberia, aware of the situation 
in the Maghrib and the weakness of Fes, began their foray into North Africa, including the 
Western Sahara. For example, the Portuguese began to settle in the northern Maghrib in 1415 
(Tangier) and by 1458 had conquered al-Qasr al-Kabir. Later in 1472, the Merinids of Fes were 
replaced by Muhammad al-Shaykh of the Banu Watta. Still, the power of the Wattasids (1472—
1554), who had replaced the Merinids, “had never extended beyond northern Morocco” and that 
“in 1471 the Moroccan state, as founded by the Almoravids, ceased to exist” (Laroui 1977, 238).  
The Wattasids ruled Fez and some of its periphery through 1524. By then, however, the 
Portuguese (see map 3.7 below) had expanded along the Atlantic coast of 'Morocco' and 
established small forts or trading outposts in Santa Cruz do Cabo de Aguer or Agadir (1505), Safi 
(1508), Azemmour (1513), and Mazagan (1514, already a protectorate in 1486). By the beginning 
of the sixteenth century, Genoese, Spanish and specifically Portuguese traders had created several 
small points across the northern coast of Morocco, stretching from Ceuta to Santa Cruz de Aguer.  
Santa Cruz de Mar Pequeña (1476) was perhaps the furthest south of the coastal European 
outposts. Essentially, the Wattasid's "effective authority...was restricted to Fez and its environs. 
They had a limited control over the Atlantic plains, and it was only by force that they could exact 
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some tribute from tribes of the Middle Atlas. Marrakesh was virtually autonomous, and the High 
Atlas, the Sus, and the pre-Saharan oases were completely outside their authority" (Levtzion 
1977, 397). 
Further south of the Sous and into the Sahara, the "northern section of the Sahara came 
increasingly under domination of Arab nomads. They imposed their 'protection' over the pre-
Saharan oases and extracted tribute from the inhabitants and traders there" (ibid., 451).  Oliver 
also reveals through Ibn Khaldun who commented that "some of the veiled Sanhaja of the 
southern Sahara were 'in subjection to the King of the Sudan, paid him tribute and were recruited 
to his armies' " (ibid, 381).  In summary, by the time of the Wattasid Dynasty (from the 
geographic periphery of the Kingdom of Fes' dominions southwest across the Atlantic coastline to 
the Wolof Kingdom in present-day Senegal, inland east to the Adrar and returning north along the 
trade route to Sijilmasa, which had ceased to be the great trading hub), the Western Sahara was 
not governed by a single sovereign entity. Historical evidence demonstrates that 
acknowledgement or submission to any authority was divided among the several fiefdoms that 
sprang up when the Wolof, Mali, Songhai, and Wattasid rule weakened considerably in the 
sixteenth century. Moreover, these dynasties or empires hardly had any sort of control over the 
wandering, ill-governable, and desolate land-dwellers of the Western Sahara. It was only when a 
new Sharifian Dynasty, the Sa'adians, came to power in the Sous River Valley in 1524 (see on 
map 3.7 below referenced as “Principauté des Chorfa Saadiens” or the Principality of the 
Sharifian Sa’adians) that perhaps a more cohesive phase of nation-building began among the 
inhabitants of the Western Saharan region, though these people could hardly be identified as 
“Sahrawis.” 
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Map 3.7:  Political  Divisions  from  1500  to  1515  of  Morocco  110 
                                                
110 Map adapted from Louis Massignon, “Le Maroc dans les Premières Années du XVI Siècle,” Tableau Géographique 
d’Après Léon L’Africain. Mémoires des la Société Historiques Algérienne (Algiers: Adolphe Jourdan, 1906), 149. 
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Historical Analysis and Critique 
The essence of this section consisted in tracing Sahrawi national identity from its antiquity until 
the beginning of the sixteenth century. It highlighted the key events that characterized much of 
Sahrawi ancestry. The chronological detail, at times tedious, was necessary so as to place it in the 
context of the evolving dynamics of 'Sahrawi' identity. Thus, many details were included so the 
reader would understand why none of the above candidates met the test of “true” ancestry to the 
Sahrawi from antiquity through the beginning of the modern era. We can see that none could 
have begun to be considered a national group, and the origins of Sahrawi nationalism are much 
more modern. The following will summarize these results, and by concluding, aid the reader in 
understanding national identity through the example of the Sahrawi. This section began with a 
highlight of the ancient origins of the indigenous inhabitants of the Maghrib, specifically the 
Western Sahara. It has found that Sahrawi ancestry may not be traceable from deep in antiquity. 
Some of the problems encountered that could have provided some evidence for Sahrawi origins at 
this time: 1) There is scant history of human beings inhabiting the area now known as Western 
Sahara going back 10,000 years. 2) Many of the early inhabitants of the region, in North Africa, 
southern Europe, and the greater Mediterranean world, can all trace their beginning from 
Neolithic peoples; a problem that may deem DNA studies necessary but beyond the scope of this 
study; 2) It is a problem of infinite regress. At which historical point does one begin to study the 
national identity of any nation? Where does one begin to discuss that 'belonging' to a group of 
people, or attachment to the homeland or territory? 3) The nature of Sahrawi ancestry and of any 
study of nationhood will certainly come across the inevitable challenge of distinguishing between 
those of pure blood and those of mixed origins, but there was not enough stability in this region 
for any people to be considered of “pure blood” to evolve.  
On the contrary, many scholars affirm the hybrid origins of the people of the Western 
Sahara. Many agree that present-day individuals who identify themselves as Sahrawi are 
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primarily of Berber descent, though mixed with the Black nations of sub-Saharan Africa, and 
finally succumbed to the 'waves' of Arab tribes from the East by the end of the Middle Ages. For 
example, Mercer writes that the early roots of the Sahrawi are complex and are a result of: several 
hundred years of intermarriage, subjugation by 'foreign' rule, or self-rule via the early Berber or 
Arab dynasties, frequent migration patterns, and 'invasions' from those groups emerging from the 
eastern and southern Sahara. (Mercer 1976a, 498) Hodges describes the ancestors of the Sahrawi 
people as sub-groups “of the beidan,111 or ‘Moors,’ nomads of mixed Berber, Arab, and black 
African descent who now speak an Arabic dialect known as Hassaniya” (Hodges 1983, 74).  He 
describes this fusion as a product of wars, and with Mercer, agrees it is also a result of 
subjugation, alliances, and intermarriage of Sanhaja Berbers, Bedouin Arabs, and black African 
slaves. Today, there is agreement among several sources that the most visible of the Sahrawi 
groups are the “Hassaniya-speaking people who claim membership among at least one of the 
social groupings found in and around the area now known as [the] Western Sahara” (Mundy and 
Zunes 2012, 140).  Thus, an early indication of Sahrawi national identity is difficult to detect. 
This mixture of “races” (Black, Arab, and Berber), perhaps not quite unique among the 
North African population, is central to perceived Sahrawi identity. Laroui writes “anthropological 
studies and archeological finds now tend to prove both the antiquity and diversity of the Maghribi 
population” (Laroui 1977, 17).  Present scholarship is inclined to recognize “a diversity of origins 
and of the essentially fragmented and passive character of the Maghribi past” (Ibid., 19).  In the 
words of Gabriel Camps, the Maghrib was “a transitional region without distinct characteristics of 
                                                
111 Beidan or bidan (bidthan) is "the name used by the Saharan Moors, both Arab and Berber speakers in order to 
distinguish themselves from the negroes. The term, meaning 'the whites,' is found in quite early writings. According to 
La Courbe (1685), "The Senegal separates the Azoaghes [Zenagah] Moors or Bazanez [Bidan], from the Blacks; so that 
on one side of the river are Moors, rather white than black; and on the other, men perfectly black." Norris, The Arab 
Conquest of the Arab Western Sahara, 245. 
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its own” 112 (ibid., 20). If there were an argument for a more homogeneous population, the case 
may be found much later in North African history, beyond the new ‘Christian’ millennium. Yet, 
Hodges has made a more modern socio-cultural distinction between the nomadic and sedentary 
Sahrawi. He writes that even today, among the Sahrawi, there are Arabophone nomads, Berber 
Tuareg nomads (east), black African farmers (south), and semi-nomadic or sedentary Berbers of 
the Sous River Valley and Anti-Atlas region, north of the Sous (Hodges 1983, 74). 
A few authors have argued that there is a case for a sense of homogeneity found in the 
Sahrawi past. For instance, Ghirelli113 believes that the apparent homogeneity of the remaining 
Sanhaja Berber may have been due to the (a) geographic protection afforded to them by the 
Sahara Desert to the south, the Mediterranean and the Atlantic Sea to the north and west of the 
Maghrib. Secondly, the (b) nomadic lifestyle that is attributed to the ancestors of the Sahrawi 
remained intact despite a history of intermarriage and constant fighting among themselves and 
with invaders. This may be the result of a unique lifestyle that adapts to the harsh, desert 
environment. However, geographic and nomadic factors do not provide evidence of socio-cultural 
homogeneity. Nomadism may be a lifestyle marker for a certain collectivity, and geography may 
demarcate the boundaries of a group, but it certainly does not indicate that all of those 
characterized by these cultural markers are of the same ethnie, or nation. Certainly, the settled 
population may better candidates for the descendants of the Western Saharan but there is 
difficulty in choosing the correct genealogical group. These factors may indicate that several 
mixes of groups, relegated to the harsh landscape over the centuries, were forced to cooperate in 
order to survive the desert. 
Third, another argument suggests that Islam may have forged Sanhaja Berber 
homogenization. Although the overwhelming majority of the population came to adopt the 
                                                
112 Gabriel Camps, “Les Traces D’un Age du Bronze en Afrique du Nord,” La Revue Africaine, Alger, 1er et 2e trim, 
1960, 31-56 quoted in Laroui, The History of the Maghrib, 19. 
 
113 Exact period for his Ghirelli’s comment not clear. 
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Muslim practice, the Sanhaja have characteristically, jealously protected their culture from 
outsiders. In fact, many of the Sanhaja Berber only nominally converted, nominally claiming to 
be Muslim but retaining pre-Islamic, pagan beliefs and practices. Moreover, the Berbers 
developed particular Islamic sects that arose to challenge the authority of the Baghdad Caliphate. 
Recent research about the area has uncovered struggles between tribes and with other foreign 
invaders over the control of the prized Trans-Saharan trade routes supplying gold and silver (in 
coins) among other valuable items as well as goods for market. The preponderance of tribal or 
sub-divisional (fractional) group communities supported a less cohesive, more fractured society 
that rarely acknowledged a sovereign power, and at times preferred to remain aloof in the desert.  
 
 This section’s efforts focused on evaluating a series of claims about different groups as 
the “true” ancestors of the modern Sahrawi. Was there a beginning? This is the second challenge. 
The first was to determine at what point to begin tracing the origins of the Sahrawi. Perhaps 
another approach to the challenge would be to follow the socio-historical progress of the groups 
confined to the Western Sahara instead of searching for definitive origins. In these terms, the 
development of Sahrawi ethnic identity may be seen as a “layering” of generations and perhaps 
centuries of movement, division, and intermarriage. Their ethnic make-up consists of disparate 
tribal conglomerations and a propensity to absorb several different generations of other foreign 
groups (i.e., Carthaginians, Romans, and Arabs). Thus, the amalgamation of groups, early periods 
of migration, and continuous tribal division make it difficult to acknowledge a nationality based 
on a primordial approach. Yet, modern-day Sahrawi nationalism may provide us with an example 
of an evolved identity that may be attributable to primordial connections. Smith for example 
refers to a "collective cultural identity…not to a uniformity of elements over generations but to a 
sense of continuity on the part of successive generations of a given cultural unit of population" 
(Smith 1991, 25). 
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Smith’s re-formulated version of primordialism is called ethno-symbolism. Ethno-
symbolists agree with post-modernists in “the importance of conceiving of nation as ‘real’ 
sociological communities” (Smith 2009, 13).  Ethno-symbolists agree with modernists that 
nations “are conceived of as historical communities, embedded in specific historical and geo-
cultural contexts” (Ibid., 14).  In other words, the ‘national’ character and ‘progression’ of a 
community is open to formative historical assessment. It absorbs change and aids in explaining 
the development of a nation. This flexible version of primordialism allows for a variable nation-
building process. Thus, it can help explain the amalgamated dynamic of Sahrawi national 
identity. Yet, ethno-symbolism “still regards ethnic identities and communities as crucial for the 
formation and the persistence of nations” (ibid., 21). It considers that “although nations may be 
partly forged by political institutions” or as “elite projects,” they also necessitate “over the long 
term… ethno-cultural resources to create a solidary community” (Smith 1991, 21). 
‘Historical ethno-symbolism’ tries to bridge primordialism to instrumentalism and 
constructivism. Instrumentalism can explain how each individual or small group of individuals 
gathered together their adherents to develop an ideology and then as a consequence, mobilized 
their followers to advance more regional ambitions—establishing rule and dominance, political 
power. However, according to Robertson, constructivism combines both primordialist and 
instrumentalist perspectives and may be a more effective explanation. Despite ethno-symbolism 
incorporating the more post-modern theories of nationalism, it still begins with an ethnic base. 
Such an approach will encounter problems in trying to locate the origins of Sahrawi identity. This 
section has illustrated that even if allowances were to be made in order to highlight an ethnic 
sense of homogenization, it still would be challenging to pinpoint within this period of history. 
Constructivism, on the other hand, does not necessitate an ethnic starting point and may be able to 
better explain the slow progression of ideas producing a Sahrawi national identity in this 
historical segment. Constructivism, by its approach will absorb these historical events and will 
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provide for a more comprehensive perspective of identity change. It also grants the possibility of 
an outright manufacture of nationhood by the elites or those who are vested with the power 
directing the population (ethnic entrepreneurs), a top-down view of forces that can give rise to 
national identity. It also consents to a criterion that establishes national identity among those links 
attached to ‘natural’ givens, including those ethnic symbols developing over time. 
The primordialist approach is severely handicapped seeking the origins of Sahrawi 
identity in this period. The challenges of mixed races, diverse interaction, and distinguishing 
between sedentary or nomadic groups hinder primordialist arguments. If placed in an 
ethnosymbolic context, a primordialist approach may help argue for gradations of development. 
Yet, these still do not solidify an identity. Instrumentalist arguments are limited to arguments that 
include dynastical leaders. However, the Almoravid and Almohad dynasties were marred by 
divisions, both geographical and tribal, and finally falling, reducing their influence to a small 
segment of northern Morocco, leaving the rest of the Western Sahara region free. The 
constructivist would absorb the layering of qualities that developed over time, add the dynastic 
experiences of the region, and begin to create an identity; a proto-Sahrawi is being built upon 
these features of identity. Still, the third (constructivist) hypothesis cannot precisely state that the 
Sahrawi were born at this time.  
This historical investigation suggests that an innate awareness, especially among a 
distinct group of people (sub-tribe, fraction or tribe, federation of tribes) that desires to 
consolidate and remain in one single area is difficult to ascertain because the expansionist and 
unifying aspirations were most commonly directed and controlled by elites. These elites usually 
had the support of clerics or fringe movements that co-opted the population of the immediate 
area. It is also very challenging to provide concrete evidence connecting present-day Sahrawi 
identity to Sanhaja Berber identity. As has been noted, as one reads this socio-historical account, 
the migratory patterns, infighting among local tribes, larger gradual incursions of foreign tribes—
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including Arabs from the East—subsequent intermarriages, death through loss of patronage 
(death of a leader) or extermination of one's people through loss in battle, and slavery, highlights 
the immense difficulty in forging a direct blood line or pattern of traditional ancestry. The 
premise “that nations were around from ‘the first time’ and were inherent in the human condition, 
if not in nature itself” (Smith 2009, 8) may, in fact, be true. It is not evident in the Sahrawi case. 
The question will continue to be when was the ‘first time’ for the Sahrawi? The answer may not 
be clear in this section. However, it may be that the development of the socio-historical character 
of the region may have been constructing Sahrawi identity all along. In this case, the results can 
only be historically measured much later in time. This leads to the next chapter, which will 
attempt to discover such an answer after 1524. 
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IV. SAHARAN IDENTITY: DYNASTIC OR TRIBAL (1524 – 1757) 
This section will focus on the roots of Sahrawi identity from the period beginning in 1524 
until 1757. This period was not chosen arbitrarily. 1524 is the year Santa Cruz de Mar Pequeña114, 
the Portuguese trading outpost and small fort, was overrun by the Sa'adian Dynasty. 1757 was the 
year Mohammed Ben Abdellah al-Khatib, or Muhammad III, came to power in Morocco and 
achieved moderate stability after almost a quarter century of fraternal infighting for power. This 
section will continue the socio-historical analysis of the period in the western and southwestern 
Maghrib region (including Mauritania, Western Sahara proper, and Morocco). It will provide 
insight to claims of distinctiveness by the Sahrawi and their possible links to this historical 
period. 
Here, the first hypothesis will be examined: that Sahrawi origins are rooted to a historical 
past but only to this period, instead of the previous era. Another hypothesis is derived from the 
constructivist approach: 1) the encroachment of colonial powers into west and northwestern 
Africa generated resistance from those long-since established inhabitants leading to a proto-
national identity (see map 4.1 below); or 2) a more organized political society among the Western 
Saharans developed because the sovereign entities ruling the area became stronger and expanded 
their territory. This chapter seeks evidence that sustains these arguments: The origins of Sahrawi 
national identity was due to the developments of the socio-political environment in this period. 
On the other hand, a combination of these two arguments may provide a better explanation for the 
coalescence of Sahrawi identity. 
The first hypothesis continues to be relevant to this chapter even though it begins in the 
sixteenth century because the more traditional approach has no limitations to how far back one 
can begin the study of nationality. Its flexibility may be one of its deficiencies because in the case 
of the Sahrawi there is no natural point of departure. Primordialist studies begin in the present, 
                                                
114 This literally means ‘Holy Cross of the Small Sea’ in Spanish. 
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move backward seeking a point of origin, and then work their way forward to the modern. The 
second hypothesis and its three derived explanations rely on a more diverse understanding of 
nationalities and allow for an identity to be approached from below—arguing for given attributes 
that can only be described as affinities or attachments to family or tribe, the land, and cultural 
links (custom, ancient myths). It also seeks explanations from above—either from geo-political 
dynamics and circumstances that have influenced the population or the manipulation direct or 
indirect from elites and 'ethnic entrepreneurs.’ After the socio-historical description and 
commentary of the Sahrawi during this period, a critique follows of both hypotheses. 
Several socio-political changes began to influence the dynamic of the Moroccan social 
landscape in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries and of both the northern and southern 
stream of Sanhaja Berber. First, the northern stream became subdivided into smaller tribes that 
began to mix and thereby diffuse power in the southernmost parts of Morocco. These groups, 
including the Berber tribes from the Gudala, Lemta (Sanhaja), the Lamtuna (Sanhaja) and the 
Arab Hassani groups had already begun intermarrying.115 The number of nomads increased from 
both the Berber and Arab populations throughout the region and south into the Sahara because of 
the influx of goods and the Trans-Saharan trade routes. However, many of these nomads lived 
mostly by foraging for date palms, hunting desert game, raising livestock, and caravanning the 
salt (Norris 1986, 176).  Second, "the northern section of the Sahara came increasingly under the 
domination of Arab nomads" who "imposed their 'protection' over the pre-Saharan oases and 
extracted tribute from the inhabitants and traders there" (Levtzion 2008b, 449).  Norris comments 
                                                
115 Lydon comments that these ancient tribes, the Gazula (or Gazulah/Jazula), Lemta (also known as the Lamtah or 
Lemta), Lamtuna (or Lamtunah), Masufa, and Gudala, are considered of “Berber” origin. However, in terms of Sahrawi 
ancestry, only the Lemta, who were “a learned Sanhaja clan of the northwestern desert edge—a region geographers 
named the southern extremity of the Maghrib (Maghrib al-aqsa),” and Lamtuna are said to be from the Sanhaja—the 
true ancestors of modern-day Sahrawi. He also suggests that the Gazula are the “forefathers of the Tikna” (or Tekna) 
Confederation of tribes that still survive today in southern Morocco and northern Western Sahara. Ghislaine Lydon, On 
Trans-Saharan Trails: Islamic Law, Trade Networks, and Cross-Cultural Exchange in Nineteenth-Century Western 
Africa, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009) 60-61, 174. Norris also suggests that the Gazula are present 
today as “distant ancestors of those people whom we now call Tiknah.” H. T. Norris, The Arab Conquest of the Arab 
Western Sahara (Harlow, UK: Longman and Libraire du Liban, 1986), 142, 246. 
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that several of the subject Berber tribes in the Sous Valley became soldiers for the Banu Maqil, 
Awlad Hassan, and Banu Hassan (Norris 1986, 174). 
 
 
Map  4.1:  Early  Colonization  of  Morocco  in  Sixteenth  Century 116 
Third, the “Portuguese raided nomad encampments of the ‘Azenegues’ (Sanahja) on the 
coast and took prisoners” (Levtzion 2008b, 451).  The Banu Maqil formed auxiliary forces with 
the nomad Berbers, subdued the Fazula, which furnished “the model for later recruitment an 
                                                
116 Map taken from Charles-André Julien in History of North Africa—Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco: From the Arab 
Conquest to 1830, trans. John Petrie, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul), 1970, 214. 
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service, bondage even of the Zenagah117to the Awlad Hassan in Mauritania” (Norris 1986, 174). 
Hodges remarks that in the sixteenth century, Leo Africanus118 and Luis de Mármol y Carvajal 
who both traveled “into the Western Sahara from Morocco in 1512 and 1556 respectively, 
reported the presence of both Sanhaja and an Arab tribe, the Oulad Delim” (Hodges 1983, 9). In 
Brown’s edited notes on John Pory’s translation of Leo Africanus’ work, he comments that the 
“Zenega seem to have extended from the Atlantic to the Salt marshes of Trarza, from Western 
Sus and the Wad Draa on the north to Timbuktu in the south” (Brown 1896, 198).  Gradually 
though, the Sanhaja name disappears through intermarriage with the Arab tribes, capture and 
enslavement by the Portuguese and rival tribesmen, and migration south toward the less 
populated Sahara. Fourth, the Wattasids (1472—1554) from their principal city of Fes (see map 
4.2 below), instead of checking the incursions of the Portuguese and the Spanish, began to re-
direct their focus against another upstart rival—the southern sharifs119. Thereafter, Wattasid  
                                                
117 Zenagah (also spelled Zenaga or Znaga) before the invasion of the Arab Banu Hassan or Hassani tribes was a 
designation to that part of society associated with caretakers of livestock. Ahmed Mahmu'd wull Mudi, in “Genèse de 
la Hiérarchie Sociale et du Pouvoir Politique ‘bidân’,” by Mariella Villasante-De Beauvais, Cahiers d'Études 
Africaines, 37, Cahier 147 (1997): 594; It was also the name of a Sanhaja tribal confederation that later became a 
tributary tribe to the Arab Hassani after the war of Char Bubba. However, academic literature has used the term 
synonymously with Sanhaja. Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th Edition, s.v. “Zenága,” (1911), Google Play Books. Today, 
however, it is viewed as the corrupted (or derivative), Arabic form of Sanhaja. John Mercer, “The Cycle of Invasion 
and Unification in the Western Sahara,” African Affairs, 75 No.301, (October 1976): 499; “Sanhaja,” Anthony 
Pazzanita, Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara, (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2006) 383-384. 
 
118 Leo Africanus, whose original name in Arabic is al-Hasan ibn Muhammad al-Wazzan al-Fasi (but later christened as 
the Italian Giovanni Leone) was born c. 1485 in the Kingdom of Granada, Spain and died c. 1554 in Tunis, Tunisia. He 
was a traveler whose writings remained for some 400 years one of Europe’s principal sources of information 
about Islam. “Around 1526, he completed his greatest work, Descrittione dell’Africa (1550; A Geographical Historie 
of Africa, 1600).” Encyclopedia Britannica, Online Edition, s.v. “Leo Africanus,” accessed February 16, 2015, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/336304/Leo-Africanus. See also Leo Africanus, The History and 
Description of Africa and of the Notable Things Therein Contained Vol. 1, trans. John Pory, edited by Dr. Robert 
Brown, (London: Bedford Press, 1896) 130-131, 146, 205. 
 
119 Sharif is a term denoting a nobleman descended from Fatima and Ali and therefore of sharifian descent, direct 
descendants of the Prophet Muhammad. Despite the problems with these claims, much of the population supported the 
sharifs. Today it is a term applied to an Islamic ruler or clergy. 
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Map  4.2:  Morocco  during  the  Wattasid Dynasty 120 
power deteriorated and “the governors of Safi 121 ” who “were making a great effort to gain 
possession of Marrakesh” allowed the emergence, “in the Sous, [of] the Beni S’ad or Sa’adians” 
(Julien 1970, 215).  Subsequently, by the end of the fifteenth century, Marrakesh had ceased to 
recognize the Wattasid authority of Fes (Laroui 1977, 238). 
As early as 1455, the southern Sanhaja had been in contact with, and reached the 
population across the Senegal River (see map 4.3 below). A letter dated from 1455 about the 
voyage of Luis de Cadamosto and Pedro de Sintra recounts that fifty miles beyond the Senegal 
River, de Cadamosto met the Damel (ruler) of Cayor122 for the purpose of trading horses and 
other items for the King’s return payment of black slaves (Newitt 2010, 67-71). De Cadamosto 
writes that only a select few could visit and enter to see the King in his vast residence of 
enclosures. One such group included “the Christians who are allowed to go freely whenever they 
are met with and the Azenegi who are those who teach the law of Mohamet” (Ibid., 70).  Newitt, 
who translated Caddeo’s account of de Cadamosto’s voyage to the Senegal, asserts in an endnote 
that these Azenegi were actually migrant Sanhaja traders, who inhabited the southwestern 
territory of the Sahara, observed Islam and practiced medicine (Ibid., 70-71).  Additionally, when 
the Zenata-based dynasties of the Merinids and the Wattasids were ousted from their strongholds 
                                                
120 Taken from Dahiru Yahya, Morocco in the Sixteenth Century: Problems and Patterns in African Foreign Policy, 
(Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press), 1981, xv. 
 
121 It was a ribat (a type of fortified monastery) “in the 13th century and was mentioned by the historian Ibn Khaldūn. 
The Portuguese occupied Safi (1508–41) and built a citadel, which now surrounds the 18th-century Keshla ([military 
enclave or] Casba). Safi prospered under the late 16th- and early 17th-century Saʿdī sultans.” Encyclopedia Britannica, 
Online Edition, s.v. “Safi,” accessed February 11, 2015, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/516146/Safi. 
122 Cayor was an independent satellite controlled by the Wolof Empire “that dominated what is now inland Senegal 
during the early period of European contact with West Africa…In 1556 the nobles of Cayor threw off Wolof 
domination and established an independent state of their own on the Senegal coast. Encyclopedia Britannica, Online 
Edition, s.v. “Wolof Empire,” accessed July 22, 2015, http://www.britannica.com/place/Wolof-empire#ref221633. 
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in Fes, many fled to the northern fringes of the Sahara. They, along with the Tadjakant (or 
Tajakant), are the modern descendants of Berber who now are found either in the “many 
sedentary centers of the northern half of the desert or “scattered all along the western edge of the 
desert, from southern Morocco southward through [what was once considered] the Spanish and 
western French Sahara” (Cabot Briggs 1960, 81). Apart from these subtle descriptions about the 
area and its history, little is known about the inhabitants prior to the middle of the seventeenth 
century. Only a little more has become known in the last two hundred years (Ibid., 211). The only 
remarkable note of the period is the increasing difficulty to choose and follow a specific tribe (or 
tribal confederation) that would lead to the present day Sahrawi. The general mixing of tribes 
among Arab and Berber along the Atlantic coast southwest into the Sous and Dra’a River Valleys 
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Map 4.3: The Greater Western Sahara123 
(see map 4.3) only impedes in ascertaining a line of succession to the modern Sahrawi. The  
constant movement from one area to another because of conflict, pressure from the encroaching 
                                                
123 Map taken from Thomas Whitcomb, “New Evidence on the Origins of the Kunta,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental 
and African Studies,” Vol 38 (1), 1975, 104. 
 105 
Arab tribes, and nomadism further dampens specific evidence for Sahrawi origins. Moreover, 
many, if not most, of the Saharan tribes, both Berber and Arab, acted independently of each other. 
The only active association among tribes was as through alliances (in a confederation for 
protection or for raiding another tribe) and trade. However, these relationships did not produce 
any notion of Saharan identity. Identification was primarily tied to the tribe.  
 
The Rise of the Sa’adians and Ouster of the Europeans (1494-1668) 
In 1494 the Treaty of Tordesillas, between Spain and Portugal, traced a line of demarcation that 
divided the New World and other possessions in West Africa. Even though Portugal had won the 
possession of Melilla (in northern Morocco) according to the lines of demarcation provided at 
Tordesillas, John II of Portugal waived this right. Spanish incursions into the Maghreb began at 
the command of Archbishop Cisneros of Toledo (1499). However, the geo-political objective of 
establishing the Spanish Kingdom in the Mediterranean rather than in the Maghreb resulted in the 
“establishment of garrison posts (presidios) on strategic points on the coast, while leaving the 
interior to be held by indigenous rulers” (Abun-Nasr 1987, 147).  The Portuguese reached the 
height of expansion during the Wattasid reign of Abu Abd Allah al-Shaykh Muhammad Ibn 
Yahya (or Muhammad al-Shaykh) (1472-1505) in what is now Morocco. A peace treaty between 
the Portuguese and al-Shaykh in 1489 led the Portuguese to ‘abandon’ the conquest of interior 
lands and concentrate on the southern periphery of ‘Morocco.’ The Sufi sharifs of the Sa’adians 
in the south “came forward to lead the Moroccan Muslims against the Portuguese” (Ibid., 208).  
The Sa’adians lived in the Valley of the Dra’a, came to prominence with the support of the 
leaders of the Sous, which led to the expulsion of the Portuguese from Santa Cruz de Mar 
Pequeña in 1524 and to the capture of Marrakesh in 1525. 
The Sa’adians become the next potential ancestors to the Sahrawi in view of their move 
from the northern region of the Western Sahara into southern ‘Morocco.’ Also, their 
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incorporation of these areas to their rule may provide, for the first time, the possible foundation 
for a Sahrawi nation. Beginning in 1524, the area south of the thirtieth parallel in latitude, the 
Sous and Dra'a River Valley and beyond into the Sequiet el-Hamra (see Map 4.3 above), was 
being overpowered by the rise of the Sa'adian sharifs supported by some of the surrounding 
tribes. These groups began to organize themselves politically for three distinct reasons. First, 
European, especially Portuguese, encroachment into the interior lands of southern and northern 
'Morocco' alarmed some of the religious leaders of the region and despite the advantages of trade 
caused them to seek redress against these non-believers. Second, the centuries-old trade routes, 
which had been an important part of the Trans-Saharan economy were being challenged by 
European privateers and supported by their ruling monarchs at home. The Trans-Saharan caravan 
routes travelled between the mouth of the Senegal River valley, from Timbuktu and Gao, Mali 
across the Sahara to present-day Tindouf, Algeria. The Europeans attempted to monopolize trade 
by establishing trading posts not only on the Senegal River but also along the northwestern shores 
of modern Morocco. The substitution of the desert overland route for the faster sea voyages along 
the Atlantic coastline became a considerable European advantage. Consequently, one of the 
objectives for the sharif became the protection of this trade from European interference. Third, 
Sa'adi sharifian leaders also feared ‘the Turkish peril.’ The Ottomans had intervened to help the 
Banu Watta (Wattasids) remain in power and would not tolerate another group claiming religio-
political leadership in the Maghrib. However, the Sa'adian leaders opposed the Ottomans because 
of Sa’adi claim to prophetic lineage. Thus, 'Christian' incursions, an already weak or passive 
Wattasid government, an Ottoman threat to southern Morocco, and a chaotic Western Sahara 
compelled some of the population and religious (Sufi) leaders to seek new leadership under the 
guise of holy war: The Sa’adians (Julien 1970, 222; Yahya 1981, 3). 
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Map  4.4: The  Wattasid  and  Sa'adian  Quest  for  Control  of  Morocco 124 
                                                
124 Map titled ‘Morocco between the beginning of the 16th century and the second storming of Fes (1554)’ was taken 
from Mohamed El Mazouni, “Political and Religious Institutions under the Saadians,” in Dominique Avon, ed., Politics 
Religion and State Building (11th – 16/19th Centuries), 2011-2012, http://hemed.univ-lemans.fr, accessed November 30, 
2015, http://hemed.univ-lemans.fr/cours2011/en/co/grain2_2_1.html . 
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The Wattasids, the last Berber dynasty that controlled the nexus of ‘Morocco’ (Meknes, Fes and 
its northwest coast) whose populations still spoke Berber dialects perhaps with some mix of 
Arabic, do not figure prominently as ancestors to the Sahrawi. They did extend their power south 
of Marrakesh but these territories were vassal principalities and would later be lost to the 
Saadians (see map 4.4 below). Geographically, the Wattasids held Berber lands, especially in the 
Atlas Mountains but are far removed from consideration as forerunners to the Sahrawi. The 
Sa’adian, mostly of Arab origin and Arab-speaking were also composed of Berber tribes. They 
rose from what is now parts of the modern Western Sahara and attempted to consolidate power 
north and southeast. By virtue of geography, at this point in history, they are considered one of 
better contenders that may be linked to Sahrawi identity. However, several problems arose that 
mitigated Sa’adian consolidation of modern southern Morocco and contemporary Western 
Sahara. 
 
The Saadians: The First Links to the Sahrawi? 
The desert dwellers of the Western Sahara, who were not subject to the Banu Watta or the Sa'adi, 
the local tribes of the periphery and most of the southern regions of the southwest Sahara were 
under no sovereign entity. They ruled themselves and maintained their nomadic lifestyle. Yahya 
mentions, “the authority of the Marini-Wattasi sultans was acknowledged only in the capital of 
Fez and the immediate surrounding regions” (Yahya 1981, 2).  Julien writes that: 
It was a period when anarchy was gaining ground despite the efforts of the 
Wattasids to assert their authority. Southern Morocco was almost completely out 
of their control. The Hintata amirs, reigning at Marrakesh, were not capable of 
exacting obedience beyond the Atlas. The plain of the Sous, the anti-Atlas and 
the Dra’ oases were de facto independent. But the people were concerned about 
Portuguese inroads, and their piety moved them to take up arms against the 
infidel (1970, 222). 
 
Jacques-Meunié adds that: 
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In the beginning of the 16th century the whole of Saharan Morocco is outside the 
control of the dynasty that rules the north of the Atlas and has Fez as its capital. 
The major provinces in the South (…) are disintegrated into numerous 
independent districts of which some have only a village as capital (…) The 
temporal power is thus broken up into multiple authorities, [sic] which are—
being independent or enemies of one another—factors of insecurity and anarchy. 
(1982, 424-425) 
 
Leo Africanus, Yahya, and Abu-Nasr mention that the region surrounding the Sous was rife with 
tribal infighting led by Sufi orders. These Sufi leaders were angered at the Wattasid for not 
resisting Portuguese assaults. 
The area was devoid of any overriding leadership that could counter the foreign intrusion. 
In fact, cohesive resistance may have been the result of the Portuguese themselves insisting on a 
representative from southern Morocco to negotiate terms to stop the fighting in the region. Abun-
Nasr adds “[t]he ascent to power began when the leaders of Sus, divided amongst themselves and 
unable to agree upon one from their midst to represent them in their dealings with the Europeans, 
were prepared to accept a sharif as their head” (Abu-Nasr 1987, 209). It seems very probable that 
southern ‘Morocco’ was considered a contested geographical area rather than a cohesive, unitary 
state or kingdom. There were other tribal powers in the wider Western Sahara region. One group, 
noted by Criado, were the Reguibayt125 tribe (of Berber origin), whose creation and “subsequent 
development [would] make it one of the most important in the Sahara, is produced in the 
sixteenth century by Sidi Ahmed Erguibí126, at the approximate period of other tribes specifically 
Sahrawi, the Arosien [of Arab origin], descendants of Sid Ahmed Arosi, and the Ould Tidrarim 
by Sid Ahmed Bo Gambor [emphasis added]”127 (Criado 1977, 76).  Other tribes included the the 
                                                
125 There a variety of spellings found throughout the literature: Rguibait, Reguibait, Reguibayt, or even Erguibat, 
however, here I will use Reguibayt because of its phonetic proximity to English. 
 
126 Caratini does not refute Sidi Ahmed Erguibi’s existence but explains the difficulty of dating his actual birth and life 
as she attempts to corroborate whether he is a myth or an actual historical figure. Sophie Caratini, Les Rgaybat (1610-
1934) Tome 1: Des Chameliers a la Conquête d’un Territoire (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1989), 42-43. 
 
127 Translated from the Spanish: “La fundación de la tribu Erguibat, cuyo “posterior desarrollo va a hacer de ella una de 
las más importantes del Sahara, se produce en el siglo XVI por Sidi Ahmed Erguibí, en la época aproximada que las 
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Barabish (or Berabich, of Arab origin), Awlad Bu Sba (Arab and Berber mix), Kunta (of Arab 
origin with a Berber name), Tadjakant (Berber), and the Tekna (whose ethnic origins are debated 
between Arab and Berber). These groups spoke either a Berber (Znaga128 dialect) or that of 
Hassaniya (from the Banu Hassan). As Whitcomb summarized, it was “apparent from the 
accounts of the Portuguese explorations of the area during the ninth/fifteenth century, that the 
[Banu] Hassan were by that time numerous, widespread, and powerful, although the Znaga and 
Hassan were clearly still distinct peoples, each with its own language, customs, and dress” 
(Whitcomb 1975, 103).  
Based on the sources above, the consolidation of power (even by the Sa’adians) would be 
challenging. The evidence also suggests that there was no overarching ‘national’ entity. For 
reasons stated above and because of the environmental dynamics of the region, some authors 
infer that Western Saharan society had already possessed a certain socio-political organization 
before the creation of the Kingdom of Morocco or Mauritania. (Africanus 1896, 145-149; Cabot 
Briggs 1960); Criado 1977, 76; Ensel 1999, 48; McDougall 2012, 84-85).  These sources speak of 
an independent nuclei of inhabitants that, although they did not have a regional governor or ruler, 
was not controlled by a single principality or an absolute sultan. The evolution of power rested on 
a tribal hierarchy at the beginning of the 16th century. Criado asserts that this hierarchy is still 
respected among the tribes of the SARIO (Saguia el-Hamra y Rio de Oro) today. (1977, 77) 
These tribal groups were a mix of Arab, Berber, even Black ethnicities. They communicated in 
different languages. Some tribes had actually become divided between sedentary and nomadic 
branches, such as the Tekna. Therefore, any notion of a proto-Sahrawi identity at this time is 
contestable. The only common feature that would serve as a foundation for a Sahrawi nation in 
                                                                                                                                            
otras tribus específicamente Saharauis, los Arosien, descendientes de Sid Ahmed Arosi, y los Uld Tidrarim por Sid 
Ahmed Bo Gambor” in Ramón Criado, Pasión y Muerte de un Sueño Colonial, Versión Ruedo Ibérico, (Chatillon-
Sous-Bagneux: SEG), 1977, 76. 
 
128 Sanhaja Berber 
 111 
this period would be the diverse set of tribal attributes—nomadic and sedentary; Berber, Black, 
and Arab; Hassaniya and Berber speaking. However, none of these groups ‘imagined’ themselves 
as such a huge conglomerate nation but as independent entities whose loyalty was first tied to 
clan and then tribe. 
Abu Abdallah (or Muhammad) al-Qaim, representative of the Sa’adian House, was to 
pursue the ouster of the Portuguese. They continued to take advantage of trade with European 
merchants through the 1530s. In addition, the Sa’adian leadership was preoccupied with the geo-
political problems to their north with the Merinids and later with the Wattasids. In exchange for 
local goods, especially sugar, Europeans would barter away “war materials including arms, 
copper, iron, sulfur, and even saltpetre” (Abun-Nasr, 210).  Ahmad al-‘A‘raj, who later became 
the leader of the Sa’adians, captured Marrakesh in 1525129 and agreed, after failed attempts by the 
Wattasid Dynasty based in Fes, to recognize him, to become ruler of Morocco—south of Tadla130 
—in 1536. Jealous, his brother Muhammad al-Shaykh131, governor of Sous, moved to counteract 
al-Araj’s power in 1540. By 1554, al-Shaykh had neutralized his brother, captured Agadir from 
the Portuguese, eliminated the Wattasids, taken Fes, and essentially had become the ruler of much 
of central Morocco. 
                                                
129 Although other accounts state that the Hintata of Marrakesh actually invited the Sous sharifs to establish their capital 
there. Thus, over the years of 1523-1524, Ahmad al-Araj, named as successor of the sharifians and who “was 
acknowledged from the Atlantic coast to Dra’a and from Agadir to Tensift,” along with his brother Muhammad al-
Shaykh as leader at Tarudant in the Sous, came to settle in Marrakesh. Yahya, Morocco in the Sixteenth Century, 7. 
 
130 Tadla is a flat central plain in the middle of Morocco situated northeast of Marrakesh, west of the Middle Atlas 
Mountains, and directly south of its present-day capital, Rabat. 
 
131 This Muhammad al-Shaykh is not to be confused with the one that was previously mentioned. The first ‘Muhammad 
al-Shaykh’ was the founder of the Wattasid state of Fes in 1472 and ruled as Sultan until 1505. The ‘Muhammad al-
Shaykh’ mentioned on this page was the acting governor of the Sous in the late 1520s—1536 and after neutralizing all 
his enemies became the Sa’adian sharif of Marrakesh (1544) and ruler of all Morocco (1554—1557). Abu-Nasr, 207. 
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Prior to 1580 and the victory by al-Mansur, Laroui depicts North Africa as those lands 
divided among the Arabs, Berbers, and Moors132 but “confined to the middle Maghrib” (Laroui 
1977, 242).  For example, the great trading city hub of Sijilmasa133 (757≈1390s AD) was no 
longer functioning and the cities on the coast had already been taken by the Portuguese or 
Spanish monarchy. In 1578, after the ‘Battle of the Three Kings’ on the field of al-Kasr al-
Kabir,134 Ahmad al-Mansur succeeded his brother Abd al-Malik (who defeated the Portuguese 
King Sebastian and Muhammad al-Mutawakkil, a usurper to his reign and collaborator of the 
Ottoman Turks) to the Sa’adian throne. Upon the death of King Sebastian, Spain was allowed to 
annex the Portuguese presidios because Portugal had no heir. By 1580, Spain had appropriated 
Portugal; unlike the Portuguese, the Spanish would administer the colonies by preserving the 
status quo (Abun-Nasr, 215).  In 1591, the forces of the Moroccan Sultan, Ahmad al-Mansur, 
moved southward to take the salt mines of Taghaza (see Map 4.3). Because of his ambition to 
unite the Muslims of West Africa and rival the power of the Ottomans, he chose to invade the 
Songhay Empire in Timbuktu. Despite guerilla revolts by the Songhay, the Sultan's forces were 
able to assert partial control of the Empire by 1594.  
 Prior to al-Mansur (1578), the Sa’adians were hard-pressed to dominate the southern 
regions of the Western Sahara. The heart of Morocco, now located in Marrakesh and Fes was 
intermittently difficult to manage. The restive Arab and Berber tribes south and southeast were 
also very restive. The abundance of these groups, the formation of smaller principalities, and 
                                                
132 The Moors were “members of the Muslim population of Spain, of mixed Arab, Spanish, and Berber origins, who 
created Arab Andalusian civilization and subsequently settled as refugees in North Africa between the 11th and 17th 
centuries.” Encyclopedia Britannica, 8, 15th ed., s.v., “Moor,” (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 2010), 301. 
 
133 Sijilmasa is located (its ruins) “at the beginning of the Maghrib in the Tafilalt oasis at the northern edge of the 
Sahara Desert.” James A. Miller, “Trading Through Islam: The Interconnection of Sijilmasa, Ghana and the Almoravid 
Movement,” in ed., Julia-Clancy Smith, North Africa, Islam and the Mediterranean World: From the Almoravids to the 
Algerian War (Portland: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), 29. 
 
134 It is known as Alcazar in Spanish. All three kings were either killed or died during the battle although his own guard 
poisoned Al-Malik.  
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European coastal encroachments make it difficult to state with certainty which group—Sa’adians, 
a vassal tribe of the Sa’adians, or one of peripheral tribes—is directly tied to the modern Sahrawi 
of today. There is no viable proto-Sahrawi groups at this stage. These are the more prominent 
difficulties, while others in the following point to the cosmopolitan nature of identity during and 
after al-Mansur’s reign. 
 
Group Identity during the Sa’adian Dynasty 
One of the problems that has not been addressed is the close historical relationship that the 
successive leadership and identity groups that occupied the territory currently identified as the 
Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco have shared. Some historians begin Moroccan 
history with the Berber dynasties mentioned in the previous chapter and indelibly complicate the 
matter of historical delineation. There is no satisfactory manner to identify at what point these 
shared histories diverge, especially in the region from the Sous River Valley southwest through 
the River Dra’a southwest to the Sequiet el-Hamra (see map 4.5 below). The term ‘Morocco’ has 
been used in historical accounts and on old maps as a designation for the modern city of 
Marrakesh. The designation of a ‘kingdom’ of Morocco began in the early eighteenth century. 
Earlier historical accounts describe how sultans, not kings, led ‘Morocco.’ Morocco seems to 
describe a geographic area in North Africa rather than a sovereign, independent political entity. In 
fact, the fourteenth to the sixteenth centuries, the region of Morocco was divided among the 
sultanate based in Fes and led by the Wattasids; the Sharifian Sultan based in Marrakesh; and the 
more southerly tribal confederations in the Kingdom of Sous. 
This problem is directly tied to the origins of Moroccan population groups as well as the 
establishment of Morocco itself.  For instance, al-Mansur’s army that crossed the Sahara (1591) 
south to defeat the Songhay Empire consisted of Andalusian mercenaries, renegades (“captured 
Europeans who had converted to Islam”), “negroes, Kabyles and Ottoman deserters,” even eight 
 114 
Christian bodyguards for the leader, Pasha Judar of Granada, of the invasion force, who himself 
was not ‘Moroccan.’ (Julien 1970, 233; Michel 1995).  Despite Julien’s Kabyle categorization, 
these Kabyle were ethnic Berber. Roughly half of Judar’s force was not from Morocco proper. 
Additionally, Sa’adian controlled territory was a mix of Arab and Berber and so there must have 
been non-Moorish or Maghrebi Arabs but they may have been the minority contingent of the 
invasion force. Generally, there were distinctions made among Maghrebi Arab, Maghrebi Berber, 
Moorish Arab and Berber, and Black based on language, skin color, and region of origin. 
However, the population groups of the Maghreb held to their family of tribes. Not only was there 
no “Sahrawi” identity group during these centuries, but also not even a “Moroccan” identity 
group. Rather, there were only ruling dynasties over “population groups” whose identity appears 
to be very fluid. 
A contemporary issue in areas of southern Morocco,135 but one which began much earlier 
in history, is that of racial identity. Today, Moroccans are generally regarded to be of either 
Berber or Arab descent. However, Morocco typically describes its original inhabitants as those 
who were not only of Arab (from the Arabian Peninsula), but also of sharifian (see footnote 
seven) descent.  ’Shurfas’ (or Sharifians) claim “in the eighth century, Sharif Idriss bin 
Abdallah…migrated from the Arabian Peninsula to Morocco and founded the first national 
dynasty” (Ensel 1999, 21).  Ensel states that this is the myth of the origin of the Moroccan nation. 
Today, Morocco is still led by a Sharifian dynastic monarch, “albeit from a different genealogical 
branch (Alawi) than the Idriss” (Ensel 1999, 21).  Monarchical discourse, for the most part, does 
not allude to Berbers as the original inhabitants. In fact, Pazzanita (2006, 385) writes that, over 
the period of 1550-1640, the encroaching Arab tribes, especially the Banu Hassan, 
                                                
135 The geographical designation of ‘southern Morocco’ is describing the area from the Sous region southwest to the 
Sequiet el-Hamra in Western Sahara, but does not include the whole of Western Sahara proper. 
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Map  4.5:  Greater  Western  Sahara  in  the  Sixteenth  Century136 
                                                
136 Map taken, adapted, and titles ‘du Maroc au Sudan,’ from D. Jacques-Meunié, Le Maroc Saharien, des Origines à 
1670, 2 Volumes (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1982), 573. 
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 “gradually vanquished and vassalized increasing numbers of Sanhaja,” who were direct 
descendants of the Berbers. Thus, in identity-contested regions of Morocco, such as the Dra’a 
River Valley (labeled ‘O. Dra’ in map 4.5), where the Arab (Ahrar)137, Berber, and black African 
cohabitate, a kind of semi-caste or class has developed. These socio-ethnic categories are usually 
organized with the Sharifian Arab above the Berber, Haratin138 (free Black), and finally the ‘Abid  
(descendants of slaves).139  
Upon the death of Ahmad al-Mansur (1578-1603), the Sa’adian Dynasty was already 
losing its hold on power. By the end of the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, Ottoman 
encroachment and the internecine conflict among the kingdoms and tribes in North Africa had 
weakened Sa’adian power in the region. Al-Mansur had claimed sovereignty over the whole 
width of the northern belt of the Sudan, from Wolof to Bornu, from the lower Senegal river to 
Lake Chad but from conquest and “nominal allegiance” (Levtzion 2008b, 415). His power 
resided in a compromise with the marabouts140 or sharifs and alliances with the English against 
the Spanish. His army was also composed of various tribes, Turks, Moors, and foreigners (at 
times even Christian exiles). The Trans-Saharan trade with ‘Sudan’ was also overtaken by 
competition from Brazilian sugar. Gold from the Sudan dried up. Europeans no longer needed 
                                                
137 Freemen 
 
138 “Scholars speculate that the Haratin came into being as a result of ancient interbreeding between indigenous blacks 
and Indo-Europeans, possibly Berbers.” Encyclopedia Britannica, 5, 15th, s.v., “Haratin,” 694. In other literature, the 
Haratin are described as ‘former slaves,’ or ‘Black Moors.’ “Mauritania-Haratin,” Minority Rights Group International, 
April 2013, accessed August 03, 2016, http://minorityrights.org/minorities/haratin/ . Toyin Falol, The African 
Diaspora: Slavery, Modernity, and Globalization (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2013), 42. However, 
today the ‘Haratines,’ especially in countries such as modern Mauritania, are considered former slaves. Despite passed 
legislation in Mauretania, criminalization of slavery is still tolerated by society. 
 
139 Remco Ensel’s anthropological/ethnological fieldwork among the population of the Ktawa Oasis in the Dra’a River 
Region indicated that at the time there were clear distinctions among Arab of Sharifian descent or Ahrar, Black African 
who were never slaves, categorized as Haratin black, and Black ‘Abid (actual descendants of slaves). Saints and 
Servants in Southern Morocco, 1999, ix-x and 2-3. 
 
140 “Marabout is the name given, especially in North Africa, to a Muslim saint or to his descendants.” The term is 
“derived from the Arabic murabit through the Portuguese marabuto (Spa. Morabito).”  H.A.R. Gibb and J. H. Kramers, 
Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam, s.v., “marabout,” (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1965), 325. See chap. 3, 
footnote no. 65. 
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alliances with Morocco. Al-Mansur’s sons divided his Empire again and led their smaller 
positions from Marrakesh and Fes. Local powers, including the religious chiefs—sharifs, 
maintained their territories. Levtzion adds that “continuous warfare” after Al-Mansur’s death 
“introduced a period of anarchy, one of the darkest in Moroccan history” which led to “insecurity 
on the Saharan routes,” and thereby diminished “the flow of gold from the Sudan” (1975, 148). 
Laroui recounts this fragmentation of history: “West of the Maghrib, …under the Sharifs, the 
state was strong only when it was independent of society and maintained its power only by 
recognizing the legitimacy of the local powers…it was a mere shadow of a state, because it was 
not rooted in the soil of the Maghrib” (Laroui 1977, 259).  
This appeal to soil evokes the primordial approach to national identity. However, Saharan 
society was characterized by a balance of power among the local chieftains, a more palatable 
view for constructivism. Despite creating a cohesive state enterprise, there is still a surprisingly 
interesting debate about Al-Mansur’s political entity. Identity groups can exist without a having 
to form, or existing in, a state structure. This example only demonstrates how contentious 
national identity can become. Conventional Moroccan history formally begins with the Sa’adian 
Empire, but an argument for the existence of a state based on the notion of the “pure Moroccan” 
is untenable in view of the socio-political environment. At this time in the region, it is undeniable 
that Morocco had little control before and after Al-Mansur’s reign over the area now called the 
‘Western Sahara’ or its environs. This fact also questions the type of cohesiveness that al-Mansur 
created during his reign and why it disintegrated so quickly. 
Al-Mansur did rule over a considerable part of Morocco for a quarter century. However, 
his sovereignty extended in name only outside the confines of central Morocco and at times for a 
very short period (i.e., three years governing the former Songhay Empire). His reign, as well as 
for the whole of the Sa’adian Dynasty, was characterized by several identity groups mentioned 
above. There were also distinct categories of races, even mixes of races among the population in 
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‘Morocco’ and across the southwestern and southern regions of the Sahara. This suggests that if 
Morocco in the sixteenth century was not based on a coherent ‘Moroccan’ identity, it is difficult 
to expect to find a ‘Sahrawi’ or proto-Sahrawi group in the area to the southwest of Morocco 
proper. Any form of cohesion established was monarchical but weakened by a heterogeneous 
population that was exemplified in the composition of the Sa’adian armies. The population 
remained tribal and segmented, undermining the sense of a national identity—in this case, a 
proto-Sahrawi identity. 
 
Sanhaja Identity after the War of Shar Bouba 
The history of the greater Western Sahara, especially in modern-day Mauritania, from the 1500s 
to the late 1600s has been far less documented than that of Morocco. This region of the world 
lacks prominent empire-builders, dynamic religious leaders, or a record of key historical events. 
Documentation has to be uncovered reading Mauritanian history. However, chronological history 
of Mauritania for this period is insufficient because many of the volumes that describe it leave 
huge historical gaps. The period from 1524 to 1758 is one of them. There is one major historical 
event that sheds light on the resulting Arab dominance leading up to 1668. It also highlights the 
last historical moment of the southern Sanhaja tribes who could possibly be the ancestral link to 
the Sahrawi. This was the Mauritanian Thirty-Year War, also called the Shar Bouba War(s),141 
which took place between 1644 and 1674. This section asks whether the southern Sanhaja of this 
period are the rightful ancestors of contemporary Sahrawis. 
By 1664, the southern Sanhaja had already been weakened and had relegated their status 
as warriors becoming “devoted to Islamic learning and piety, being known as Zawáyá or 
maraboutic tribes” (Levtzion 2008a, 199).  By the fifteenth century, the Arab Hassani warrior 
                                                
141 Different spellings have been found among the various sources, including Shurbubba, Shar Buba, Char Bobha, or 
Char Bouba. However, it is also referred to as the Mauritanian Thirty Year’s War. Mulero Clemente 1945, Gray 1975, 
Norris 1986, and Pazzanita 2008. Here, I will compromise and will label it as the Shar Bouba War.  
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tribes had penetrated the southwestern Sahara and subjugated the Sanhaja. This pressure against 
the Zawáyá resulted in an ongoing battle that pitted the last bastion of Sanhaja Berbers against the 
Hassani Arabs. The Hassani rulers had extracted tribute or horma142 from the more maraboutic 
tribes in exchange for protection. However, protection was inadequate and led to insecurity, 
especially along the trade routes. One crusading spirit from among the Lamtuna Berber, later 
named Nasr al-Din al-Daymani (Tashumsha143 Confederation) began to proselytize and advocate 
for a more devout following of Islam (Webb Jr. 1995b, 458; Hall 2007, 134).  Nasr al-Din 
“appointed a vizier and four qadis144, and was determined to establish order and political stability 
in the Qibla (the southern Sahara). Fighting against warriors who 'cut roads', neglected Islam and 
oppressed the believers; creating a supra-tribal community to overcome fragmentation; 
establishing a new divinely guided order: these were the goals” of al-Din (Levtzion 2008a, 200). 
 Many of the remaining Sanhaja, who were most numerous in the deep southwest of 
Western Sahara proper and, present-day southern Mauritania, had extended themselves farther 
south to the northern fringes of the Senegal River region and protested against Hassani 
absorption. Many of these Zawaya immediately heeded the call of Nasr al-Din (whose original 
name was Awbek bin Ashfaga) for several reasons. They faced discrimination from the Hassani 
tribes by way of the unjust tribute imposed on them. As a tributary tribe, they were relegated to 
secondary status in the contemporary tribal hierarchies. This was difficult for the Zawaya to 
accept since the Banu Hassan were not invited and thus were seen as ‘invaders.’ Nasr al-Din 
might have also had economic reasons for his pursuit of power. At the mouth of the Senegal 
River, the French had already established a trading post. Soon much of the trade that was 
                                                
142 Horma, hurmah, or ghorma was “a payment to Hassani protectors, on demand, of annual sheep, or two calves, or a 
piece of guinée cloth.” Norris, The Arab Conquest of the Arab Western Sahara, 37. 
 
143 A confederation of five tribes that spoke the Berber Zenaga dialect. 
 
144 A Qadi or Qadhi is a judge. “A per son of good reputation who is versed in Islamic jurisprudence and acts as a judge 
in civil and criminal matters. Adamec, Historical Dictionary of Islam, s.v., “Judge,” 152. 
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flourishing along the Senegal River and north along the trans-Saharan trade route was 
monopolized by European traders. This economic consideration was “associated with the growth 
of French trade on the Senegal since the first half of the seventeenth century. By controlling the 
entrepôts for the gum trade on the Senegal he could offset the control of the Hassan over the trade 
to the ports of the Saharan coast” (Levtzion 2008a, 200).  If trade in the north was disrupted and 
security was lacking due to the fragmentary nature of the northwestern Atlantic Sahara, Nasr al-
Din’s goal was to gain control and impose social order. Additionally, Nasr a-Din not only 
“wanted the Black riverine and savanna peoples to embrace a stricter, more rigorous adherence to 
Islamic principles” but also sought a more pious order among the Hassani population who were 
not considered faithful to Islam (Webb Jr. 1995a, 32). 
 Norris, in his impressive The Arab Conquest of the Western Sahara, writes that many of 
the stories, especially those of the War of Shar Bouba War were derived from hagiographical 
sources. He describes some of the accounts by ancient Arabic historiographers of the Western 
Sahara as common folk tales because there are no external historical sources to confirm or deny 
them. These accounts are frequently written in commemoration of saintly figures.   In his book 
Norris relates that even before the age of Al-Mansur and the Alawite Dynasty, the Banu Hassan 
(as a giant sub-tribe of the Maqil Arabs) had begun their conquest of the Western Sahara as they 
marched west toward the coast. Commenting on the 1506 work of Valentin Fernandes145, Norris 
states that the “Mountain of Kedyet Ijjel, near Tiris and close to a salt mine that [sic] was later 
controlled by the Kuntah146, was a bastion of the Saharan Lamtunah147. ‘The kings of this 
                                                
145 Valentin Fernandes, a German printer who worked in Lisbon from 1495 to 1513 compiled several works on Africa 
and published them in 1506. 
 
146 “The Kunta were probably formed in the ninth/fifteenth or tenth/sixteenth century, in the north-western Sahara 
between the Adrar and the Sagiya al-Hamra… the Kunta divided into two branches, one of which remained in the west, 
eventually moving to the central western Sahara and the south-western Sahara, while the other moved to the east 
towards the central Sahara, and then south to the Azawad, north of the Niger bend, early in the twelfth/eighteenth 
century.” Whitcomb, “New Evidence on the Origins of the Kunta,” 1975,105. 
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mountain, as all the population, are Aznages. They are the great enemies of the Arabs” (Norris 
1986, 35).  Norris suggests that these ‘Arabs’ effectively subjugated the Lamtuna, who had “little 
choice but to go south or to make peace with the Hassanis” and were the Awlad Hassan (Ibid., 
35). 
Nasr al-Din began his jihad in the southern fringes of modern-day Mauritania in 1664. 
His forces were able to gain the upper hand at first and defeat the black forces of the Senegal. 
From the Senegal, al-Din moved northeast against the Hassani tribe. He met the Hassani warriors 
in three battles for control of key commercial centers. However, Babba,148 one of the tributaries, 
called upon the aid of Hadi,149 chief of the Trarza, one of the Hassani tribes, to counter the al-Din 
threat. Tradition would characterize these engagements as the Shar Bouba War. Mulero Clemente 
writes that the Hassani invaders had “finally triumphed” over the Zawaya Berbers because the 
former “were supported by the Sultans of the Maghreb and ended up founding the Takuler150 
Empire”151 (1945, 79).  This account has been described in one of Shaykh Baba’s poems but 
Norris speculates that the 30-year war probably refers to al-Din’s lifetime and the “the imposition 
of the Hassani” over “other groups in the south-west of Mauritania” (Norris 1986, 36).  The battle 
of 1674 at Tin Yedfad proved disastrous for the Lamtuna and Tashumsha Berbers.  
These southern Sanhaja Berbers were decisively defeated in this third battle at the hands 
of a more experienced group of nomadic Arab warriors. The remnants of the Sanhaja were no 
                                                                                                                                            
147 Written here as Lamtuna are a Sanhaja sub-tribe. See Chapter 3, page 4, footnote 61. 
 
148 The name of the tributary tribe of the Tashidbit Lamtuna 
 
149 Shaykh al-Qadi Muhammad ibn Mahmud Babba (or Baba) had asked for the help of the Hassani Banu Maghfar 
Prince of Trarza (or Trarzah), Hadi Ibn Ahmad Ibn Daman. Norris, The Arab Conquest of the Arab Western Sahara, 35 
150 The Takuler (Sp.) Empire refers to the founding of the Tukulor (Fr. Toucouleur) Muslim theocracy in 1854 in the 
Senegambia. 
 
151 Taken from the Spanish and translated by the author, “al fin triunfaron los invasores [Hassan] que estaban apoyados 
por los Sultanes del Mogreb y que acabaron fundando el imperio Takuler in Manuel Mulero Clemente, Los Territorios 
Españoles del Sahara y Sus Grupos Nómadas (Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, Spain: ‘El Siglo’ de Sánchez Talavera, 
1945), 79. 
  122 
longer allowed to raise arms. They were forced to pay tribute again for protection, “renounced all 
pretensions to…military and political” authority; remained as ulama, which deepened their 
spiritual militancy; and were obliged to give the milk from their herds and water from the wells to 
the warrior Hassani (Levtzion 2008a, 201). The Berbers became Zenaga (a derivative of Sanhaja), 
tributaries of the Arabs by peace treaty (Pazzanita 2006, 385). Even before end of the sixteenth 
century, the Awlad Hassan had already permeated much of Berber society in the southwestern 
Sahara. Lamtuna remnants had been nominally subject to the Peul152 of the Trarza until 1638 and 
were largely repressed by several Hassani tribes—leading to military resistance. “Several of the 
Zwaya leaders had married into Hassani families, and even when the conflict was at its most 
bitter…certain tribes remained aloof from the war” (Norris 1986, 37-38).  At the same time, the 
Sultans of Morocco became active in support of the Mauritanian Emirates. Appeals to the Sultan 
by the Hassani and the aid that was given to the Arab armies helped forge an alliance in 1678 
between Moulay Hassan who “received the submission of many of the tribes of Awlad Hassan in 
the entire Western Sahara” (Ibid., 39). 
The identity of the southern Sanhaja tribes was transformed from ‘warrior’ to clerical and 
lost an essential link to the modern Sahrawi. Much of their population was absorbed by the Arab. 
The decline of the Sanhaja Berber in the deep southwestern Sahara coincided with the rise of the 
Alawite Dynasty in southern Morocco. Subsequently, the Banu Hassan merged with the Sanhaja 
to form a tribe led by Sidi Ahmad Erguibi. The tribe of the Reguibayt153 is sometimes called 
                                                
152 The Peul also known as Fulani, “a people of obscure origins, expanded eastward from” Trarza and “Futa Toro in 
Lower Senegal in the 14th century” into the Niger River Bend. They established an Empire that is now known as the 
Sokoto Calipahte in 1804, today relegated to a province of Northern Nigeria. The Fulani, however, are found scattered 
throughout West Africa. Encyclopedia Britannica, s.v., “Fulani Empire,” “Fulani,” 5, 15th ed., 2015, 42; New World 
Encyclopedia, s.v., “Fulani Sultanate,” 21 November 2013, accessed August 04, 2016, 
http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Fulani_Sultanate. 
 
153 Presently “the most numerous and influential tribe of the Western Sahara,” having “many fractions and sub-
fractions and which is thought to be of predominantly Sanhaja Berber extraction” are found throughout northwest 
Africa. Pazzanita describes the Reguibayt as the “largest component of the Sahrawi nationalist movement” assisting the 
POLISARIO in the 1970s and well into the early 21st century “by virtue of the sheer numbers as well as their 
traditionally independent attitude and warlike history.” Historical Dictionary of the Western Sahara, 363-367. 
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Tekna in the Sequiet el-Hamra region. This merger also created and adapted the Arabic 
Hassaniya dialect of the present-day Sahrawi people, supplanting the Sanhaja Berber dialect. The 
Sanhaja Berber become linguistically disconnected from modern Sahrawi speakers and displaced 
geographically from the Western Sahara. The only remnants of the southern Sanhaja (Zenaga)  
survive in southwestern Mauritania and the Senegal154. Their connections to the Sahrawi today 
remain unconvincing. Thereafter, the Hassani tribes become dominant south of Morocco. Despite 
being poor “and thus mobile and with nothing to lose,” these Hassaniya tribes ruled the desert, 
possessed a “superior vitality” through desert warfare, adapting to the desert way of life (Mercer 
1976, 500). Still, although these Hassaniya Arabo-Berbers (Tekna) of the Sahara were mostly free 
along the littoral desert, these primary descendants of the Western Sahara remained divided 
among tribal affiliations. The divisions make it difficult to link them directly to the Sahrawi 
unless the claims include all tribes of the Western Sahara who at one point or another settled and 
traversed the region. However, such claims prove even more daunting. 
 
The Alawite Sultanate 1669 — 1757: Contentious Concepts of Identity and Territoriality 
Despite intermittent cohesiveness along the northwestern Atlantic coast of Morocco, many of the 
ruling factions were rivals. Until al-Mansur’s reign, all were incapable of fending off European 
incursions, Moorish155  exiles from Iberia and the gradual intervention of the Ottoman Turks. In 
addition, the research indicates that the socio-political history in this area of the world 
 
                                                
154 Today, Sanhaja of the northern stream still exist in small pockets of the Rif in northern Morocco and in parts of the 
Middle Atlas Mountains in eastern Morocco. 
 
155 Moor is the term derived from Latin that denotes the mostly Muslim population that lived on the Iberian Peninsula 
before the Spanish Reconquista and then fled across the Mediterranean to present-day Mauritania, the Western Sahara, 
and Morocco. According to C.C. Stewart, “the appellation…has been applied at various times to Muslim peoples from 
Andalusia to the Senegal basin” where they eventually mixed with Berber, Black, and Arab tribes. “Political Authority 
and Social Stratification in Mauritania,” in Ernest Gellner and Charles Micaud, eds., Arabs and Berbers: From Tribe to 
Nation in North Africa (London: Duckworth and Co.) 1973, 377. 
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Figure  4.6:  Morocco  in  the  Sixteenth  and  Seventeenth  Centuries  156 
                                                
156 Charles-André Julien, History of North Africa—Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco: From the Arab Conquest to 1830, 
Translated by John Petrie, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul), 1970, 231. 
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has been concerned with the nature of trade, alliances, and the power of the Sultans and monarchs 
of the Iberian Peninsula. Discoveries made at this time were also prominent in the journals of 
these adventurers157 but there is little account of the population in the northwest and western 
coasts of North Africa that led into the western Sahara. Much of the region’s history remains in 
parchments (i.e., Timbuktu), stored in personal libraries, which have not been thoroughly 
investigated. Several stories that have been related here have been documented by sources tied to 
oral tradition. The lack of textual history notwithstanding, tradition and documented history have 
shown that there is ample evidence to suggest that there was never a controlled group nor one 
authoritative dynasty or empire that had control of this area for much more than fifty years. 
Additionally, although many of the Arab tribes asked for aid and some submitted to the authority 
of the Moroccan Sultanate, these were nominal at best. Evidence suggests that the Saharan tribes 
probably recognized the Sultan’s spiritual authority but not his temporal—political and 
territorial—authority. 
 Still, inadequate or incomplete as it may seem, the research still provides some history 
that describes the problems associated with recognition of authority by the communities outside 
of the purview of the Moroccan Sultanates. In fact, Sufi orders (or zawiyas) competed against 
each other for power and influence in sites opposed to the dismembered Sa’adian Empire: “the 
Dala’iyya in the Middle Atlas, the Samlaliyya in the Sous valley, and the Arab tribesmen in the 
Atlantic littoral led by al-‘Ayyashi” (Bouasria 2015, 54). Moreover, between 1640 and 1686, 
there were Sultans all in the principal cities of Marrakesh, Fes, Meknes, Tetuan in the north (see 
map 4.7 above), and the Sous Valley in the south vying for the unification of Morocco. Finally, in 
1664, Moulay Rashid defeated his brother Muhammad al-Sharif and within ten years was able to 
consolidate power throughout most of Morocco. Moulay Rashid is considered the founder of the 
second Sharifian reign in Morocco—the Alawite Dynasty. By 1673, his son, Moulay Ismail, had 
                                                
157 Some of these include Ibn Battuta (1304 -1368), Ibn Khladun (1332 -1406), Leo Africanus (1485 - 1554), Alvise 
Cadamosto (1432-1483), and Major Daniel Houghton (1740-1791).  
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taken over and established law and order throughout most of Morocco through brutal means. He 
implemented a new, systematic manner of militarization; he adopted a Negro army called the 
‘Abid or black regiments composed of either formally or soon to be freed slaves. 
 Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth ‘Alawite’ centuries, control by the Sultans 
was, for the most part, taken by force and almost never by acquiescence of the population or 
diplomatic means. For example, Moulay Ismail, “Sultan of Fez…of the Gharb, the Rif, and the 
Taza region,” was able to control the Sous, not through any negotiated terms but “at the point of 
the sword” (Julien 1970, 248).  Rebellion was common and the Sultan had to campaign 
throughout the southern ‘territories’ of Morocco between 1672 and 1687. He not only vanquished 
enemy leaders in Marrakesh, Fes, Taruouant, Tadla, in Dila, and other provinces in the north, but 
also massacred the population of entire cities such as Taroudant in March 1687. García-Arenal 
and De Bunes wrote that although "the policy of Moulay Isma’il [was] aimed at creating stable 
borders in his kingdom," especially in the east versus Algiers, he was more capable at 'preaching' 
a 'holy war' “against the occupying Christians of the coastal cities of his kingdom" in the south158 
(1992, 141).  In spite of the relative consolidation of Moroccan lands, Abun-Nasr admits that 
even after Moulay Ismail’s death: 
Morocco had no stable bureaucracy or recognized representative bodies that 
could ensure continuity in the government of the country…the existence of 
effective government depended on a new sultan’s ability to develop the military 
means of having his authority obeyed…Consequently the discordant tribal 
constitutions of the society and the strong local particularisms plunged the 
country into continuous political strife and led sometimes to chaos (1987, 231). 
 
It is at this point that a new political concept developed in Morocco: bilad al-siba (the 
lands of no authority) and the bilad al-makhzen (the lands of government). This dichotomous 
political idea implied that although the sultans were absolute rulers, they still only controlled part 
                                                
158 Taken and translated from the Spanish by the author: “La política de Muley Isma’il está orientada a crear unas 
fronteras estables en su reino” and “contra los ocupantes cristianos de las ciudades costeras de su reino” in the south 
found in Mercedes García-Arenal and Miguel Ángel De Bunes, Los Españoles y El Norte de África Siglos XV-XVIII 
(Madrid: Editorial Mapfre, 1992), 141. 
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of Morocco. In addition, the ‘Sudanic’ or southern Saharan lands that stretched to Timbuktu had 
already reneged on acknowledging the Alawi Sultan. When Moulay Rashid “was proclaimed 
sultan in Fez as the first ruler of the ‘Alawi Dynasty,” the bilad al-makhzen was a realm described 
by Levtzion as “land effectively controlled by the central authority and, under the influence of the 
towns, integrated into the social and economic texture of the sultanate” (2008, 156, 147).  The 
bilad al-siba were “the lands…in practice, independent, but in theory, part of the sultan’s 
dominions temporarily in secession” (Ibid., 147).  Hodges, in describing the reign of Moulay 
Ismail159 (1672—1727), states that the Moors used the term trab el-beidan, for “the land of the 
‘whites’ ” (1983, 9).  The Moors, who paradoxically were of mixed origin, designated much of 
the ‘western’ Sahara as the trab el-beidan including the territory “from the Dra’a River in the 
north to the banks of the Senegal and the bend of the Niger, and from the Atlantic seaboard to a 
series of almost impenetrable dune zones…in what is now eastern Mauritania” (ibid., 8-9). 
This large territory was actually in flux as the Moroccan Sultan made several attempts to 
control these dominions. Moulay Ismail attempted to subdue the tribes outside his influence but 
primarily came away with slaves, mostly black that were, in turn, set apart and integrated into his 
growing ‘Abid army. He sent forces to Trarza (1672), led an expedition in 1679 south of the 
Sous, to the Adrar, and made other incursions to settle disputes among his allies or against 
enemies (ibid., 29).  However, his allies only nominally accepted the Sultan’s suzerainty in order 
to reinforce their own power and his expeditions were relatively short and irregular. Moreover, 
the acquisition of so many slaves depleted the southern oases of their agricultural manpower and 
decimated the sustenance “in the environs of the cities” (Laroui 1977, 274).  The Sultanate seems 
to have had no overriding long-term “impact at all on the region now constituting Western 
Sahara” (Hodges1983, 30). By 1740, the ruling pashas in Timbuktu were forced to pay tribute to 
                                                
159 “whose mother was a black Saharan slave.” Hodges, Western Sahara: Roots of a Desert War, 29. 
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the Tuareg. Consequently, by the time of Moulay Ismail’s death (1727), tribal rivalry renewed 
and a state of anarchy reigned in the southern territories of Morocco for the next thirty years. 
The inability of the sultans to consolidate power (which was intermittent and based on 
force) among the Berbers in the mountains, the Arab tribes of the plains, and the zawaya160 
brotherhoods, “whose power had increased in the course of the holy wars against European 
aggression on the Moroccan coast in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries,” allowed for “the 
decline of central authority” (Levtzion 2008, 147).  Hodges wrote that “the sultans’ chances of 
maintaining direct contact with the trab el-beidan vanished as the regions to its immediate north, 
the Noun, the Anti-Atlas and the southern Souss [Sus], reverted to their old status as part of the 
bilad as-siba” (Hodges 1983, 30).  Dunn, examining the expansion of a Berber-speaking tribe 
called the Ait Atta or “people of Atta,” originating in the “pre-Saharan belt just south of the 
central High161 Atlas” in the Tafilalet region, writes that the Sultan ignored this expansion as well 
as “populations lying directly in its path” (1973, 99).  Dunn also reiterates Hodges’ comments on 
the lack of Sultanate military expeditions south of the High Atlas Mountains. He further describes 
how “no Sultan succeeded regularly in collecting taxes or calling up military contingents south of 
the High Atlas” (ibid.).  However, he does contrast this argument by stating that: 
Despite the absence of real political authority, the Sultan did claim sovereignty 
over the entire western Sahara as amir al-mu’minin, or head of the Muslim 
community…by issuing seals and letters of investiture to local leaders and by 
mediating…disputes.162 Thus, local leaders sought association with the Sultan 
                                                
160 Centers of Sufi brotherhoods. 
 
161 The High Atlas Mountains compose the highest mountain peaks of the Atlas Mountain range. This section is located 
in south central Morocco. Directly south of the westernmost High Atlas lays the Sous River Basin. The southernmost 
Atlas section of peaks is labeled as the Anti-Atlas Mountains. The Dra’a River Valley runs parallel to the latter section 
and, along with the Sus, had been in continuous dispute for centuries over the control of these regions. South of these 
regions, lies the Western Sahara, which has been the focus of international controversy between the POLISARIO and 
the Kingdom of Morocco. 
 
162 “In turn, most southern groups…recognized the Sultan’s religious authority, believing him as a sharif, to retain the 
Baraka, or divine grace, which brought munificence and good fortune on the community of believers,” Ross E. Dunn, 
“Berber Imperialism: The Ait Atta Expansion in Southeast Morocco,” in Arabs and Berbers: From to Nation in North 
Africa, edited by Ernest Gellner and Charles Micaud (London: Duckworth and Company, 1973), 99. 
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through political investiture… and disputing families, villages, and even tribes 
sent their cases to the Sultan or makhzan judges for adjudication (ibid.). 
 
This is a debate that is rooted in the fusion of Islam over both the public and private dimensions 
of civil society. The Sahrawi are predominantly Muslim followers even outside the frontiers of 
Western Sahara proper in the camps around Tindouf, Algeria. However, based on over 25 
interviews conducted in their ‘refugee’ camps in Rabouni, Smara, and Laayoune, the leading 
political and intellectual leaders of these communities have expressed openness to other faiths. 
They do not seem to center their national aspirations on religious governance but rather in 
political or temporal authority based in part on territorial sovereignty—the claim over the 
Western Sahara. 
 This divide has been of such importance that it was addressed at the International Court 
of Justice’s (ICJ) proceedings concerning the Western Sahara in 1975. For example, the Alawite 
Empire was considered a Sharifian Empire because of its religious ties to the Prophet 
Mohammed. In presenting evidence to the ICJ, Morocco actually asked that the Court take into 
account the ‘special’ status of the “Sharifian State,” based on the rule of international law that 
“requires the structure of a State to follow any particular pattern, as is evident from the diversity 
of the forms of State found in the world today” (ICJ 1975, 43-44).  Morocco argued that the 
Sharifian State “consisted in the fact that it was founded on the common religious bond of Islam 
existing among the peoples and on the allegiance of various tribes to the Sultan, through their 
caids or sheikhs, rather than on the notion of territory” (ibid., 44).  The Moroccan state pressed 
for the Advisory Panel to take note of the “special forms in which its exercise of sovereignty 
may…have expressed itself” (ibid., 44).  This interpretation of national identity associated with 
recognition of a supreme authority such as the sultan is difficult to challenge. For instance, 
primordialism does allow for such a development because primordial bonds rely on objectified 
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points of nationality that include religion, in this case Islam. Moreover, Morocco stated when 
presenting their case before the ICJ that: 
“bled makhzen and bled siba [sic], merely described two types of relationship 
between the Moroccan local authorities and the central power, not a territorial 
separation; and that the existence of these different types did not affect the unity 
of Morocco. Because of a common cultural heritage, the spiritual authority of the 
Sultan was always accepted…Thus the difference…did not reflect a wish to 
challenge the existence of the central power so much as the conditions for the 
exercise of power” (ibid., 44). 
 
Yet, these interpretations of the bilad al-makhzen and bilad al-siba were made almost 
three hundred years later. For despite the Moroccan claim, it would be difficult to ascertain if, in 
fact, the sultans of the age and the local caids163 or sheikhs actually agreed with these types of 
interpretive arguments. What is certain is that there was such devolution of power that it allowed 
for free localized rule. Accordingly, if such claims are to be accepted then nationhood is based on 
the influence that was bestowed through others, namely other local chieftains. This might indicate 
that the proper approach to understanding this type of nation building is instrumentalism. 
Instrumentalism considers national identity through rational means and socio-institutional 
practicality. For example, the sultan’s rule, as determined by the Moroccan claim (in 1975), was 
of political behavior for governmental expediency. One may argue that the manner in which the 
Sultanate took shape was based on economic advantages—the Trans-Saharan trade routes—but it 
was primarily focused on spiritual authority—a more cultural explanation of nationhood. The 
political reality of the period fused not only an elitist (Sultanic) process of governance—
instrumentalism—but also Islam (already in place at the grass-roots level), a cultural, primordial 
characteristic of group cohesion, to produce a distinct mode of power and of course national 
identity. 
Still, the POLISARIO does not consider this the appropriate interpretation because of the 
vagueness of the sultan’s rule at the time. The POLISARIO insists that once they do establish a 
                                                
163 Caid (also spelled qaid or kaid) is the name given (in a North Africa) to a Muslim chief (or Berber chieftain), judge, 
or senior official.  
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socio-governmental framework in the Western Sahara, their constitution would be open to all 
faiths. Yet, from first hand observation, it seems difficult to imagine how a Christian or Jewish 
convert would fare in camps where the population is predominantly Muslim. In truth, the 
POLISARIO have a point in maintaining that ‘spiritual influence’ is not a valid consideration of 
authority because of its subjective connotations. It is one reason why the POLISARIO and 
SADR164 have not grounded their social and political objectives in Islam. Currently, religion has 
been treated as a private matter, not to be enforced from above (Zunes 1988, 149). The issue of 
spiritual sovereignty is usually a topic debated among theologians as it relates to a Creator Being. 
However, this issue has become prominent among Middle Eastern states because of the influence 
of religious-leaning political parties and terrorist movements desiring to install ‘Islamist States’ or 
Caliphates. After all, the Kingdom of Morocco, although one of the more secular-leaning 
countries of the Middles East, is still ruled by a King who claims ties of sacred descent to the 
Prophet Muhammad. These religious claims necessitate a closer interpretation through the 
theoretical approaches of identity, which will be discussed in a later chapter. 
The Central Question of this section asked if the origins of Sahrawi identity lie within 
this period. And if so, in what form did it materialize? If Sahrawi national identity began here, 
then it would still prove difficult to ascertain due to the huge flux of tribal rivalries challenging 
the power bases of the imperial cities and their sultans in Fes, Marrakesh and south into the 
Tafilalet region. More importantly, the northern part of Western Sahara proper, the Sequiet el-
Hamra, was open to a disparity of cross migration and inconsistent suitors for power. This area 
included the northern belt of the Sequiet el-Hamra and the Oued Dra’a and Sous River Valleys, 
which currently compose the southern provinces of Morocco. Moreover, the consolidation of 
power involved not only politico-tribal dominance supported by physical force but also socio-
                                                
164 SADR is the acronym for the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic proclaimed on February 27, 1976 by the 
Provisional National Sahrawi Council of the Polisario Front, the Sahrawi government-in-exile that administers non-
Moroccan administrative lands in the Western Sahara. 
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religious influence through the zawiyas led by the sharifs. Of course, the most important region is 
the actual territory of what is today the Western Sahara. More constructivist approaches argue 
that the encroachment of colonial powers into west and northwestern Africa generated resistance 
from those long-since arrived established. Yet, the only evidence of ‘colonial’ resistance was as a 
result of the Portuguese crown’s insisting that the sultans send an emissary to conclude 
negotiations over commercial outposts along their Moroccan coastline. This produced a staggered 
union of tribes joined in the ouster of the Portuguese by 1524. This aggression was inconsistent, 
varied, and primarily forged by the use of religious flag-waving against infidels. Monotheistic 
Islam did change the faith among Saharan Berbers; however, it did not profoundly change their 
lifestyle. Zunes explains, in his serious study of the internal governing structure of the Sahrawis 
that Islam did not coalesce religious and civil affairs as it did in almost all Arab countries. His 
interviews conducted with Sahrawis across different sectors of society demonstrated that they 
emphasized “the difference between true Islam (the message of the Prophet Muhammad) and the 
cultural traditions of societies which adopted Islam as an official religion” (Zunes 1988, 149).  
According to Zunes, the Sahrawis “have never known an emir or imam…were never under direct 
Ottoman rule,” and thus Islam never became their ‘state’ religion (ibid.).  In addition, at this time, 
Europeans never did gain a proper foothold in the Western Sahara. 
This section demonstrates that a more organized political society among the Western 
Saharans developed because the sovereign entities ruling the area in this period became stronger 
and their control of territory expanded. Although there were many sultans and numerous tribal 
fiefdoms sprang up at one time, the geographical scope of the region had already diverged and 
produced independent histories north and south of the Western Sahara. In the most crucial of 
sectors such as the Sequiet el-Hamra and the Sous River Valley, questions remained until the 
emergence of the late Alawite Sultans as to who controlled these areas. Despite the unclear 
interpretation of dominion over these disputed areas north of the Western Sahara and the 
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inconsistent uprisings against foreign intrusion during this period, no definitive origin for a 
Sahrawi nation stands out. In fact, Sahrawi identity remains difficult to establish. 
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V. SAHARAN  HISTORY: SEARCHING  FOR  SAHRAWI  ORIGINS  FROM  1758 –1859 
 
This period from 1758 until 1859 features the diplomatic peak of Moroccan and Spanish 
diplomacy over commerce and territory in contested areas of Morocco. This section extends the 
socio-historical analysis of the period in the western and southwestern Maghreb region (including 
Mauritania, Western Sahara proper, and Morocco), and provides insight to Sahrawi claims of 
separateness during this historical period. This chapter seeks evidence that sustains the primordial 
argument that the origins of the Sahrawi as a distinctive national people begin in this historical 
period. The chapter then examines the possibility that the origins of Sahrawi national 
consciousness developed from the social constructs of the region's socio-political environment (a 
combined primordial and instrumental approach). The argument proposes that Sahrawi national 
identity began to emerge at this historical juncture when local agents began to react to historical 
developments in a way that allowed Sahrawi nationalism to emerge. Finally, the chapter 
considers pure instrumentalism: A national identity that is created, manipulated, or embellished 
directly, subtly, or indirectly by ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’ for solely economic or political objectives.  
The continuing central question remains: do the origins of Sahrawi identity lie within this period, 
and through what socio-political mechanisms does it materialize?  
The primordial notion, continues to be relevant to this chapter even though the analysis 
begins in the eighteenth century. Still, problems recur about the modern interpretation of national 
identity. Primordialism seeks origins of identity in the historical past but it is not a popular 
concept today. It also identifies national characteristics of identity within objective ethnic or 
cultural parameters. However, there is no standard point of origin for national identification 
because it is contingent upon the group in question. Because one not only lives in the modern 
world, but also reads and studies modern scholarship, the more inclusive, constructivist approach 
to nationality has prevailed. Constructivists argue that the emergence of national identity is 
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arbitrary and subjective in selecting a point of origin, and discuss the interaction of structural 
realities and the agency of ambitious politicians or nation-builders to select any point of origin. 
Constructivism also conforms to the dictates of our modern age in that it enhances our 
understanding of identity politics by fusing instrumentalism and primordialism—two streams of 
thought that some suggest are largely dated and unpopular. 
Despite its scholarly unpopularity, it is not an easy task to dismiss primordial concepts. 
This segment in history is still being studied, revised, and re-told. In addition, countries continue 
to form based on nationalities seeking autonomy, secession165 or outright independence. Several 
collectivities or minority groups within other countries or territories persist even today in seeking 
more autonomy or recognition by other powers as legitimate, independent political entities (the 
Palestinians, Kurds, Catalans, and the Naga as examples).  They distinguish themselves by 
pointing to what they believe are objective cultural or ethnic markers. They remark on their 
history. 
In this chapter, the constructivist approach, where the encroachment of foreign powers 
into west and northwestern Africa generated resistance and a more organized political society 
among the proto-Sahrawis, will become much more significant. Constructivist explanations rely 
on a more fluid understanding of the emergence of nationalities, for it allows an identity to be 
approached from below. This would be the level of the common citizenry, a grass-roots level, 
where arguments are made for given and objective attributes that can only be described as 
affinities or attachments to family or tribe, the land, and links to tradition (custom, ancient 
myths). It also allows for identity to be studied from above. It seeks explanations of nationhood 
either from geo-political dynamics and circumstances that have influenced the citizens or the 
manipulation either directly or indirectly from elitist or 'ethnic' entrepreneurs. After the socio-
                                                
165 Secession is noted as a different category from independence because it involves seceding from a territory and 
possible willingly being annexed by another territory— an irredentist form of autonomy. Instead, independence is 
actively engaging in an independent country enterprise. 
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historical description and commentary of the Sahrawi during this period, a critique concludes this 
section. 
 
The Sharifian Age (1758 — 1800) 
The chronology below mentions numerous tribes, which only make ancestral arguments even 
more convoluted. Independent tribes had taken control of the vast greater Western Sahara, south 
and southwest of Morocco. This section, therefore, highlights a more concrete feature of national 
identity—territory. The Sahrawi claim they have never historically submitted to any type of 
territorial control. This ‘rebellious’ attitude in asserting that the Western Sahara had always 
remained outside the influence of any sultan is an important part of Sahrawi national identity. 
This section also underscores the precarious position of the sultans and the regional independence 
of the many competing tribes not only within the fledgling ‘Moroccan Empire’ but also outside 
its frontiers. If direct ancestry to the modern Sahrawi remains elusive perhaps this feature of their 
identity is more apparent. In 1757, Sidi Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd Allah (1757—1790), or Sidi 
Muhammad III, took the reins of power in Morocco, but had not made incursions deep into 
Western Sahara proper. Julien notes in his History of North166Africa, Sidi Muhammad, as with 
previous sultans, had trouble extending his power and controlling even the unruly populations 
within his ‘Moroccan Empire.’ Several independencies sprang up to the south and east of the 
High Atlas ‘domains’ of Morocco. Julien states that the “unsubjected zone remained very 
extensive and the sultan spent a great part of his reign in putting down revolts and stemming 
encroachments by the Sanhaja in the Middle Atlas” (Julien 1970, 264).  These principalities had 
already begun falling away from the direct control of Sultan MoulayIsmail in the late seventeenth 
and early eighteenth centuries. Sidi Muhammad III’s subsequent 
                                                
166 Moulay is also spelled Mawlay, or Mulay in the Maghreb and Andalucía. In Morocco it refers to descendants of 
Muhammad. John L Esposito, Oxford Dictionary of Islam, s.v. “Mawla,” (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
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Maps 5.1/5.2:  Comparison  of  Modern-Day  Morocco  (above)  with  ‘Morocco,’  in  1600 — 
1822  167 
                                                
167 The maps above compare of the modern state of Morocco to its nominal extent of influence in the seventeenth 
through early nineteenth centuries. The map below shows its fluid ‘frontiers’ extending until the Oued Dra’a (south of 
Iligh stretching northeast and then north) to its south but not to the whole of modern Western Sahara. South of the Oued 
Dra’a there remained various independent tribal confederations. The maps do not show other independent tribes in the 
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aggressive policies executed by his ‘Abid168 army and his alteration of the trans-Saharan trade 
routes for more control dissatisfied many competing groups in the region. Sidi Muhammad had 
created a new Atlantic port called Mogador (Al-Sawira)169 to serve as the entry point for trade to 
the south, bypassing Sijilmasa170 and the Tafilalet region, controlled by other leaders. The city of 
Mogador at the southern fringes of Morocco deprived the Sous (and its inhabitants) “of its former 
maritime outlets, grew poor and ceased to be a centre [sic] of rebellion and a threat to the 
authority of the makhzan171” (Julien 1970, 266).  Nevertheless, the loss of control along these 
trade routes172, internal volatility within the ‘Empire’ itself, and the lack of stability in Timbuktu 
led to a high level of insecurity “for trans-Saharan traders” (Lydon 2009, 97). The net result of 
these policies did not extend his reach south of the Sous River Valley and modern Western 
Sahara remained mostly outside of the Sultan’s influence. 
                                                                                                                                            
deep south into modern Mauritania and northern Mali. Maps adapted from C.R. Pennel, Morocco: From Empire to 
Independence, eBook Edition (London: One World Publications, 2013), 14, 55. 
 
168 ‘Abid comes from the term ‘abid al-Bukhari, meaning servants of al-Bukhari, which were the Sultan’s army of 
Saharan blacks recruited and sent to a special camp at Mechra’ er-Remel to propagate and their children at the age of 
10 were then presented to the Sultan and trained to become fighters in his army. Encyclopedia Britannica, 15th ed., s.v. 
“al-Bukhari.” 
 
169 Mogador had also replaced the coastal commercial port of Agadir and is known today as Essaouira. 
 
170 Sijilmasa, which had been the primary trans-Saharan trade hub (primarily for gold) for more than 650 years (757 
AD to its first abandonment in the 1390s), was a stopping point for caravaners travelling southward, especially to 
Timbuktu, had been reconstructed by Moulay Ismail but again was destroyed by the nomadic Ait Atta Berber tribes 
moving northwest in to the Tafilalet and Dra’a Oases. James Miller, “Trading Through Islam: The Interconnections of 
Sijilmasa, Ghana and the Almoravid Movement,” in Julia Clancy-Smith, ed., North Africa, Islam and the 
Mediterranean World: From the Almoravids to the Algerian War, (Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), 29. 
 
171 Makhzan or Makhzen is defined as the traditional central government and in this case the central administrative 
government of the Sultan of Morocco. Ernest Gellner and Charles Micaud, eds., Arabs and Berbers: From Tribe to 
Nation in North Africa, London: Gerald Duckworth and Company, 1973), index page 445. 
 
172 Despite much evidence depicting a hard to control, peripheral Morocco under Sidi Muhammad, Lydon states that 
Sidi Muhammad III “ushered in a peaceful political climate favoring the expansion of international commerce.” 
Ghislaine Lydon, On Trans-Saharan Trails: Islamic Law, Trade Networks, and Cross-Cultural Exchange in Nineteenth 
Century Western Africa. (Los Angeles: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 99. Of all the sources used from this 
period, Lydon seems to be among the few who portrays Sidi Muhammad positively in terms of improving trade in the 
region. 
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The infusion by imperial rivals—the Ottoman Empire encroaching from the east and 
southeast of Morocco, the Spanish, French, and British infringing on Morocco’s southwestern 
coasts then southward parallel to the Senegal River—along with the earlier collapse of the 
Songhay Empire, and the loss of reach by Morocco over its outer dominions “increased the 
margin of maneuver for regional groups” (McDougall 2012, 86).  For example, a “charismatic 
Sufi and powerful entrepreneur,” Shaykh Sidi al-Mukhtar bin Ahmad al-Bakkay, represented the 
scholarly Kunta173 tribe which formed the main part of the Sufi Qadiriyya brotherhood174 in 
western Africa (Lydon 2009, 97).  By the late eighteenth century, this group (along with other 
branches of the same brotherhood) controlled the main oases and therefore the caravanning traffic 
from the Western Sahara to the Adrar, east to Tawdenni and the Azawad region, and south to 
Timbuktu (see map 5.3). Aziz Batran labeled this ‘a holy economic empire,’ while Lydon 
described the power of the Kunta as one where they “established regional order of a kind that had 
not been known since the fall of Songhay” and succeeded “in filling a political vacuum in the 
region” (Ibid, 98).  Moreover, McDougall asserts that from the: 
Late sixteenth through the late eighteenth centuries in the southern Sahara and 
the Sahel can be seen as a dynamic period of both fragmentation and 
recomposition, with the appearance of new power centers controlled by emerging 
social groups and a proliferation of new states: …arma175 viceroyalty of 
                                                
173 “The Kunta are neither a ‘tribe’ nor a confederation but rather family groupings…who have acquired a great 
religious reputation, considerable wealth” … “dispersed throughout” the Sahara between the Atlantic Ocean and Niger. 
Aziz A. Batran, “The Kunta, Sidi al-Mukhtar al-Kuntī, and the Office of Shaykh al-Tarīqa ’l-Qādiriyya,” in Studies in 
West Islamic History, Vol 1: The Cultivators of Islam, edited by John Ralph Willis (New York: Routledge, 1979), 127. 
“The great tribe of the Kunta, who are distinguished by their purer blood and by their learning above almost all the 
tribes of the desert.” Heinrich Barth, Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa: Being a Journal of an 
Expedition Undertaken under the Auspices of H.B.M.'s Government, in the years 1849-1855, Vol III (New York: 
Harper and Brother Publishers, 1859), 686. 
 
174 A powerful Sufi movement led by the Bakkay branch of the nomadic Kunta “in the early part of the seventeenth 
century” would emerge “in a large region extending from the northern oasis of Tuwat, the regions of Tiris and 
Zemmur, over to the Taganit and the Hawd and into present-day Senegal. Eventually, one family came to settle in the 
Azawad region, to the north of Timbucktu, in the mid-seventeenth century, and shortly after, Kunta relatives would 
follow.” Lydon, On Trans-Saharan Trails, 2009, 97. 
 
175 The arma are a people of traditionally Moroccan descent from the toppling of the Songhay Empire that still survive 
today in and around Timbucktu. 
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Timbucktu and Jenné and the emergent Tuareg confederations that pressed upon 
it from the north” (2012, 86). 
 
This regional order outside the purview of the Moroccan Sultan, moved among the trans-Saharan 
trade in salt, tobacco, slaves, camels, gum, and book manuscripts among other items. These 
regional power centers would begin to revolve around confederations of tribes such as the Tekna, 
Reguibayt, Kunta, Tuareg and other sub-tribes176. In addition, “embryonic supratribal” groups 
would produce the independent nomadic Emirates of Trarza, Brakna, and later in the Adrar, in the 
deep southwestern Sahara (see map 5.1) and south central regions of Western Sahara proper 
respectively (Lydon 10; Hodges 1983, 31). 
 The late eighteenth century was marked by a high level of independency among several 
groups. These groups had forged a tribal identity. These identities had not coalesced with, and 
were separate from those of, the ‘Empire of Morocco.’ Muhammad III’s empire also was not a 
homogenous political entity that was composed of several tribes and these were associated with 
several ‘kingdoms’ that were themselves composed of several tribes: 1) Kingdom of Fes; 2) 
Kingdom of Marrakesh (Morocco); 3) Kingdom of the Sous; 4) and at times the Royalty of 
Sijilmasa. The southern tribes that were independent of these fiefdoms were composed mostly of 
confederations that maintained an identity loyal to the tribe and trickled down to the clan. The 
assessment at this juncture makes it difficult to isolate a confederation or tribe associated with 
one of Sahrawi descent. 
Lydon mentions that “the region of the western Sahara, stretching south of the Wad177 [or 
Oued] Nun to the Senegal River, was now dominated by Saharans of mixed ancestry who chose 
as their identity marker…the ethnonym bidan,” which will be discussed later (ibid., 10).  For  
                                                
176 Other tribes such as the Arosien, Oulad (or Awlad, which is defined as descendants or sons of) Delim, Oulad 
Tridrarim, and the Oulad Bu Sbaa also are considered Sahrawi today but are mainly of Arabic extract. 
 
177 Wad or Wadi is a transcription of the word Oued that is used across the Middle East, in general, for the name of a 
river valley. However, in the Maghreb, this term Oued is applied to a river or riverbed even if dry for most of the year. 
Oued will be utilized in this work because it is more commonly found in the literature as such. 
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Map 5.3:  Socio-Political  Environment  of  Northwest  Africa 178 
                                                
178 Map titled “Western Africa,” from Lydon, On Trans-Saharan Trails, 2009, xxiii. 
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instance, The Tekna are “thought to be a product of a fusion of Lamta [Sanhaja] Berbers” and the 
Beni Hassan branch of the Maqil Arab Bedouins. They had arisen to live between the southern 
Anti-Atlas Mountains and the Sequiet al-Hamra (see map 5.3 as Saqiya al-Hamra’) (Pazzanita 
2006, 406).  The Reguibayt, the most known and influential of all tribes in the Western Sahara, 
are thought to be of Sanhaja extraction as well. Its founder, Sidi Ahmed Erguibi, travelled from 
Fes to the Dra’a River Valley but moved further south, inland, to escape the “depredations” of 
both the Europeans, “then present on the coast,” and the Maqil Arabs (ibid, 364).  The Reguibayt 
became more prominent in the early nineteenth centuries and later had a “series of ghazzis” (or 
tribal raids) with the rival Tadjakant tribe for the control of Tindouf179 (now part of modern-day 
Algeria) (Ibid).  Moreover, Trout mentions that the Emirates that flourished in southern 
Mauritania received no type of investiture from Moroccan authority and the Adrar fell into 
internecine warfare in the 1740s. These areas were clearly outside of Moroccan control. Although 
these regions remained free of Moroccan control, they also remained independent of each other. 
Despite Sahrawi claims of Tekna or Reguibayt ancestry, there is no definitive proof. In fact, the 
only possible claim is that the Sahrawi are descendants of a multitude of tribes who, at the time, 
did not identify themselves as part of a great Saharan nation but to the local tribe. 
 
Contested Treaties 
European encroachment on the northwestern and western coasts of Africa had become 
aggressive. By 1757, Sidi Muhammad III had rebuilt the Alawite Empire, but questions were still 
                                                
179 Tindouf is the Algerian city closest to the Sahrawi ‘refugee camp’ communities. It serves as the entrepôt for not 
only goods and services for the Sahrawi population today, but also for international visitors such as researchers 
(including the author of this work), journalists, and diplomatic officials, on their way to visit with POLISARIO/SADR 
representatives. It is approximately 30km from the principal Sahrawi Rabouni ‘city’ (mostly referred to as a camp). 
While the POLISARIO receives most of its visitors at this site and its governmental functions operate from this ‘camp,’ 
the official provisional and administrative capital for the POLISARIO government—the SADR (Sahrawi Arab 
Democratic Republic)—is located inside the “liberated zone” of Western Sahara proper in Bir Lehlu. Bir Lehlu (or 
Lahlou) was where the POLISARIO first established the government of the SADR. SADR, http://www.arso.org/03-
0.htm, Text of the Proclamation of the First Government of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic, accessed June 12, 
2015, http://www.arso.org/03-1.htm, 27 February 1976. 
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unanswered about the actual control of southern and southwestern frontiers. The research of the 
area at this time turned to evidence of recognition to established authority either of the Sultan or 
of other foreign powers in the Western Sahara. This type of information was sought in the 
Spanish national archives. Preliminary research established that the Spanish Monarchy had 
arranged and ratified treaties with the Kingdom of Morocco beginning in the late eighteenth 
century. Even though Britain, Germany, Italy, and Portugal had begun diplomatic exchanges with 
the Sultans in order to pursue commercial enterprises on the west African shores, only France and 
Spain had gained enough experience to produce signed treaties.  Spain would maintain and begin 
colonization of the territory in question as France gained much more influence in Algeria and 
south on both side of the Senegal River. 
Here, these treaties are explored to establish whether or not the Moroccan sultan 
controlled the territory that we now call “Western Sahara” in the late eighteenth century. It will 
also verify if POLSARIO claims that the descendants of the Sahrawi were never controlled by a 
Sultan are true. One of the first of these documents was the Treaty of Marrakesh, signed by 
Sultan Muhammad III and on behalf of -King Charles III of Spain, the Admiral Jorge Juan y 
Santacilia180 in 1767. This document, cited in the 1975 International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
Advisory Opinion, became a subject of controversy surrounding its interpretation. Its words have 
become an item of contention for both the POLISARIO and the Kingdom of Morocco. The 
English translation of Article 18 from the Tratado de Paz con Marruecos (or Treaty of Peace with 
Morocco)181 originally written in both Arabic and Spanish is as follows: 
                                                
180 Jorge Juan y Santacilia was a famous admiral in the Spanish Navy, who was designated by Charles III of Spain, 
ambassador extraordinaire to the court of the Moroccan Sultan Muhammad III in November of 1766. Armando 
Alberola Romá and Rosario Die Maculet, “El Autor: Jorge Juan Santacilia—Marino y Científico (Perfil Biográfico),” 
Biblioteca Virtual Miguel de Cervantes, accessed June 2 2015. 
http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/portales/jorge_juan_santacilia/autor_biografia/. 
 
181 The following quote is taken from the Spanish and translated by the author: “S.M.I. [Su Majestad Imperial] se aparta 
de deliverar [deliberar] sobre el establecimiento que S.M.C. [Su Majestad Católica] quiere fundar al Sur del Rio Non, 
pues no puede hacerse responsable de los accidentes ò desgracias que sucedieren, à causa de no llegar allà [allá] sus 
Dominios, y ser la Gente que Havita [habita] el Pais [País] errante y feròz [feroz], que siempre ha ofendido y 
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His Imperial Majesty deviates from discussing on the venture that His Catholic 
Majesty wants to start south of the River Non (Nun) [emphasis added], for he 
cannot be held responsible for any accidents or misfortune that would occur since 
his dominions do not reach there, and because the people who inhabit the 
Country are fugitive and fierce, who have always offended and imprisoned the 
Canarians182. From north of Santa Cruz183 (emphasis added) [,] His Imperial 
Majesty grants to them [the Canary Islanders] and the Spanish fishing, without 
allowing any other Nation to conduct [fishing] anywhere on the coast, which will 
be left entirely for them (Convenio con Marruecos, 1767). 
 
This passage was debated between the parties to the conflict in 1975 at the ICJ. On the one hand, 
Spain has argued that their wording “constitutes a disavowal by the Sultan himself of any 
pretensions to authority in that region.”184 On the other hand, Morocco’s Arabic text is worded as 
follows: 
His Imperial Majesty warns the inhabitants of the Canaries against any fishing 
expedition to the coasts of [Oued] Noun [sic] and beyond (emphasis added). He 
disclaims any responsibility for the way they may be treated by the Arabs of the 
country, to whom it is difficult to apply decisions, since they have no fixed 
residence, travel as they wish and pitch their tents where they choose. The 
inhabitants of the Canaries are certain to be maltreated by those Arabs (Western 
Sahara [ICJ] Advisory Opinion 1975, 50). 
 
Both Morocco and Spain claim that these interpretations are authentic. Morocco insists that their 
“Arabic text is the only ‘official text’ and should have preference” (Ibid).  The words that I have 
italicized are the most contentious of the text. They 1) They imply that the Sultan had little 
demonstrable power over these areas, but 2) they indicate beyond what geographical point the 
Sultan intended to give the Spaniards permission for commercial fishing. The point here is not to 
                                                                                                                                            
apricionado [aprisionado] à los Canàrios [Canarios]. De S.ta  [Santa] Cruz al Norte S.M.I. concede à estos y a los 
Españoles la Pesca, sin permitir que ninguna otra Nacion [Nación] la execute [ejecute] en ninguna parte de la Costa, 
que quedarà [quedará] enteramente por aquellos.” Convenio con Marruecos 28 Mayo, 1767, Tratado de Paz con 
Marruecos, Estado 3372, Carpeta #11, Número 1 y 2, Archivo Histórico Nacional de España, Madrid. See ICJ English 
translation in “Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion of 16 October 1975,” International Court of Justice, Reports of 
Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders, 1975, 50. 
 
182 Also known as Canary Islanders. 
 
183 Spanish for Holy Cross. 
 
184 “Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion,” 50. 
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re-adjudicate a legal issue that has already been methodically treated, but to highlight the problem 
of interpretation that both sides use to as markers for identity 
The overriding subject of this work is national identity. However, identity or identity 
politics is only a portion of the complex series of sub-themes within international affairs. The 
communication of ideas, documented or undocumented, is also an important part of global 
politics. At this juncture, the case introduces the communication of documentation that concerns 
questions of governance. Thus, the communiqués in this chapter combine both the concept of 
national identity with publicly written statements on the course of action that may lead to 
answering the questions of governance—that is, which entity will govern the Western Sahara. 
This is true not only for the 1767 treaty, but also for the long history of agreements 
among Spain, Morocco, and other foreign powers. For example, the 1799 Treaty of Meknes 
between Spain and Morocco apparently confirms the previous agreement set in the 1767 accord. 
Yet, Morocco refers to their original, more ‘official,’ interpretation of the Arabic 1767 text. 
Article 29 of the Meknes Treaty makes a background reference to His Moroccan Highness’ 
previous offer to a certain reduction of commercial tariffs “if this grace will take place, provided 
that such port opens,”185 directly referring to the Barbary port of Santa Cruz (Tratado de Paz 
1799).  Thereafter, article 35 of the same treaty, under the title of ‘Fishing,’ reads186 that “[t]o the 
inhabitants of the Canary Islands and to all classes of Spanish His Moroccan Majesty concedes 
the right of fishing from the Barbary port of Santa Cruz to the North” (ibid).  This reiterates the 
fishing opportunities granted by the Sultan to the Spanish from Santa Cruz northward. Yet, article 
                                                
185 Taken from the Spanish and translated by the author: “Hallándose cerrado en el dia [día] el puerto de Santa Cruz de 
Berbería, no puede tener efecto la oferta que S. M. [Su Majestad] Marroquí tiene hecha anteriormente á la España, de 
que sus vasallos disfruten la baxa de un treinta por ciento sobre los derechos que satisfacen las demás Naciones; pero sí 
tendrá lugar esta gracia siempre que dicho Puerto se llegue á abrir” in “Tratado de Paz, Amistad, Navegación, 
Comercio Y Pesca, entre S. M. [Su Majestad] Cat. [Católico] Y S. M. Marroquí concluido y firmado en Mequínez á 1 
de Marzo de 1799,” Tratado con Marruecos, Artículo XXIX, Madrid: La Imprenta Real. Archivo Histórico Nacional 
de España, Estado, Legajo 4350, No. 1 (Caja No.1). 
 
186 Taken from the Spanish, “Á los habitantes de las islas Canarias y á toda clase de Españoles concede S. M. [Su 
Majestad] Marroquí el derecho de la pesca desde el puerto de Santa Cruz de Berbería al Norte.” Ibid., artículo (article) 
XXXV.  
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35 in 1799 contradicts the passage from 1767. In 1799, they refer to different directions being 
conceded from the point of Santa Cruz. Still, the first article of the Treaty of Meknes187 begins: 
“[t]he Treaty of 1767, the Convention of 1780, and the 1785 Agreement in all that is not contrary 
to the present [1799] Treaty is renewed and confirmed” (Ibid).  Overall, despite the small 
contradiction, these documents seem to indicate that the Sultans were willing to give Spain 
control over certain territories, either within or outside of their control, for the construction of a 
port and fishing rights adjacent to Santa Cruz. These interpretive debates over the wording and 
then meaning of terms in public documents stem from the translation of the treaties above. 
However, meaning can also be debated over less official documentation and more so over 
demographic expressions of the period. For instance, in the previous chapter, the concept of bilad 
al-siba was introduced as the region of unruliness. Julien writes that after the reign of Sidi 
Muhammad up until 1912, "the country was divided into two sections, the bled-makhzen, more or 
less obedient to the ruler if he was a man of energy, and the bled al-siba, itself rent by tribal 
rivalries but always obstinately resistant to the sultan's authority" (270).  Bilad al-siba, the part of 
the desert that did not fully accept the Sultan as supreme ruler, has traditionally also been known 
by the expression trab al-bidan. Trab al-bidan or land of the whites, in contrast to al-sudan or land 
of the Negroes, was an Arabic term that racially divided the African population. The term has 
been associated with the Hassaniyya-speaking population in the Western Sahara region that 
includes Mauritania, the Tarfaya Strip188 in southern Morocco, the Tindouf region in Algeria,  
.
                                                
187 Taken from the Spanish and translated by the author: “Se renuevan y confirman el Tratado del año de 1767, el 
Convenio de 1780, y el Arreglo de 1785 en todo lo que no sea contrario al presente Tratado.” Ibid., artículo I. 
 
188 Tarfaya Strip – At the end of the 19th century, the Scottish entrepreneur Donald Mackenzie persuaded the Governor 
of Sous, Muhammad Bayruk, to cede him a strip of land on which to establish a trading post. Known as Tarfaya strip or 
Cape Juby strip, (roughly three km wide and 12 km long), Mackenzie built Port Victoria, a trading post/factory, which 
he managed through his own North-West Africa Company, hoping to capture a portion of the caravan trade. "'Casa del 
Mar' Fortress," in Sharing History: Arab World—Europe 1815-1918, http://www.museumwnf.org/, Museum With No 
Frontiers, 2015, accessed June 12, 2015,  
http://www.sharinghistory.org/database_item.php?id=monument;AWE;ma;21;en&pageT=N. 
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Map 5.4:  Morocco  in  the  Eighteenth  Century 189 
parts of Niger and a small strip of Mali (Lakhal et al 2006, 5; San Martin 2010, 589; Deubel190 
2011, 3). 
In several of the interviews, the author posed the question to many members of the 
POLISARIO if they could describe what is the origin of their identity. The current representative 
                                                
189 Julien, History of North Africa 1970, 268. 
 
190 Deubel also suggests that only in Mauritania are they called Maures. 
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of the SADR in Washington, DC, Yeslem Beisat, stated that they were a mix of people—Berber, 
Arab, and Black—and seem to be proud of this fact.191 They also believe that part of their identity 
stems from the heterogeneity of tribes and races as well as never submitting to Moroccan Sultanic 
rule. For instance, Muhammed Omar, my translator and guide while interviewing the various 
members of the SADR vanguard, stated that the Sahrawi knew “ni Satan ni Sultan” (neither Satan 
nor Sultan).192 The development of a distinct Arabic Hassaniya dialect adds to these layers of 
distinction. These layers of identity: 1) For the first time, Moroccan leaders admitting to outsiders 
that they did not really control the area now known as “Western Sahara”; 2) the mixture of tribes 
in the Oued Dra’a, south of the Oued Nun into the deep Sahara; 3) the rise of autonomous tribal 
entities across the Nun, Sous, and Sequiet al-Hamra River valleys, separate these groups from 
those living under the sovereignty of the Sultan. These distinctions seem to be part of modern 
Sahrawi identity. Yet, it still proves challenging, even with these distinctions, to derive from any 
one tribe, a direct line of ancestry to the Sahrawi even as we approach the nineteenth century.  
 
The Lands of ‘Dissonance’ and of the ‘White Moors’ 
This section introduces the concepts of ‘bilad as-siba’ and the ‘bidan.’ Bilad as-siba added to the 
growing notion that a divide was evident between those territories ruled by Morocco (bilad al-
makhzen) and those that were not. Bidan characterized those populations who were not of black 
African origin but were ‘white.’ Despite their usage in the late eighteenth century, bilad al-
makhzen and bilad al-siba are still under heavy scrutiny today. Bilad al-makhzen has been 
predominantly understood as the areas that were under the full control of the Sultan. What is the 
significance of and why stress these groups of words now? First, these expressions have become 
                                                
191 Mohamed Yeslem Beisat, SADR ambassador to the United States, interview by author, Washington DC, November 
11, 2013. 
 
192 Mohammed Omar, Deputy Minister of Public Relations, interview by author in Rabouni Camp outside of Tindouf, 
Algeria 02 October, 2014. 
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even more relevant today as a result of more anthropological and political discussion over the 
origins and composition of North African identity. The research, which is still in its infancy, 
about the early origins of the Saharan population may contradict the traditional views of many 
tribes who claim Arabic ancestry and direct lineage to the Prophet Muhammed. Second, as it 
relates to the Western Sahara dispute, usage of the terms has been used to add and dismiss 
Sahrawi national identity. Third, these concepts agree with the type of discussion at this juncture 
of history because they play an important role when foreign powers begin formal colonial 
administration of areas not under the Sultan’s control. 
Bilad al-siba is generally accorded the definition of “land of dissonance” or autonomy 
(López Bargados 2003, 598; Pazzanita 2006, 56).  Despite the agreed upon meaning, Morocco 
has applied al-siba to defend the annexation of the Western Sahara. Morocco will argue that 
despite being administered by independent caids and where “taxes were not paid,” these 
sovereigns of these lands “were appointed by royal decree” (Pazzanita, 56). The caids would be 
given ‘authority’ over these peripheral territories on behalf of the Sultan of Morocco. The 
Sahrawi argue that these are ambiguous claims because: 1) Many Saharan tribes travelled 
between both areas of the makhzen and al-siba making the exercise of proper rule by anyone 
difficult; 2) Although several independent tribes acknowledged the sultan’s spiritual authority, he 
did not command temporal authority; and finally 3), Due to harsh climatic conditions “in the 
territory…along with a near-total lack of” urbanization “in pre-colonial Western Sahara…in 
contrast to what is now southern Morocco…a status of bilad [al]-siba, let alone bilad al-makhzen, 
never existed in the Western Sahara” (ibid). 
Trab al-bidan or the bidan has been described as an ‘imaginary collective’ (Ould 
Mohamed 2010, 236), a region that by the turn of the nineteenth century began to take shape 
identifying a divide from the ‘white’ Hassaniyya-speaking Arabs “from the neighboring regions 
to north and east, where Berber languages…remained dominant” (Hodges 1983, 11).  The term is 
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traced to early Islamic geographers, conquerors, and European explorers. Norris confirms this 
notion by writing that bidan: “Meaning ‘the whites,’ is found in quite early writings. According to 
La Courbe (1685), ‘The Senegal [River] separates the Azoaghes (Zenagah), Moors or Bazanez 
(Bidan), from the Blacks; so that on one side of the river are Moors, rather white than black; and 
on the other, men perfectly black’” (Norris 1986, 245).  Still, the term of trab al-bidan has been 
discussed by many North African scholars in comparison with several other terminological 
references—1) al-sib, 2) ahrar, 3) al-sudan, 4) haratin, and 5) ‘abid—for more ancient populations 
that lived in northwest Africa, especially in the Sahara). These words are Arabic references that 
mean the unruly (region), free one, dark one, freed slave, and servant or slave, respectively. 
Terminological chaos becomes even greater with the infusion of the primary colonial 
languages–Spanish and French. For example, the English term ‘Moor’ is a label that came to 
designate Arabic and Berber-speaking groups who migrated from North Africa to the Iberian 
Peninsula. The Spanish changed it to Moro, while the French adopted the term and changed it to 
mean Maure. Yet, some scholars believe that this wording may have ancient Latin (Maurus) or 
even Greek (Mauron)193 roots. Despite the nomenclature and the linguistic ambiguities, the 
phrase of trab al-bidan will be used in agreement with López Bargados’ statement after 
explaining these troubling nuances of group identity. He writes, “in this sense, the designation 
Trab al-Bidan will include all Hassaniya speakers equally, irrespective of their status, adopting as 
an index for inclusion the fluency or competency in that Arabic dialect, and not the status that 
each determined social group holds”194 (López Bargados 2003, 117).  One primary source that is 
given for this term is an Islamic Saharan scholar, poet, and jurist from the Gibla region in what 
                                                
193 This Greek form of Moor was a Roman derivative of Mauri, which was the name given to the ancient Berber 
Empire of Mauretania and consequently lends its name to the modern country of Mauritania. 
 
194 Taken from the Spanish and translated by the author: “En este sentido, la denominación Trab al-Bidan incluirá por 
igual a todos los hablantes de hassaniyya, sea cual fuere su estatus, adoptando como índice de inclusión el manejo o 
competencia en ese dialecto del árabe, y no el estatus que posee cada grupo social determinado.” Alberto López 
Bargados, Arena Coloniales: Los Awlad Dalim ante la Colonización Franco-Española del Sáhara, Barcelona: Edicions 
Bellaterra, 2003. See Chapter 3, note no. 83. 
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should be present-day Mauritania, Sheikh Muhammad al-Mami (1792-1865). The Gibla region is 
supposed to have been located in the Trarza195 Emirate. Among Muhammad al-Mami’s many 
works, is one called Kitab al-Badiya, which is translated either as ‘Book of the Desert’ or ‘Book 
of Nomadism.’ The phrase trab al-bidan is mentioned in this book and, according to a volume of 
collected works published by six public universities in Madrid, it: 
Is [an] expression of a Mauritanian colleague, El Hassen196, translating the 
intentions of Shaykh Muhammad al-Mami as provisional space where 
compliance197 with the 'urf198 is imposed, from local custom, made inevitable 
given that it is, in the words of another great Saharan sage, Sheikh Sidi 
Muhammad al-Kunti,199 a, I quote, ‘country without master,’ where there is 
neither king nor prince, nor pious leader capable of placing the habitants from 
shelter of injustice and arbitrariness”200 (Martínez Lillo et al. 2009, 216). 
 
 
 
                                                
195 See Map 5.1. 
 
196 El-Hassen, as a person of historical significance, remains un-sourced and unidentifiable. 
 
197 Other translations may read “where reverence to the” or “where respect of the” urf is imposed or implemented. 
 
198 Urf is customary law in Islam, which consists of traditional customs and practices on the local level that are not 
directly based on the Quran and hadith but that still have legal weight. Before the modern era, it was largely unwritten 
and not codified. Campo, Juan E., Encyclopedia of World Religions: Encyclopedia of Islam. New York, NY, USA: 
Facts On File, 2009. ProQuest ebrary. Web. 
http://site.ebrary.com.ezproxy.fiu.edu/lib/FIU/reader.action?docID=10315266. Accessed 10 June 2015. 
 
199 Shaykh Sidi Muhammad al-Kunti (1769-1826) was a Saharan scholar who between the approximate years of 1811 
and 1826 had taken over “as head of the zawiya [religious order of] Qadiriyya that his father had created in the Malian 
Azawad, around the wells of al-Mabruk and Bujbayba, some 300 kilometers northeast of Timbuktu.” Abdel Wedoud 
Ould Cheikh states that al-Kunti left a considerable amount of writings that remain unpublished. “A Man of Letters in 
Timbuktu: al-Shaykh Sidi Muhammad al-Kunti,” Chapter 15, in The Meanings of Timbuktu, eds., Shamil Jeppie and 
Souleymane Bachir Diagne, Human Sciences Research Council, 2008) 238, 231, accessed January 15, 2016, 
http://codesria.org/spip.php?article643 . 
 
200 Taken from the Spanish, “expresión es de un colega mauritano, El Hassen, que traducía las intenciones de Chej 
Muhammad al-Mami como espacio de la provisionalidad donde se impone el acatamiento de ‘urf, de la costumbre 
local, dado que se trata, en las palabras de otra gran sabio sahariano, Chej Sidi Muhammad al-Kunti, de un, cito 
textualmente, ‘país sin señor’, donde no hay rey, ni príncipe, ni jefe piadoso capaz de poner a los habitantes al abrigo 
de la injusticia y de lo arbitrario.” Pedro Martínez Lillo, Silvio Arias Careaga, Caros Tanarro Alonso, Julia Weingartner 
(Coords.), Oficina de Acción Solidaria y Cooperación / Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Universidad y Sahara 
Occidental: Reflexiones para la Solución de un Conflicto, Cuadernos Solidarios No.6, Spain: R.B. Servicios 
Editoriales, 2009. 
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 “Boundaries” as a Source of Identity 
The collection of works cited above is one of the few that mention these Saharan scholars because 
their discovery was only made public in 1975 when it was presented as evidence to the ICJ 
(Western Sahara Oral Statements [ICJ] 1982, 135 and 286).  The group that compiled the 
aforementioned study stated that the discovery of the work of al-Mami has created opportunities 
for debate about the political and juridical fundamentals of Saharan society. It has uncovered that 
the nature of Saharan society was distinct from one in the north ruled by the Sultan. The 
following describes al-Mami’s writings in the mid-nineteenth century and what it may infer about 
the development of a separate Saharan society; a precursor to a possible Sahrawi collectivity. It 
also will comment on the labels given to physical boundaries that today are utilized as arguments 
for separateness by the Sahrawi. 
The collection enumerates several points in al-Mami’s writings, which 1) “make visible a 
representation that Saharan society was built on its own, breaking…” the European discursive 
monopoly; 2) allows one to better reflect on the conditions of Saharan identity; and, 3) “is a 
modest homage to the complexity of a social order” that has just begun to gain interest in Spain 
(Martínez Lillo 2009, 216).  In another work, only recently published, [al]-Mami “distinguished 
himself for his geographic texts on the land, regional songs in which he declared the secular 
independence of his country”201 (Mahmud Awa 2015, 4).  Mahmud Awa mentions that al-Mami 
“proposed formulas of government that organized and agglutinated the inhabitants of the 
territory, then grouped in different tribes, in a single state”202 (ibid.).  Criado furthers the 
argument by affirming this ‘independence’ and asserting that the Kitab al-Badiya “talks about the 
                                                
201 Translated from the Spanish by the author: “se destacó por sus textos geográficos sobre la tierra, cantos regionales 
en los que declaraba la independencia secular de su país.” Bahía Mahmud Awa, “Generaciones Literarias: 
Intelectualidad y Política en el Sahara Occidental, 1850-1975,” Les Cahiers d’EMAM (Études sur le Monde Arabe et la 
Méditerrané) [Online] 2015, 24-25, Sahara Occidental: Mémoires, Culture, Histoires—Culture et Politique Series, 
accessed June 18 2015,  http://emam.revues.org/774. 
 
202 Translated from the Spanish by the author: “propuso fórmulas de gobierno que organizara y aglutinaran a los 
habitantes del territorio, entonces agrupados en diferentes tribus, en un solo estado.” Ibid. 
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life and culture of nomads and distinguishes other neighboring countries among which it cites 
Chinguetti (currently Mauritania), Timbuktu (Mali), and Tichit (southern Morocco)”203 (1977, 
83).  Moya Fernández even affirms for al-Mami that: 
“[F]or him the peculiar geographical and historical conditions of the Sahara, out 
of the way from the central powers of Islam and being a predominantly nomadic 
society was conditioned to self-regulate in a particular manner; having overcome 
the existence of a central authority, the Sahara was defined as a land 'without 
king or prince or ruler ' ”204 (2009, 86). 
 
PHYSICAL BOUNDARIES: The fact that the ICJ accepted this newly discovered evidence is 
surprising and perhaps even dangerous without sufficient scholarly review. The importance of 
these expressions sourced from these Saharan scholars needs much more study. Nevertheless, 
Muhammad al-Mami, as a historical person, did exist and left many works. However, the copies 
of such works are scattered and found in few locations. To date, they are available only in Arabic 
(with hardly any copies translated into another language) and, most worrisome of all, have 
scarcely been studied. Yet, a few authors cite al-Mami and also refer to his mention of a distinct 
boundary called ‘Jat al-Jaof,’ which delineated most of what is the trab al-bidan. Jat al-Jaof has 
been translated as “línea de peligro o barrera del peligro” (Spanish for line of danger or barrier of 
danger) (Criado 1977, 78; Moya Fernández 2009, 12).  This boundary was actually presented to 
the ICJ as verifiable proof by a Spanish representative in arguments against the Moroccan claim 
over the Western Sahara. In it Mr. Martinez Caro (on behalf of the Spanish Government) stated 
that: 
The nomads' land, such defined in contrast to that of sedentary populations, 
substantially coincides to the north with the historical borders of Morocco and to 
                                                
203 “habla de la vida y de la cultura de los nómadas y distingue otros países vecinos entre los que cita Chingueti (actual 
[Mauritania]), Tomboctú (Mali), y Tichit (sur de Marruecos).” Ramón Criado, Sahara: Pasión y Muerte de un Sueño 
Colonial, Chatillon-sous-Bagneux: Imprimerie S.E.G., 1977. 
 
204 Translated from the Spanish by the author: “[P]ara él las condiciones geográficas e históricas peculiares del Sahara, 
alejado de los poderes centrales del Islam y siendo una sociedad mayoritariamente nómadas condicionaban a que se 
autorregulara de forma particular; superada la existencia de una autoridad central, el Sahara se definía como tierra ‘sin 
rey ni príncipe ni señor’.” Conchi Moya Fernández, Delicias Saharauis, (No Place: Bubok Publishing, 2009), 86. 
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the south with the Emirate of Adrar Tmar. To the west, it reaches the Atlantic 
Ocean, and to the east it would be more or less defined by that in the oral and 
written traditions of Western Sahara, called Jat al-Jaof or ‘danger line’ – a kind 
of border, facing the exterior, of all the nomadic tribes that used to inhabit the 
territory …The Jat al-Jaof was thus a geographical as well as a political frontier, 
because it would sometimes separate zones that were litigious or belonging to 
tribes that were not a part of the agreement205 (ICJ 1982, 135-136). 
 
Despite the lack of peer-review study because of its inaccessibility, a few media sources 
did report on the ‘frontier’ findings. For example, when the ICJ disclosed its concluding “Western 
Sahara: Oral Statements and Correspondence,” a few newspapers such as the Sahrawi bilingual 
La Realidad206 (June 21 1975) and ABC, a Spanish Daily newspaper, reported that “a document 
about the frontier between the Sahara and Mauritania” had been deciphered and presented at The 
Hague to the ICJ (July 2 1975, 9).  Thereafter, a few authors such as Criado (1977, 83) and the 
Dirección General de Promoción de Sahara (1975, 24) have mentioned this geographic boundary. 
Today, it has become legitimized and taken to be somewhat official proof that there was an 
“independent” zone away from the rule of the Moroccan sultans because the evidence was 
allowed at the ICJ. Sahrawi blogs and pro-Western Sahara websites have already appropriated 
these “proofs” and used these boundaries to solidify their claims as a distinct identity, that live 
separately (geographically and conceptually) from Moroccans. Modern scholars such as Mahmud 
Awa (2015), Moya Fernández (2009, 87), and del Riquelme (1991, 117-118) have begun to refer 
to this geographic division. 
                                                
205 Translated from the French by María Antonieta García what is in italics: “La terre des nomades, ainsi définie, par 
rapport à celle des sédentaires, coïncide sensiblement au nord avec les frontières historiques du Maroc et au sud avec 
l'émirat de l'Adrar Tmar. A l'ouest, elle arrive jusqu'à l'océan Atlantique, et à l'est elle [sic] se trouverait plus ou moins 
définie par ce que, dans les traditions orales et écrites du Sahara Occidental, on appelle le Jat al-Jaof ou "ligne de 
danger" – sorte de frontière commune, face à l'extérieur, de toutes les tribus nomades qui habitaient le territoire. Cette 
ligne partait, selon la tradition, des environs du cap Blanc, continuait au sud-est, en territoire aujourd’hui mauritanien, 
passait un peu au nord d’Atar, de Chinguiti et de Ouadane, remontait vers le nord, traversant les puits de Turin, un peu 
a l’est de l’actuelle frontière du Sahara occidental jusqu’à la sebka de Tindouf et revenait vers l’océan en suivant le 
basin du Draa…Le Jat al-Jaof était ainsi une frontière aussi bien géographique que politique, car elle séparait parfois 
des zones litigieuses ou qui appartenaient à des tribus qui ne faisaient pas partie de l'entente.” “Western Sahara, 
Volume V, Oral Statements and Correspondence,” International Court of Justice Pleadings, Oral Arguments, 
Documents, 1982. 
 
206 Now a long-since defunct newspaper because of the political sensitivities from the Western Saharan conflict. 
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LITERARY BOUNDARIES: The ‘first golden age’ of Saharan scholarship,207 which included al-
Mami’s works, arose in the eighteenth century and lasted until the early nineteenth century 
(Dirección General de Promoción de Sahara 1975, 13).  These investigators and a few other 
scholars speak of this golden age developing in the Tiris region of the Sahara. Today, the Tiris (a 
mostly desert plain of the northwest Sahara; refer to map 5.5 below) region is divided among 
three areas: 1) the Tiris al-Gharbiyya or Western Tiris in Western Sahara proper; 2) a small sliver 
of the Western Tiris that is now part of what is named by the POLISARIO as the ‘liberated’ or 
‘free’ zone of the Western Sahara; and 3) the Mauritanian province of Tiris Zemmour. These 
Saharan works of poets, historians, and theologians flourished at a time when Europeans began to 
re-establish more commercial and political exchanges, because of more active exploration in west 
and northwest Africa. Muhammad al-Mami wrote a book titled Kitab al-Badia (Book of the 
Nomad). It is an account of the nomadic independence of tribes within the trab al-bidan 
demarcated by the Jat al-Jaof. A few pro-Sahrawi scholars to point to al-Mami’s Kitab as proof 
that the ‘nomadic independence’ of tribes is a key distinction to their identity. 
The problem with these claims by those who have actually viewed the Kitab al-Badia is 
the issue of hermeneutics. For example, Mauritania had presented al-Mami’s work in order to 
augment their claim to parts of the Western Sahara. Spain had submitted oral arguments to the 
contrary, interpreting the Kitab’s descriptions as tribes independent from any authority. Morocco 
maintained: “that to better interpret the original agreement we must talk about 'domain' and not of 
'sovereignty,' which has led advocates of the Moroccan thesis to maintain that the Sultan always 
had sovereignty over the Saharan lands that Spain would later occupy, although not necessarily 
                                                
207 The ‘golden age’ of Saharan scholarship is referred to the works of Al-Mami and al-Kunti in the eighteenth century 
in the fields of history, literature, poetry, and science. 
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Map  5.5:  Principal  Regions  of  the  Western  Sahara  208 
its domain”209 (Algueró Cuervo 2006, 45).  Thus, despite Muhammad al-Mami’s ‘Tirisian’ 
account, Morocco will insist that the Sultan still had ‘dominion’ over these territories. 
                                                
208 Map adapted from Caro Baroja, Estudios Saharianos (Madrid: Calamar Ediciónes, 2008), 68-69. 
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The question then becomes defining what is dominion? How did the Alawite Kingdom 
announce the extent of its power to its external ‘desert provinces’? Were there tribal agreements 
made with the Sultan as to the recognition of his authority in the trab al-bidan? Perhaps there 
were inter-tribal accords made to acknowledge the Sultan on his behalf? How did Morocco 
exactly delimit their domains? Did they use geographical landmarks for physical boundaries? 
How does one go about placing landmarks in a desert? These questions are difficult to answer 
because more study is needed to evaluate these ‘desert chronicles.’ The issue over territorial 
control is a much older problem than depicted here in this chapter and adds to the historical claim 
of separateness from Morocco. Even though historical territorial control may not be central to 
Sahrawi distinctiveness, it is an important part of their identity.’ 
 
Saharan History as Identity: Tribal Independence 
Difficulties arise in the search for historical accounts about the Sahrawi at the latter end 
of the eighteenth century. The literature, excepting a few a works, centers on Moroccan 
descriptions of history. Scholars on both sides of the conflict usually cite the treaties Marrakesh 
(1767) and Meknes (1799) and the problems therein, but then ‘jump’ to 1830 or beyond. My 
research has been able to uncover some forms of historical data in French and Spanish, but 
because of the limited knowledge of Arabic many works within this period—the first golden age 
of Saharan scholarship—are unavailable. Despite these obstacles, the following sketch is an 
attempt to find links to a Sahrawi ‘past.’ This section reveals that south of the Moroccan sphere of 
influence there was an area of Saharan society that developed independently. It details how tribes 
already independent, rebelled, ignored, or passively recognized the Sultan. It also demonstrates 
                                                                                                                                            
209 Translated from the Spanish by the author: “que para bien interpretar el original del acuerdo hay que hablar de 
‘dominio’ y no de ‘soberanía,’ lo que ha dado pie a los defensores de la tesis marroquíes a mantener que el sultán 
siempre tuvo la soberanía sobre las tierras saharianas que luego ocuparía España, aunque no necesariamente el 
dominio.” Algueró Cuervo, El Sahara y España: Claves de una Descolonización Pendiente (Las Palmas de Gran 
Canaria: Ediciones IDEA, 2006), 45. 
  159 
how tribes of the greater Western Sahara ran their own affairs, traded, and warred with each other 
without consulting the Sultan of Morocco. The following recounts an independent historical 
tradition that the Sahrawi claim as separate to Moroccan history in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries. 
Morocco had claimed, even before this period of history, lands to the greater southern 
areas of the Sahara and the littoral coast of the Western Sahara. Yet, at several historical 
junctures, including this one, Morocco had trouble keeping itself together as a political entity. 
Unrest had begun because many of Sidi Muhammad’s black armies were forced in 1775-1776 to 
divide, were sent to different parts of the Moroccan region. They became dissatisfied, and 
rebelled against the Sultan. It is important to note that the power of the Sultan depended largely 
on his armies to carry out conquests, implement order, and exert influence. The ‘abid contingents 
had once been a monolithic group that exhibited loyalty only to the Sultan. However, the new, 
more urban army had developed a strong sense of entitlement and had become split among rival 
political leaders. These local rivals had, for some time, begun to integrate Arab and Berber 
recruits into their local militias. The ‘abid armies grew resentful of these changes. Subsequent 
revolts by these black armies and local insurrections kept most of ‘Morocco’ under subtle 
turmoil. 
  Certain regions and tribes highlight the pattern of the lost Saharan history beginning in 
the latter half of the eighteenth century through about the 1850s. Much of what today is 
considered Western Sahara proper was devoid of direct control between the 1750s and 1820s. 
Despite some tribes recognizing the Sultan’s spiritual authority, many Saharan qabila 
(confederations of tribes) actively governed their own affairs and pursued their own interests—in 
grazing and trade. Sidi Muhammad’s death gave the seat of ‘Morocco’ to his son al-Yazid. Two 
years of relative unruliness marked al-Yazid’s short reign. Yet, well before the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, the Western Sahara had developed its own historical record of events 
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independent of the makhzen government of the ‘Moroccan Empire.’ Damis argues that in these 
“areas of dissidence, tribes would accept the Sultan’s suzerainty but refused to submit to central 
administrative control” (1983, 20).  One of these regions lies between the Oued Nun, including 
the Oued Dra’a, and north to the Sous River Valleys. In summary, Damis states that: “During the 
periods of central weakness or instability, tribes near the periphery would rise up in revolt, 
enlarging the siba lands and encroaching on the area under the sultan’s control. At the same time, 
there were tribes that submitted partly to central control, thus forming areas of semi dissidence. A 
tribe in the middle ground might receive the sultan’s officials and obey their directives but refuse 
to pay taxes” (ibid). 
Trout recounts that, “around 1765, most of the Tekna confederation found near the mouth 
of the Oued Draa broke away from Moroccan control” (1969, 143).  The Tekna were described 
above as a tribal confederation but Lydon writes, “many [of his] informants explained that the 
Tikna [sic] formed a national entity (emphasis added) rather than a ‘tribal’ or even ethnic one” 
(2009, 174). They had briefly developed an autonomous principality in the city of Tazeroualt, 
whose main port was Masa, until Moulay Rashid took control of the city (Pazzanita 2006, 406-
07).  Much later and relevant to this period, a branch of the Tekna, the Ait Moussa ou Ali arose to 
create another smaller independent Oued Nun princedom, “centered upon the trading town of 
Goulimine” (or Guelmim210) (Trout 1969, 143).  Other sources state that Tazeroualt resurfaced 
again “constituting a virtually independent maraboutic211 principality until the late 19th century” 
(ibid.; Schroeter, 2015).  In fact, Trout broadens the geographical scope of Moroccan non-rule by 
writing: “Farther to the east, along the upper course of the oued Dra [sic], from the High Atlas to 
                                                
210 Another alternative spelling includes Guelmin. 
 
211 Maraboutic from the root marabout is the designation of a saint or his descendants who are called upon to dispense 
blessings, and whose tombs are places of pilgrimage. In this context, a maraboutic city-state seems to be one where its 
inhabitants are either descendants or followers of a Muslim saint buried in that area. 
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the ‘Bend of the Dra’ (where all sedentary population along the Dra ends), Moroccan authority 
was sporadically maintained; but even here open revolt was a frequent occurrence” (1969, 143). 
López Bargados relates how another confederation of tribes or qabila,212 the Oulad 
Delim, which under Saharan tradition were thought to be part of the Beni Hassan, became very 
independent of Moroccan control as well after the Shar Bouba War in the mid-seventeenth 
century. He claims that they are of particular importance because of their regional singularity and 
close ethnic affinity to the Arab Hassani tribes. They gravitated to the Western Sahara’s bidanic 
region between the thirteenth and fifteenth century. Gradually, they moved south into the 
nomadic territory of the Tekna and finally to the peripheral domains of the Trarza Emirate, 
coming into conflict with both independencies. There is no mention of intervention by the 
Sultan213 in any of these battles that lasted for decades with the eventual defeat of the Oulad 
Delim. However, El Hamel writes that in 1807, the Sultan did lead an expedition to Guelmim, an 
important link in the caravan route. Nevertheless, El Hamel also writes that the ruler of the people 
of Guelmim, ‘Abd Allah Usalim “commanded independently [emphasis added] a vast region in 
the western Sahara…dominated the trans-Saharan caravan trade and had an army of fifteen 
hundred black slaves” (El Hamel 2013, 233). 
Despite the propensity toward disparate tribal affiliation, contempt for the Sultan’s 
authority, and the susceptibility of each to warring, there was a semblance of order within and 
among tribes (or tribal confederations). Criado finds that there is not only evidence of a 
suspension of warrior-like activities but also proof of collective responsibility among tribes. 
Criado, commenting on López Bargados’ mention of a tribe called the “Bu Amaran” (although 
his writing focuses mainly on the Oulad Delim) located in the Oued Nun next to Ifni, discusses 
how they had “dedicated themselves to agriculture from October to May and that, once the 
                                                
212 Some refer to this term as a large confederation of over a dozen clans. Lydon, On Trans-Saharan Trails, 2009, 42. 
 
213 Except to provide aid to the Trarza Emir Ali Sandura decades earlier. 
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harvest was obtained, they rushed to war amongst each other until the new sowing season”214 
(1977, 87; López Bargados 1955, 341-342).  He insists that these skirmishes, “typical of the 
Moroccan bled as-siba” did not exist among the tribes of what he describes as the Sario.215 
(Criado 1977, 87).  “They had established once and for all a supratribal order that avoided the 
waste of energy and human life and that it would allow the resolution of disputes through 
mediation”216 (Ibid).  Caro Baroja has implied that Western academic study of the tribe, 
especially in terms of the Western Sahara, is prone to view it as disparate, disorderly, and 
anarchic. While these characterizations may be true, they only apply when there is another power 
that attempts to co-opt, win, or conquer the region of its inhabiting tribes. Therefore, the 
alternative position would indicate, based on the evidence of ‘super tribes’ or, as some scholars 
have designated, confederations of tribes, that there was indeed ‘tribal’ order. Still, it was 
“‘primitive,’ egalitarian, and static, lacking in itself the necessary elements for an evolution”217 
but one which does not conform to Western pretensions of social order (Criado 1977, 87). 
Moulay Sliman came to power as Sultan of Morocco in 1792 and his reign lasted until 
1822. He was able to take control of the north of Morocco and proceeded to suppress and bring 
under his control the ‘unruly’ south. Julien notes that Sliman managed to “enlarge… [the bilad al-
makhzen] somewhat by bringing back under control the Dra’ [sic], Figuig, and part of the 
                                                
214 Translated from the Spanish: “los Bu Amaran se dedicaba a la agricultura de octubre a mayo y que, una vez 
obtenida la cosecha, se lanzaban a guerrear entre ellos hasta la nueva época de siembra” in Criado, Sahara: Pasion y 
Muerte de un Sueño Colonial, 87. 
 
215 Sario is an abbreviation of the Saguia al-Hamra and Rio de Oro regions of the Western Sahara. 
 
216 Translated from the Spanish: “que habían establecido de una vez para siempre un orden supratirbal que evitara la 
pérdida inútil de energías y vidas humanas y que permitiría resolver los litigios por vía de mediación” in Criado, 87. 
 
217 Taken from the Spanish and translated by the author: “que carecía en sí misma de los elementos necesarios para una 
evolución.” Criado, 87. 
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Tadla218 ” (1970, 269).  However, once again his power waned and by 1818 he had lost the Tadla. 
By his death the area “once more headed for anarchy” (ibid.).  El Hamel documents that Moulay 
Sliman had trouble reorganizing his country due to the rebellious black armies, internal 
dissension among local power brokers in the different cities, and usurpers to his authority in the 
east and south of Morocco (2013, 226-227).  Apart from Rézette (and his more pro-Moroccan 
view of the period), Dunn in Arabs and Berbers speaks of political investiture given by the 
Moroccan Sultan to local leaders. However, the references that Dunn makes seem to be about 
populations in Tafilalet and the city of Sijilmasa, and even farther to the southeast in Tuat (which 
is now in present-day Algeria) (Dunn 1972, 99).  These are regions to the east of Morocco over 
the Atlas Mountains stretching into the Sahara Desert. Apart from some correspondence and a 
referenced gift sent to the Emir of Trarza there has not been any mention of an authoritative 
investiture given to the southwestern Emirates of the Sahara. While this was probably true for the 
east and some of the southeast areas of the Morocco, the south and southwest along the Atlantic 
coastline, beginning with the Sous Valley, has been, more often than not, described as the bilad 
al-siba (land of dissidence) and by extension part of the trab al-bidan. 
Confederative tribal struggles of power over trading routes, grazing territory, and blood 
feuds marked much of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries well into the 1850s. 
López Bargados writes of the wars between the Oulad Delim and the Oulad Qaylan tribes (2003, 
248). Another confrontation was that of the Oulad Delim with the Reguibayt, including constant 
ghazzian (warrior) raids by the Oulad Delim defended by the leader of the Trarza Emirate Ahmad 
wald ‘Ayda. These battles between the eastern section of the Oulad Delim, the Oulad Salim and 
Oulad Mulat, (ibid., 240; Caratini 1989, 79) was fought for twelve years (1824-1836). Timbuktu 
had finally been subjugated by the Tuareg in the 1790s. Caro Baroja notes that the Reguibayt 
began a struggle with the Tajakant in 1825 and ended with the complete victory by the latter 
                                                
218 The Tadla is located surrounding the city of Boujad on Map 5.2 and 5.4. As an interesting note, the author lived and 
taught English in the city of Boujad while he served as a U.S. Peace Corps Volunteer in 2002—2003. 
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(1955, 348-349).  Perhaps before 1830, another tribe, the Ait Atta, who would later merge into 
the Tafargant alliance with the Bani Mhammad, also escaped Sultanic control during the reign of 
Abd al-Rahman, Moulay Slimane’s son, and secured their hold of the western Ziz Valley in the 
Tafilalet region in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Dunn 1972, 91-93).  This alliance of 
tribes was largely successful focusing on the commercial trading enterprise along the eastern 
fringes of the Ziz Oasis (ibid., 98).  It also maintained such peaceful relations with another the 
Dawi Mani, for pasturage in the east of the Ziz that “inter-tribal boundary demarcations did not 
exist and conflicts over grazing rights were isolated and infrequent” (ibid., 92).  These tribal 
struggles are written by these sources but they arrive in these volumes as part of oral history. 
These accounts serve to highlight the nature of tribal independence and their objection to 
the Sultanate outside of the major ‘Moroccan’ cities of Fes, Marrakesh, its northern coastline, and 
east of the Atlas Mountains. These tribes were running their own affairs after the demise of 
Muhammad III in 1790. The actions of these tribes argue for the autonomous nature of their 
society. The POLISARIO assert that these examples of autonomy prove that the Sultan never had 
complete control over the Western Sahara. They will make the historical claim that ‘Sahrawi’ 
tribes were not only making independent choices but were also cohabitating separately from the 
Kingdom of Morocco, irrespective of any spiritual investiture. Damis admits that Morocco can 
argue that these tribes recognized spiritual authority but questions how “the sheer distance 
between the Sahara and the seats of power in Fes, Meknes, or Marrakesh posed an obvious 
obstacle” – and logistically, it would be almost impossible to ‘exercise’ administrative control 
over the nomadic tribes, which required “population centers...[and] the Western Sahara has no 
major oases or other natural centers from administrative control could be exercised” (Damis 
1983, 21). Autonomous tribal action and the habitation of populations not under control of the 
Sultan, however, do not constitute a unique identity. There were several tribes living in this 
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manner. There was no collective awareness or ‘national’ identity much less one for a ‘Sahrawi’ 
identity. 
 
Early European Observations 
There are brief accounts among European explorers and diplomats in their travels and 
observations that document the tenuous rule of the Sultan. Here, only a few brief passages of their 
reflections will be given. These examples  express the continuous problem of Moroccan territorial 
integrity. Europeans viewed the internal weakness of the Sultan as an opportunity for commerce 
with the tribes south of ‘Morocco.’ As they established trading posts and negotiated terms of 
commerce, they began to distinguishing between those tribes that were open to trade and those 
that were not; usually those that were controlled by the Sultan. These relationships would soon 
begin to help differentiate between subject tribes of the Sultan and those ‘freer’ tribes. At the 
same time, the sense of tribal autonomy allowed for disparate historical trajectories; one not 
subject to Moroccan control. Tribal identity, thus begins to change because of indirect influences. 
One such comment by the representative of the Spanish Crown to the Court of Morocco, 
Jorge Juan, as official negotiator in the 1767 Treaty indicates the precarious position of the 
Empire. He states that: 
It is true that the population of the whole country is neither as excessive as 
hitherto believed, which is evidenced in the small number of places, because 
although it is said that more live in encampments, nor are these as numerous, and 
proves that even in the province of Duquela that qualifies as the richest, and most 
populated, for just as we passed were they able to gather 10,000 men even though 
anyone who can handle a horse is presented with him, and those who could not 
[would present themselves] with weapons only, as if all were soldiers, when in 
fact they are nothing more than a kind of militia without discipline, or obedience, 
for such reasons any of its main squares [or parade grounds] that are reduced to 
[the cities of ] Tetouan, Tangiers, Larache, Sale, Mogodor [sic] and Santa Cruz 
could be taken by a surprise attack with 60 men who could land in the 
surrounding artillery area, which by the poor state of its fortifications have 
pointed them over the beaches, they would immediately lose capturing them from 
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the rear without fear of any early relief, for at most could they seek in four days 
would be 6000 men [emphasis added]219 (Rodriguez Casado 1941, 41). 
 
In another account written in 1813, a notation is made concerning ‘Modern Barbary’ or what was 
historically described as the Barbary States, which included the empire of Morocco.220 Lempriere 
is referring to the southwestern extremities of ‘Barbary’ and their piratical activities when he 
states that: “To the west, the line of coast is not so extensive, as it does not reach further than 
Cape Non in the 29th latitude, but it is sufficient to afford the Moors a ready access to several 
important islands in the Atlantic Ocean, and to extend their depredations to the western coast of 
Europe, which not unfrequently has suffered by their piracies [emphasis added]” (1813, 4). Later 
in his volume, Lempriere states that Tarudant, capital of what was previously the metropolis of 
the kingdom of the Sous,221 “may be considered as the frontier town of that part of the 
[Moroccan] emperor’s dominions.” He also states that: 
The [Moroccan] emperor, it is true, claims the sovereignty of the desert of the 
Zahara [sic], and the territory of Vled [sic] de Non [sic]; but his authority over 
that part of the country is almost nominal as it entirely depends on the caprice 
and inclination of the Arabs who inhabit it; and who from their distant situation 
from the seat of government, are more properly under the dominion of their own 
chiefs. They acknowledge the emperor to be their sovereign, and the head of their 
church, and occasionally pay him tribute as sultan; but they give no attention 
whatever to his particular orders, and over their interior government he has not 
the least control. These people consist of different tribes of Arabs, who live in 
                                                
219 Translated from the Spanish by the author: “Bien es verdad que la población de todo el país no es tan excesiva como 
hasta aquí se ha creído, lo que se comprueba del corto número de lugares, pues aunque se diga que los más viven en 
aduares, tampoco éstos son tan numerosos, y lo acredita que aun en la provincia de Duquela que pasa por la más rica, y 
poblada, apenas cuando pasamos pudieron juntar 10,000 hombres siendo así que todo el que puede manejar un caballo 
se presenta con él, y con solas armas el que no lo tiene, como si todos fuesen tropa, cuando en realidad no son más que 
una especie de milicia sin disciplina, ni obediencia, por cuyas razones cualquiera de sus plazas de armas que se reducen 
a Tetuán, Tánger, Larache, Sale, Mogodor y Santa Cruz podría tomarse de un golpe de mano con 60 hombres que 
pudieran desembarcar en las inmediaciones de las baterías, que por el mal estado de sus fortalezas han tenido precisión 
de formar sobre las playas, que perderían inmediatamente tomándolas por espalda sin temor de algún pronto socorro, 
pues el mayor que en cuatro días podría acudir sería lo más 6000 hombres” in Vicente Rodríguez Casado, Jorge Juan 
en la Corte de Marruecos, Biblioteca de Camarote de la Revista General de Marina Series 4, (Madrid: Escelicer) 1941. 
 
220 William Lampriere lists those ‘States of Barbary’ as divided among “five distinct and independent sovereignties, 
viz. the empire of Morocco, and the kingdoms of Tremecen, Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli” in A Tour through the 
Dominions of the Emperor of Morocco, London: Tayler and Co. (1813), 34. 
 
221 For in the same document, Lampriere does acknowledge that although the Kingdom of the Sous was an independent 
entity, it is now controlled by the Sultan of Morocco. Lampriere, Dominions of the Emperor of Morocco, 151. 
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tents without any fixed places of residence: they wander over the country in 
search of plunder, and are supposed, on some occasions, to extend their 
depredations as far as Nigritia, whence they carry off Negroes” (Lampriere 1813, 
152). 
 
By the end of Abd al-Rahman ibn Hisham’s reign (1822-1859), the Kingdom was beset by both 
internal conflict, which he managed to control, and direct French intervention. The French had 
taken Algiers in 1830 but did not completely vanquish Algerian resistance until 1847. Algerian 
resistance had received aid from tribes in Morocco during the 1840s to support the Emir ‘Abd al-
Qadir and his troops against the French. Irritated by Moroccan assistance, France then bombed its 
ports at Mogador and Tangier in 1844.222 The Spanish seized the Chafarinas Islands in 1849 off 
the northern coast of Morocco. The British pressured Morocco into signing a bi-lateral 
commercial treaty in 1856.223 Upon the death of Sultan ‘Abd al-Rahman (1859) the Spanish 
observing the weakness of the Sultan, and not to be outdone by the major competing powers, 
declared their first official war (1860) with the Kingdom of Morocco in the North and secured 
“from Morocco the town of Ifni, near Cape Nun” in the south (Johnston 1966, 120).  The 
engagements with the Europeans distracted the Sultan from its southwestern and southern 
Saharan periphery and left those territories unmanageable. In addition, due to the many-sided 
conflicts with the Spanish, French, as well as diplomatic exchanges with the British and even 
American frigates (because of piracy), Morocco almost fragmented into smaller political units. 
Thus by 1859, direct European involvement began to influence Maghrebi politics, and its 
consequences would reverberate in the Western Sahara. Moroccan politics would forge a defense 
                                                
222 Today it is known as the Franco-Moroccan War of 1844. The Emir ‘Abd al-Qadir finally surrendered to the French 
in 1847. John E Flint, The Cambridge History of Africa from c. 1790 to c. 1870, Vol. 5, New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1976, 112. 
 
223 The General Treaty and Convention of Commerce and Navigation, signed in 1856, effectively gave Britain 'most 
favored nation' status in Morocco. Dr. Michael Willis, “Deepening Relations during the 18th and the 19th Centuries,” 
Morocco and Britain. www.mbs.ma, Moroccan British Society, accessed July 15, 2015. 
http://www.mbs.ma/En/moroccobrit1-1.htm.  
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of its frontiers against European encroachments and extol the aid of the surrounding tribal 
confederations. 
 
This section attempts to link historical territorial autonomy as part of Sahrawi identity. It 
features autonomous tribes who manage their own affairs without approval from the Sultan or 
rebel against his in the Western Sahara. It also evaluates treaties that were agreed upon between 
Europeans and the Sultans. The Sultan(s) acknowledge that they did not have complete control of 
its southern flank. The discussion of physical boundaries based on the concepts of distinction 
highlight how the socio-political environment of the greater Western Sahara was viewed; there 
were groups that were different from those under the rule of a Moroccan sovereign. The section 
on literary boundaries presented the case that there were two competing historical trajectories: 
one being written by the Moroccan Sultans and another that has been neglected but ‘re-
discovered,’ written by obscure Saharan scholars. Yet-to-be translated and studied manuscripts 
from these golden years of literature also seem to suggest that there was a Saharan-wide 
scholarship, providing evidence of an autonomous Saharan society. It depicts a whole separate 
history, independent of Morocco. It chronicles a distinct history of not only the Western Sahara 
but also the deep southern extremities of the region.  
Historical evidence suggests that there was no break in the genealogical line of the 
Sultans. However, while it is difficult to criticize that Morocco was always a coherent religio-
political entity, its socio-geographical (especially its southeastern, southern, and southwestern) 
frontiers certainly are open to question based on the research herein. The discussion in this 
historical period suggests that there were other tribal identities, separate from Morocco. There 
were other histories being written, boundaries were made, and were being recognized by both the 
Sultans and the Europeans. Still, instead of a fusion of independent clans moving toward one 
supreme, region-wide trans-Saharan federation of tribes, the opposite had occurred. Several 
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independencies arose, power struggles ensued; different tribes had already merged with each 
other and established confederations of super-tribes. They competed with each other over land 
(grazing rights and agricultural resources), trade routes, and commodities—animal husbandry, 
gum, salt, gold, and slaves. Yet, the only possible association to the modern Sahrawi are the 
building of subtle ‘layers of distinction’: the Hassaniya language, separate tribal history, and 
territorial autonomy. These features of identity though were found among numerous tribes. Thus, 
despite these insights into Saharan society, a less than cohesive Moroccan Empire, and proof of 
self-governing super-tribes, there are no concrete links to Sahrawi national identity in this 
historical segment. 
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VI. IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION IN THE MIDST OF EUROPEAN INTERVENTION 
(1860 — 1883) 
 
This chapter will focus on the roots of Sahrawi identity from the period beginning in 
1860 until right before the Act of Berlin in 1884. This period includes the diplomatic peak 
between Morocco and Spain over commerce and territory surrounding the contested frontiers of 
Morocco. The Berlin West Africa Conference, a series of negotiations (Nov. 15, 1884–Feb. 26, 
1885) held in Berlin where the major European powers “met to decide all questions connected 
with the Congo River basin in Central Africa” effectively accelerated European ‘spheres of 
influence,’ which included northwest Africa (Britannica, 15th ed., s.v. “Berlin West Africa 
Conference”). Although these dates are not exclusive to the Sahrawi timeline, they do represent 
historical landmarks in the search for the roots of their national identity. The socio-historical 
analysis of the period in the western and southwestern Maghreb region (including Mauritania, 
Western Sahara proper, and Morocco) continues to provide insight to claims of separateness. The 
continuing question remains: do the origins of Sahrawi identity lie within this period, and in what 
form does it materialize?  
This chapter will analyze historical sources that document Western Saharan history, 
including maps from the latter nineteenth and early twentieth centuries depicting frontiers of the 
northwestern Sahara and literature about the Western Sahara. Written texts begin to expand with 
respect to this period, but only provide intermittent details of ‘Sahrawi’ history. The literature is 
scant and considerable effort has been made to find as much information as possible with the 
limitations discussed in the introduction. The research found alternative sources of information 
not available in the United States—via independent booksellers in small street bookshops and 
online booksellers, at the various AHN (National Historical Archives) localities, and in the BNE 
(Biblioteca Nacional de España) in Madrid. It is the hope that this chapter will shed some light as 
to the approximate origins of Sahrawi national identity. 
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This period does not lend itself to the primordial theory of Sahrawi origins in the near 
past. Again, questions arise about what can be considered as the traditional past. Is 1860 too early 
to be considered as evidence for a primordial past? Perhaps highpoints in the discernable past, 
despite fluctuations in national awareness, are links to national identity. The argument linking 
national identity to historical features falls within the theoretical approach of primordialism—
perennialism. From perennialism, an argument can be derived demonstrating that despite 
evidence contradicting the notion of any formal acknowledgment of nationhood, there might be 
‘low levels’ or traces of sentiments of national coherence. Undoubtedly, further questions arise 
about how these low levels of identity should resemble—how are they to be discovered, or what 
should one search for? Clearly, ‘perennial’ notions of history must demonstrate traces of an 
identity that can be associated to later, more distinct manifestations of nationality. These low-
level forms of national identity are far beyond the scope of this work. That work will be left to 
anthropologists and other social scientists. Here, the reader should consider the socio-historical 
evidence presented and judge for themselves. 
By 1860, the Western Sahara entered the modern period of world history. Previous 
chapters presented a connection to the early modern (1524) to the beginning of the modern period 
of history (1789).224 This chapter seeks evidence that may indicate that the national identity of the 
Sahrawi was established within this period of history. It also seeks evidence that there are 
lingering traces of Sahrawi nationality that can be linked to previous eras. If the sources of 
Sahrawi national awareness were not evident in previous segments of history, then they must 
have begun at the dawn of European intervention, if not later in this period. This argument is 
widely considered, by most modern scholars of the Western Sahara, to be the most prominent for 
the development of the Sahrawi national identity. 
                                                
224 Chapter five was written about the sources of identity from 1758 to roughly 1859, which includes what scholars of 
history claim as nearing the end of the ‘early modern’ period of 1800, using the French Revolution of 1789 as a 
benchmark. By 1859, nations have entered the modern period of history. 
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A combination of both the primordial and top-down level arguments is based on the 
region's socio-political environment. The second hypothesis claims it is arbitrary and subjective 
to select point of origin—indeed almost instrumental, especially if a group is making a case for its 
cause. Thus, its arguments, formulated from constructivism, advocate that: 1) Sahrawi identity 
was created in response to the encroachment of foreign powers into west and northwestern 
Africa; 2) in this period of history, Western Saharan society became more organized as a socio-
political entity due to stronger regional ties, not only to other groups, but also to the land. These 
two derived explanations further pursue a diverse understanding of nationalities—from the 
ground level and upper levels of influence. The constructivist approach resonates most fully with 
contemporary social science thinking, in that it enhances our understanding of identity politics by 
fusing instrumentalism and primordialism—two streams of thought that some suggest are largely 
dated and unpopular.  
Yet another argument derives from pure instrumentalism. The argument posits that group 
cohesiveness may be a result of regional leaders (shaykhs, sultans) or other actors (foreign 
powers or leaders)—sometimes labeled as “ethnic entrepreneurs”—co-opting, manipulating, or 
embellishing directly, subtly, or unwittingly the markers of identity for solely economic or 
political objectives. The only force powerful enough to forge a sense of national consciousness 
among the Saharan population in the previous chapters was that of the Sultan of Morocco. 
However, his influence was stunted in the face of prominent forces such as the southern Emirates 
in the Western Sahara and other tribes who chose not to acknowledge his authority. The intrusion 
of the French and Spanish in the internal affairs of the Western Saharans may be the biggest 
marker of identity formation for the Sahrawi but not before they had already established nominal 
political independence prior to 1860. Still, the historical analysis must continue to ask if, in fact, 
there were select proto-Sahrawi leaders who could bring together these populations. tribes. 
Constructivists seek products of human social interaction, that is, socialization and historical 
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forces states that combine a combination of cultural artifacts and social constructs. This section, 
then, evaluates how Europeans, the Sultanate of Morocco along with the tribes of the  
 
 
Map  6.1:  Map  of  the  People  of  the  Sénégal 225  
                                                
225 Map taken from Abbé David Boilat, “Carte des Peuples Du Sénégal,” in Esquisses Sénégalaises: Physionomie du 
Pays— Peuplades— Commerce—Religions Passé et Avenir Récits et Légendes (Paris: Librairie P. Bertrand, 1853), 
512, Gallica.bnf.fr. — Bibliothèque Nationale de France, accessed June 12 2015, 
http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k103361c/f512.image. 
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greater Western Sahara (see map 6.1 and the political communities in the deep southwestern 
Sahara) interacted with each other. Did these interactions aid in developing concrete forms of 
national identity among the Western Saharans? It seeks the synthesis of distinctive (Hassaniya, 
territorial affinity, political autonomy) ethnic features with the aspirations of actors or forces 
(resistance) as catalysts to Sahrawi identity. If the fusion of these top-down elements is evident in 
this period, then it will confirm the constructivist hypothesis for the origins of Sahrawi identity. If 
not, the search will continue. 
 
The Socio-Political Environment of Southern ‘Morocco’ (1850s—1900) 
Indeed, when Moulay Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman (or Abderrahmane), also known as Sultan 
Muhammad IV (1830-1873), replaced his uncle, Moulay Sliman, on the throne, Morocco’s 
weakness was prominently displayed to the European powers. Julien in a very telling comment, 
wrote that: “Thus it was that, in a world in full and swift evolution and increasing daily in 
strength through improvements in means of transport and growth of the volume of trade, 
Morocco remained an amalgam of tribes, very unstably bound by the link of religion…and 
attached to a centuries-old if not thousand-years-old economic system” (Julien 1970, 270).  Flint 
adds that European involvement in the Morocco-Saharan sphere of north Africa, which coincided 
in an untimely way for Morocco with the Sultan Abderrahmane’s death, was “invariably the 
occasion for revolt in various parts of the kingdom” (Flint 1976, 122).  Revolts broke out in 
Morocco in the north and in the south as the new Sultan tried to suppress Rahamna Tribesmen 
from besieging Marrakesh (ibid).  As a consequence of these events, colonial opportunities arose 
for the great powers from the north of the Mediterranean. 
Spain, after an attack by a squad of Riffian militants on one of its fortifications in Ceuta, 
responded by landing an army in Ceuta and occupying Tetuan in 1860 with British and French 
consent (Spanish War History 2012).  The Treaty of Wad Ras (which ended the 1859-60 
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Hispano-Moroccan War) not only cemented Spanish control of Ceuta and Tetuan, but also 
“secured from Morocco the town of Ifni, near Cape Nun on the Atlantic coast” (Johnston 1966, 
63).  Several authors (ibid., 120-121) write of the weakness of Muhammad IV as he attempted to 
deflect the eyes of the European powers away from its “tempting geographic position” and “lying 
along essential maritime routes” (Julien 1970, 271). However, the importance of the Straits of 
Gibraltar, located at one of the major transportation intersections of the world, did little to 
diminish European interests. In addition, his primary advisers were “divided amongst those who 
saw all that was happening as a result of European penetration and who urged adherence to a 
rigid, traditional, anti-European attitude and those who believed that it was necessary to 
modernize and to improve the administration” (Johnson 1976, 123).  Laroui, tellingly, 
summarizes the state in which Morocco found itself by asserting, “that the sultan’s independence 
and the integrity of his territory were safeguarded not by the Moroccan army, which was 
disorganized and poorly equipped, but by the protection of the English” (i.e, the British 
diplomatic corps) (1977, 317). 
Historical documentation generally indicated that in the southwest of Morocco, in the 
area of the Sous, and further south into the Oued Dra’a, there appeared to be a loosening of 
control by the Sultan at the time (late nineteenth century) of these crises. One important tribe is 
the Tekna mentioned previously in chapter five. The Tekna claim links to the Almoravid Empire 
that stretched from what is now Morocco to the southeastern peripheries of the Sahara adjacent to 
the ancient Ghana empire and their present-day connections to the Sahrawi. As a historical note 
and mentioned briefly in chapter three, the Sanhaja family of Berbers226 of the twelfth century 
were sub-divided among several groups of tribes—the Hawwara, Lawata, Lamtuna, Massufa, and 
                                                
226 As a note of remembrance, the ancient Berbers were divided among several family of Berber tribes—the Sanhaja, 
Masmuda, and Zenaga. Ilahiane, 109. 
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Guddala. The Almoravids, a hodgepodge of “Lemtoûna” 227 [or Lamtuna] (Doutté 1914, 344), 
Guddala, and other tribes that gravitated from the southwestern Atlantic coast of North Africa, 
picked up converts, and traveled north to modern Morocco. Other scholars believe that the Tekna 
are a mix of either Lamta (De La Chapelle 1930, 50) or descendants of the Gazula (Lydon 2009, 
173-174; Norris 1986, 142, 145). However, most scholars conclude that the Tekna were the 
“earliest inhabitants of the Wad Nun” (ibid., 173). The result, evident according to POLISARIO 
proponents, are that those members of the present-day Tekna Confederation now located in 
southern Morocco and Western Sahara proper (including some refugees that inhabit the Algerian 
camps near Tindouf) compose part of the Sahrawi nation. 
Chapter five documents how the “país Tekna” (the Tekna nation) (Martinez Milán 2007, 
367) and a certain personality, Shaykh Beyruk (1815-1859), of the Ait Moussa Ou Ali of the 
Tekna Confederacy came to prominence in the early part of the nineteenth century (see map 6.2) 
and ruled with autonomy (Pazzanita 2006, 408), free from the control of the Sultan, in the Oued 
Nun from the city of Guelmime (Lydon 2009, 164, 174-175).  He, along with his sons thereafter, 
attempted at various times to create a commercial port in Tarfaya (Cape, or Cabo in Spanish, 
Juby). (ibid., 167-169; Pennell 2000, 100-101; Ould Mohamed 2010, 248-249 note 9).  Both 
Shaykh Beyruk and Sidi Hashem had tried to establish trading posts along the Atlantic coast with 
the Europeans in order to circumvent taxes on trade levied by the Moroccan Sultan (Hodges 
1983, 32).  Sidi Hashem was the Sharif228 of Iligh in the Tazeroualt 229 oasis on the edge of the 
                                                
227 Taken from the French and translated by Dr. Maria Antonieta Garcia: “Hier matin nous avons quitté avec plaisir ce 
campement peu agréable. Pendant deux ou trois heures, nous marchons encore sur le territoire de cette tribu de 
chenapans; les Tekna sont de hardis voleurs, ils sèment au loin la terreur le caïd : dit-on, a sa part de leurs rapines. Zéla-
leurs fanatiques, pillards éhontés, vagabonds incorrigibles, ils évoquent le souvenir des Sahariens dont les hordes 
envahirent cette même région du H'oûz il y a bien des siècles : les Tekna d'aujourd'hui sont des Almoravides. C'est bien 
ainsi qu'étaient les compagnons de Ioûcef ben Tâchfîn, les Lemtoûna au visage violé, venus des profondeurs du 
Sahara…,” Edmond Doutté, Mission au Maroc: En Tribu. Paris: Librairie Paul Geuthner, 1914. 
 
228 Sharif in Arabic denotes “noble” or “high-born.” An Arabic title of respect, restricted, after the advent of Islam, to 
members of Muhammad’s clan of Hāshim. Encyclopedia Britannica Online, s.v. ‘Sharif’ May 9, 2014 
http://www.britannica.com/topic/sharif, Accessed October 16 2015. “In several cases, Sharifian descent was part of a 
dynasty’s title to rule…Most important of all for the history of Africa south of the Sahara were the Sharifian 
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Map 6.2:  Tazeroualt,  the  ‘State’ of  Beyruk  and  Tekna 230 
Sahara Desert. Lenz, who visited Morocco in 1880, stated, “Sidi Husayn, an old black man who 
ruled the area as an independent prince, maintained an army of five thousand slaves, all black 
from different backgrounds in West Africa, including the Fulani” [Emphasis added] (Lenz 2013, 
                                                                                                                                            
pretensions of the ‘Alawi dynasty of Morocco.” H. J. Fisher, “The Eastern Maghrib and the Central Sudan, in Roland 
Oliver, ed., The Cambridge History of Africa 3, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 1977, 314-315. 
 
229 Tazeroualt is also found spelled as Tazerwalt, Tazarwalt, or Tazerualt (in Spanish). 
 
230 Map is adapted and translated by the author directly from the Spanish in José Carlos López-Pozas Lanuza, “África 
Occidental Española: La Cuestión de Soberanía y La Retirada del Sahara” (Ph.D. diss., Instituto Universitario General 
Mellado, 2015), 313. 
  179 
251). ‘Sidi Husayn’ is the same Sidi Hashem of Iligh mentioned above. His given name would be 
Sidi Husayn Bin (or Ben) Hashem (1842-1886) based in the city of Iligh, which was found in the 
Tazeroualt (region). Curiously, although Pennell writes that the Iligh Sharif had acquired great 
economic autonomy, he adds that he was not the kind of leader that would lead a rebellion against 
the sultan (Pennell 2000, 26). Then in the following paragraph, he states that neither Sidi Hashem 
nor Shaykh Beyruk were a threat to the sultan (ibid.).  In fact, Sultan Moulay Hassan I (1873-
1894) would ask other leaders of the area to intervene, such as Sidi Hashem, to try to influence 
and rein “in Beyruk and [David] Mackenzie, but Husayn [bin Hashem] was a very autonomous 
subject and was negotiating on his own account with French and German representatives” (ibid., 
101). 
In addition to the odd juxtaposition of these sentences, it is questionable why these 
leaders would want to initiate a full-scale war with the sultan’s armies in the first place. It would 
have interrupted their successful business enterprises and only then evoked the ire of the 
Kingdom’s forces. Still, trade negotiations with the Europeans by Beyruk (1835-36, 1840, 1845, 
and 1853) and Sidi Hashem proved unsuccessful and were permanently discarded when Sultan 
Moulay Abderrahmane co-opted the shaykhs and his sons away from the influence of the British 
and the French.231 Still, these failures did not prevent other tribal entities from initiating 
commercial endeavors with the French farther south in the Senegal River Valley. Again though, 
instead of maintaining these agreements, the French expanded up the Senegal in order to seize 
control of the acacia gum trade away from the Emirates of Trarza, Brakna, and the Tagant. 
Eventually, France defeated the Moorish Emirates, including the Kingdom of Waalo, which was 
located south of the Senegal River.  
In an interesting and severe criticism of European ethnography by colonial adventurers 
and travelers, Hasan Mohamed ponders how a major qabila (or coalition of tribes), such as the 
                                                
231 However, the Sultan did finally concede to Shaykh Beyruk a trading house in 1844 at Mogador. 
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Tekna, could have been left to negotiate with Europeans, and possibly displacing, the caravan 
trade. He indignantly asserts “it is difficult to imagine how the Bayruk could have been short-
sighted to the extent that they would risk confrontation with the Alawite court in return for access 
to European markets that have no use for their slaves” (due to the abolitionist movement that 
initiated in England) (Hasan Mohamed 2012, 277).  The Alawite Kingdom would dote on the 
Tekna with “a system of patronage…with lavish distribution of ‘decrees of respect’ to” the 
zawaya [religious] power centers to secure the security of trade routes “over the ‘qabila [Beyruk] 
ensembles’” (ibid., 138-140).  In addition, H. Mohammed makes the very arduous and methodical 
case that the claims of Tekna origins to the Sous and the wider Oued Nun region, are documented 
from outside observers. He is also doubtful of the Tekna’s homogeneous ancestry for in the least, 
they are a series of hybridized foreign bloodlines—Arab, Berber, and possibly even Moorish. As 
such, he criticizes all the aforementioned scholars for ‘mistranslating’ the ‘tribe’ and objectifying 
‘libertarian’ concepts incorrectly associated with the Tekna and the Shaykh Beyruk. Furthermore, 
he states that the Tekna’s “notions of origin were often authored by ‘foreign elites’ such as the 
Beyruk,” thus relying heavily on Arabic and other ancient Saharan sources, such as Ibn Khaldun 
(ibid., 210). 
Hassan Mohamed’s critique implies that the Moroccan Sultan did have control of Shaykh 
Beyruk and that the Tekna were not native to the Oued Nun or Sous Valleys in the late nineteenth 
century. He also suggests that the Tekna were not independent. This argument will prevent the 
use of the Tekna as a perennial ancestor to the Sahrawi because the POLISARIO have argued that 
they have always been free of any Sultan. More study would be needed to understand how the 
Tekna viewed themselves at that time. Yet, the POLSARIO, based on the several interviews 
conducted in Rabouni Camp, acknowledge that they are a mix of different identities. The problem 
with that notion is that there is uncertainty over which tribe or tribes to use in order to properly 
trace the origins of the Sahrawi. The only alternative is to consider all regional tribes as possible 
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candidates. Yet, another problem arises: how many tribes and how far the region should one 
include? Are the tribes in and around the Sous, Nun, Dra’a, and Sequiet al-Hamra the only viable 
contenders? Or is it necessary to study all tribes of the greater western Sahara: nomadic and 
sedentary and across modern frontiers (Mali, Mauritania, and Morocco)? More investigation is 
needed that is beyond the scope of this study. 
 
However, despite Hasan Mohamed’s aversion to European ‘misconceptions, he does 
conclude that the Beyruk became originators of their own history (and that of the Tekna), because 
“of the frequency of their encounters with the outside world, and ability to accumulate resources 
and concentrate power” (Hasan Mohamed 2012, 210).  Rézette indicates that their loss of 
independence was actually the result of the threat posed by the Spanish Monarchy in attempting 
to establish a port of trade somewhere “between the Wadi Noun and Agadir,” which “seemed to 
them to correspond exactly to the old Santa Cruz de Mar Pequeña” (1975, 58).  Both the threat 
and these ‘dissident’ tribes were thus met with force by the Sultanate. The Sultan would invade 
and leave garrisons of armies, loyal to him, to maintain order. For example, in 1882, Sultan 
Moulay Hassan I, marched with an overwhelming mass of troops, numbering between 40,000 to 
70,000, from Marrakesh to Guelmime “to appease the appetites of the local chiefs” and crush the 
aspirations of these independent rulers (ibid.).  It is hardly surprising to read from Rézette that the 
defeated “tribes’ notables came to affirm their loyalty to him and to promise to oppose European 
movements” (Rézette 1975, 58).  Pennell, who seems to lean on the more official side of 
Moroccan history, affirms that the ‘dissident’ or bilad al-siba areas “still recognized the Sultan, 
even if they took little notice of him in daily affairs” (2000, 28).  Yet, he admits earlier: 
“Otherwise, the Sultan was content to let the remoter regions well enough alone, since it was too 
expensive to maintain direct control over unproductive areas. He only required that the caravans 
get through, that bandits should not close the roads and, above all, that his leadership of the 
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community be recognized in the Friday prayers” (ibid.). None of these interactions though gave 
the tribal confederations impetus for ‘national’ cohesion. 
This is similar to what many around the world perceived as American military, political, 
and possible economic domination of global affairs after World War II. Yet, the United States 
would affirm that it would not become embroiled in any sovereign country or region unless it had 
a vested national interest for such intervention. The United States would undoubtedly defend its 
well-demarcated geographical borders. In contrast, nineteenth-century Morocco had ill-defined 
frontiers and ‘invasions’ into the Sultan’s land were subjective. However, similar to the Sultanate, 
the U.S. would most likely only become involved in key transit or economic zones (South China 
Sea, Panama Canal) because of the importance in international commerce. Otherwise, America, 
too, would deem it far too expensive to maintain direct control of all trade routes, and would 
prefer ‘to let these’ more remote regions ‘well enough alone.’ The problem with these statements 
is rooted in the socio-cultural environment of the day. The modern-day Westphalian concept of 
the nation-state does not provide one with an accurate description or characterization of the 
‘nation’ of Morocco in a North African setting during the Sa’adian and Alawite Dynasties, 
depicted by historians such as Pennell. 
The modern era invites this analogy but only because the United States is a well-defined, 
territorially fixed nation-state, whereas the Sultanate of nineteenth century Morocco cannot be 
well defined in twenty-first century fashion. The only group identities, outside of the tribal, were 
those fashioned by the regional leaders, such as Shaykh Beyruk, Sidi Hashem, and Sultan Moulay 
Hassan I. If the Westphalian concept of the modern nation-state were to recognize titles of 
spiritual investiture as criteria for statehood, the Vatican would surely inherit millions of 
adherents across dozens of states. It would result in the reemergence of an ‘Holy Empire’ never 
before seen. Yet, no one today would agree to such a notion. Even Criado will argue that in the 
nineteenth century, ‘decrees of respect,’ ‘occasional affirmations of loyalty’ by other tribes 
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(Pennell 2000, 100), or letters of investiture and acknowledgement by the Alawite Sultans did not 
signify that their power extended over all tribes. He states “it was a type of propaganda without 
efficacy, intended to produce the illusion of a domain with no real existence”232 (Criado 1977, 
90).  It is difficult to assert that a Sahrawi national identity had emerged at this time. The only 
verifiable (group) identities were those socio-political entities established by dynastic and tribal 
leaders. 
Independent Entities in the Northwestern Sahara 
The autonomous entities described in the following provide examples of group identities that 
developed at the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in and around modern 
Western Sahara. It gives an account of certain groups that had already established a cohesive 
identity, independent of the Sultanate. It tries to establish a possible link from some of these tribal 
confederations to the emergence of Sahrawi national identity. It also introduces the debate over 
autonomy and its relation to national identity. If documenting the correct set of tribes does not 
help in seeking the origins of Sahrawi identity, then perhaps territorial autonomy can be a better 
tool. 
For instance, a publication by La Presse (Parisian Daily) written in 1844 of June 14 reads: 
“At the beginning of last century, Morocco still extended its authority down to Tombouctou in the 
Sahara, but its influence decreases every day, especially since 1795; most of the kingdom of Sous 
was detached from the empire of Morocco to form the independent state of Sydy-Hecham”233 (4). 
Caratini, states, “the economic power of the Tekna of the Oued Nun had developed in relation to 
Tazeroualt. This state, created, at the time of the decline of Sa'adians, around the seaport of Masa, 
                                                
232 Taken from the Spanish: “se trataba de una especie de propaganda sin eficacia, destinada a producir la ilusión de un 
dominio sin existencia real.” Ramón Criado, 1977, 90. 
 
233 Taken from the French and translated by Dr. Maria Antonieta Garcia: Au commencement du siècle dernier, le 
Maroc étendait encore son autorité jusqu’à Tombouctou dans le Sahara, mais son influence diminue tous les jours, 
surtout depuis 1795; une grande partie du royaume de Sous s’est détachée de l’empire de Maroc pour former l’état 
indépendant de Sydy-Hecham. “Nouvelles et Faits Divers,” La Presse, June 14, 1844, Gallica.bnf.fr. Accessed August 
12, 2015. 
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is, intermittently, independent of sharifian authority” before 1765 (1989, 80).234  In another 
reference, Désiré-Vuillemin states, “the ‘great nomads’ are especially the Reguibayt (Sahel and 
Lgouacem), Oulad Delim, but their cousins Tekna are ‘lessor [or junior] nomads’ — herders. 
They live between the confines [or frontiers] of Morocco and the Adrar (See map 6.4), far from 
any authority” [Emphasis added]235 (1962, 55).  The ICJ, in their 1975 Advisory Opinion on the 
Western Sahara, stated “although Morocco asserts that the Regheibat tribe always recognized the 
suzerainty of the Tekna Confederation, and through them that of the Sultan himself, this assertion 
has not been supported by any convincing evidence” (48). However, later in this report, the ICJ 
equivocated and acknowledged that: 
Those Tekna septs236 in their nomadic journeys spent periods of time within the 
territory of the caids237 of the Tekna confederation appears, however, to the Court 
to lend support to the view that they were subject, at least in some measure, to the 
authority of Tekna caids…Furthermore, the material before the Court contains 
various indications of some projection of the Sultan’s authority to certain Tekna 
tribes or septs nomadizing in Western Sahara238 (ibid.). 
 
Despite the independent attributes identified by some of these scholars, the Tekna have 
historically demonstrated the closest ties to the Sultanate of Morocco (Deubel 2010, 67). 
Thus far, the most important point here is that each tribe had already developed a sense of 
                                                
234 Translated from the French and translated by Dr. Maria Antonieta Garcia: La puissance économique des Takna du 
wad Nun s’était développé en relation avec le Tazarwalt. Cet État, créé, au moment de la décadence des Sa’adiens, 
autour du port maritime de Massa, est, par intermittence, indépendant du pouvoir chérifien. Sophie Caratini, Les 
Rgaybat (1610-1934) : Des Chameliers a la Conquete D’un Territoire, Tome 1. Paris: L’Harmattan, 1989, 80. 
 
235 Translated from the French and translated by Dr. Maria Antonieta Garcia: Les ‘grands nomades’ sont spécialement 
les Regueibat (Sahel et Lgouacem), O. Delim, mais leurs cousins Tekna sont ‘petits nomades’ moutonniers. Ils vivent 
entre les confins marocains et l’Adrar, loin de toute autorité. Geneviève Désiré-Vuillemin, “Contribution a L’Histoire 
de la Mauritanie de 1900 a 1934,” Ph.D.  Diss., Université de Montpellier, 1962, 55. 
 
236 Sept is a term used mostly in Irish and Scottish culture signifying folds (divisions within a family) or clans. 
 
237 Caids 
 
238 Such material includes documents relating to the recovery of shipwrecked seamen and other foreigners held captive 
by Teknas in Western Sahara… or documents showing that on some occasions, notably the Sultan’s visit in 1882 and 
1886, he received the allegiance of certain nomadic tribes which came from Western Sahara… and in letters from the 
Sultan to Tekna caids requesting the performance of certain acts to the south of the Noun and the Dra’a. Sahara 
Occidental (Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders) ICJ Advisory Opinion of 16 October 1975, 48. 
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separateness despite being subject or non-subject to the Sultan. They had distinguished 
themselves by self-government even if this charge was through devolution of power. Tribes had 
developed trade hubs and were willing to exchange goods with the Europeans in spite of 
Moroccan challenges. These social interactions provided stability and autonomy, which was 
attached to territory, mostly with the more sedentary tribes. Tribal identity was strong but the 
sense of a national identity was absent. Affinities were still very localized. There certainly were 
several emerging tribal identities but not one that can be described as Sahrawi. 
There is an ambiguity to the domain of the Sultanate over areas predominantly controlled 
by the Tekna confederation in the Oued Nun, Sous River Valley extending to the Sequiet al-
Hamra. These ambiguities pose a challenge to defining domains by political groups. If the task of 
defining the territorial control of a political group in an environment of competition and intrigue 
is challenging, how much more difficult can it be for identifying the roots of a nation? The Tekna, 
descendants of the Almoravids and presently claimed by the POLSARIO to be the ancestors of 
the Sahrawi, despite having once been subjugated and under the control of others (as confirmed 
by the many scholarly sources) developed a ‘nation’—an established geographical area, 
commercial system, and a sedentary, semi-nomadic, and nomadic way of life, with a small ruling 
political system. Yet, the author of this work does not yet find strong evidence for an awareness 
of ‘Sahrawiness’ or a defined Sahrawi identification, much less the establishment of the Saharawi 
nation. On the contrary there were an abundance of tribal entities. The lack of Sahrawi national 
presence in this period and in the preceding chapters does not preclude the fact that their origins 
emerged from such historical accounts; the results of which are grounded in constructivist 
arguments.  
Another approach that could have shed some light on the creation of older ‘nations’ is a 
sub-field of primordialism—perennialism. For instance, the Tekna (see map 6.3), Reguibayt, 
Tajakant, Oulad Delim, and those tribes farther south in Tiris, Zemmour, the Adrar, and Brakna 
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all have, to a degree, descended from Sanhaja Berbers. (see chapter three) These descendants 
intermarried with Arabs and split into the several branches of the Sanhaja. The POLISARIO have 
claimed that these tribes or at least the greater part of their composition belong to the Sahrawi 
nation. These arguments may be derived from the idea that nations may be evident since 
antiquity, or recurrent, disappearing but reappearing at a later time in a different fashion. Most of 
these perennial arguments though seem to only fit verifiable, strong and established groups such 
as the Jews, Greeks, Egyptians, who were present in antiquity and still exist today. 5,000 years 
ago, there had not yet been one Sahrawi. Evidently, these arguments do not fit in the Sahrawi 
case. 
Furthermore, there are reports that acknowledge the independence of not only the Tekna 
Confederation but also many other independencies. One example of a political entity that 
developed alongside the Tekna (see map 6.3) and the Moroccan ‘Empire’ are the Reguibayt. The 
Reguibayt were “[h]eirs of the baraka of their eponymous ancestor, Sharif Sid Ahmed Reguibi 
established in the Seguiet el-Hamra in the XVI century”239 (Beslay 1984, 84).  Scholars have not 
agreed as to the origins or even the birth of their legendary founder of the Reguibayt. In fact, 
there is even disagreement as to the actual territory that was controlled by this tribe. Criado writes 
that, according to Mamadu Ahmadu Ba, “During its history, the Erguibat were never under 
foreign domination. Politically, they were always independent of the Mauritanian emirs as the 
Tekna caids’ representatives of His Sharifian Majesty in the rejected southern Anti-Atlas”240 
(1977, 90).  Zunes and Mundy have also stated that the Reguibayt had always rejected the 
Sultan’s suzerainty (2010).  Yet today, even though “the base of support for the POLISARIO is  
                                                
239 Translated from the French and translated by Dr. Maria Antonieta Garcia: Héretiers de la baraka de leur ancêtre 
éponyme, le chérif Sid Ahmed Reguibi établi dans la Seguiet el-Hamra au XVI siècle. François Beslay, Les Reguibats: 
De la Paix Française au Front POLISARIO, Paris: L’Harmattan, 1984, 82. 
 
240 Taken from the Spanish and translated by the author: “Durante su historia, los Erguibat no fueron jamás sometidos a 
dominación extranjera. Políticamente, fueron siempre independientes de los emires mauritanos como de los caids tekna 
representantes del su Majestad Cherifiana en el sur del Antiatlas.”  
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Map  6.3:  Morocco  1894:  Sultanate  of  Morocco  and  Rio  de  Oro  Colony 241 
among some of the Reguibat tribes of the east…the Reguibat tribes in the western part of the 
[Western Sahara] territory as well as the Tekna confederation are largely pro-Moroccan.”  
[Emphasis added] (Pham 2010, 16). 
There is also documentation of tribes that settled and established small villages, then 
cities without the direction of a regional leader, but far outside the sovereign control of the 
Moroccan Sultan. For instance, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the Tajakant who enjoyed 
nomadic living in the Adrar, once held the abandoned oasis of Tinigi. However, after being 
ousted by the Reguibayt, they established the Saharan city of Tindouf that later became a central 
caravan hub (Lydon 2009, 155).242  In fact, the Tekna, recognizing the Tajakant’s value to 
trading, became allied to them by the late 1850s. There were also Hassani (mostly Arab) tribes 
that “triumphed in the beginning of the eighteenth century over the Ideyeselli, who until then 
dominated the oases and grazing grounds of Adrar… [and] represented in that period a unity of 
tribes with segmentary lineages” (Bonte 1981, 46).  The authors state that these tribes later 
organized themselves as a Moorish Emiral state around the Emiral lineage of Shaykh Ahel Etman 
(Bonte, 48).  In addition, Pennell describes how, despite the nomination in 1882-84 by the 
Moroccan Sultan, Moulay Hassan I, of a local khalifa “over the Figuig oases, and in 1892 a local 
administrator over the Touat…the population243 refused either to pay taxes or to recognize the 
                                                
241 Translated from the Spanish and translated by the author: “Marruecos 1894: Sultanato de Marruecos y Colonia Río 
de Oro-Poderes Reales/Imperiales,” Euroatlas.net, 2014. http://www.euratlas.net/index_en.html. Accessed July 31, 
2015. http://www.euratlas.net/history/hisatlas/africa/es_1894marocTRZ.html. 
242 Apparently, Tindouf was an important trading city that connected Oued Nun, Tazeroualt, Tafilalet, and the oasis of 
Tuat. Lydon On Trans-Saharan Trails, 155. 
 
243 This refusal by the population may have been in part to support the Algerian rebel leader, Bu Amaran, as these 
communities resided on the Algerian-Moroccan frontier. Pennell, on the other hand, will state “in the Sous, local 
leaders undermined the Makhzan’s authority not by fighting but by trading with the Europeans.” However, it is unclear 
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authority of the Sultan’s qaids” (Pennell 2000, 100). 
 The absence of sovereign control over the peripheral areas surrounding Morocco allowed 
for the independent tribes to flourish and create their principalities. It allowed for the 
development of distinct tribal identities. It also alters the nomadic lifestyle of some tribes, now 
even in the deep south. The major northern tribes of the Western Sahara such as the Tekna, 
Reguibayt, and Tajakant become urban and more powerful. The smaller tribes seek alliances. 
These examples demonstrate that there was no one ‘national’ identity that bonded all tribes; they 
had become self-sufficient, autonomous. In fact, tribes fractured through conflict, divisions, or 
because of demographic agricultural limitations. They also merged because of conquest, through 
inter-breeding, or the loss of grazing and water shortages necessitating alliance with others. Tribal 
identities, at least for smaller tribes shifted. Although these examples provide glimpses of 
territorially-independent tribal identities, they still do not prove that there was evidence of a grand 
Saharan, or much less, Sahrawi ‘national’ identity. In the southern extremities of the Western 
Sahara, similar developments are taking place. 
 
Independent Entities in the Southwestern Sahara 
In 1724, Moulay Ismail “sent an army to support southern Saharan Arabs against the French 
along the Senegal River” (Cleaveland 2002, 99).  However, this would become one of the last 
instances in which a Sultan would be able to intervene in the politics of the southwestern Sahara.  
A detailed study on the Walati,244 confirms that this was another decidedly independent region 
with rich history. “An early twentieth-century Walati chronicle conferred on Mulay Ismail and 
the other Alawi sultans the title of Amir al-Mu’minin (Commander of the Faithful)” [Emphasis 
                                                                                                                                            
and still would require much more study as to the nature of the makhzen (Moroccan administration) authority. Morocco 
since 1830, 
244 Walati were a “people from the Saharan oasis called Walata or Oulata, which is about 300 hundred kilometers west 
from Timbuktu.” Walata is located in present-day southeastern Mauritania. Timothy Cleaveland, Becoming Walata: A 
History of Saharan Social Formation and Transformation (Portsmouth, NH: Heineman, 2002), xix. 
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added] (ibid.).  However, Cleaveland adds that this same chronicler, along with other Walati 
leaders had publicly “submitted to Ahmad, the son of Fulani jihadist ‘Umar Tal, in 1873, 
describing both as commanders of the faithful” [Emphasis added] (Cleaveland, 99).  The Walati 
chronicles “leave the reader with the impression that Walatis never considered themselves part of 
the Sa’adian or Alawi domains, and give much more attention to the Ruma245 [or arma] regime in 
Timbuktu246 and Fulani politics in Masina” (ibid.).  In fact, based on scholarship outside the 
scope of this study and other oral histories, there were several independent confederations that 
rose, fought, and declined in the Tagant, the area surrounding the town of Walata, and in the 
Hawd247 (ibid., 103-104). 
Lydon speaks of certain regional Emirs (see map 6.4) that came to power in the 
southwestern and southern Saharan. Ahmad Mawlud Wuld ‘Abd al-Wadud Wuld Intaha’s 
describes this period of relative stability: 
The coming to power of (the Emir of Adrar) Ahmad Wuld Muhammad (a.k.a. 
Lemhammad) Wuld ‘Abdy. He was just and he entertained good relations with 
Bakar Wuld Swayd Ahmad (Idawish Emir of Taganit) and ‘Aly Wuld 
Muhammad Lahbib (Emir of Trarza) and Muhammad Mahmud Lahaymid (Emir 
of Brakna) and Dahman Wuld Bayruk (Tikna leader of Guelmim in Wad Nun) 
and Mulay al-Hasan (Sultan of Morocco)248 (2009, 127-128). 
                                                
245 The Arabic term ruma(h), translated as ‘musketeers’ in English, is the plural form of rami (shooter), the name given 
to the combined Sa’adian army of Sultan Ahmad al-Mansur of “Spanish, Berber, and Arab mercenary soldiers who 
participated in the Moroccan conquest of Timbuktu in 1591.” This army settled and mixed “with the local elites, 
becoming the ruling caste.” John O. Hunwick and Alida Jay Boye, The Hidden Treasures of Timbuktu: Historic city of 
Islamic Africa, London (Thames & Hudson) 2008, 154. Al-rumah later passed into Songhay as arma, the term used for 
the Moroccan ruling elite in Timbuktu post-1591, whose descendants still form a social class. John O. Hunwick, edited, 
Timbuktu and the Songhay Empire: Al-Sa’di’s Ta’rikh Al-Sudan Down to 1613 and Other Contemporary Documents 
(Boston: Brill, 1999), 166, 197. 
 
246 Ahmad al-Mansur’s march south toward the southern fringes of the Sahara defeated the Songhay Empire, and 
subsequently, the Arma or al-rumah (in Arabic) administration that was established by the Sa’adian Sultan became 
independent of his rule by 1618. 
 
247 The Hawd is a term that means “Arabic for ‘basin,’ and refers to the regions’ lower topography in relations to the 
neighboring Tagant highlands, and the elevated plateau to the north and northwest, respectively. In Saharan narratives, 
the Hawd was the ‘end of the line,’ one of the last regions where groups claiming Arab origins exerted hegemony over 
indigenous farmers and herders.” John H. Hanson, Migration, Jihad, and Muslim Authority in West Africa: The 
Futanke Colonies in Karta, (Indianapolis: Inmdian University Press) 1996, 49. 
 
248 Ahmad Mawlud Wuld ‘Abd al-Wadud Wuld Intaha. Ta’rikh Adrar, Manuscript by his son Jilil b. ‘Abd al-Qadar b. 
Intaha (1934) quoted in Lydon, Trans-Saharan Trails, 127-128. 
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The Adrari Emir Lemhammad is claimed to have “brought relative peace and great prosperity, 
assisted by several years of abundant rains” to the region (ibid., 127).  Indeed, Lydon
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Map 6.4:  1876  Map  of  the  Western  Sahara  249 
                                                
249 This map shows, magnified within the westernmost red lines, 1) the “Aderer” or Adrar Emirate; 2) At the 
southwestern-most point, the Trarza Emirate; 3) To the east and last to be formed, the Emirate of the Tagant; 4) Finally, 
due north are the independencies of the ‘Uled’ Tidrarin, the Arusin (otherwise known as the Arosien Tribe), the 
Ergrebat (or in this study spelled as the Reguibayt), and the Tajakant located south and southeast of the ‘Wad’ Nun and 
the Sakiat el Hamra River Valleys. (Not magnified but on the map is also the Emirate of Brakna) E. G. Ravenstein, 
“The Western Sahara,” in Sir Clements R. Markham, ed., The Geographical Magazine III (Trubner and Company: 
London), January 1 1876, 12. Google Play Books.  
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also adds that Emir Lemhammad signed several agreements “with Dahman bin Beyruk, then the 
Tikna ruler of Guelmim” (2009, 127).  Bonte reports “the ‘customs’ paid by the French 
merchants to the Moorish chiefs…strongly reinforced the powers of the emirs” (1981, 46). 
McDougall and Steele describe that, “by the mid- to late eighteenth century, it is clear that the 
sultan’s interests in the region (Tegaza to Timbuktu) remained strong; moreover, his authority 
was recognized as legitimate by at least some important Saharans” [Emphasis added] (2012, 52).  
However, a correspondence with the Sultan of Morocco about tariffs on salt, explains: “The 
famous shaykh Sidi al-Mukhtar al-Kunti claimed that the Kunta250 should be exempt from paying 
salt taxes not because the sultan had no right to levy them in the first place, but because as a 
respected family of venerated saints, the Kunta should answer to no secular authority, such as 
Moroccan representatives, or qa’ids” (McDougall and Steele 2012, 52). 
McDougall and Scheele reveal details on specific autonomous entities by exploring their 
caravan trade networks (ibid., 44-45).  Lydon used a diaspora framework that centered on the 
growth and fluctuation of trade routes, which originated in the Tekna heartland in southern 
Morocco, to exert control over the Western Sahara. Alternatively, Norris saw control of the 
Sahara as part of the Arab mentality of conquest through “the agency of local Saharans” (A. 
McDougall 2012, 45).  Control over the southwestern Sahara, even in the late nineteenth century 
was still in doubt and indicates that the Sultan could not have had proper dominion over these 
territories. As a result, Morocco’s King today, cannot claim that these lands have been 
historically apart of the Kingdom. Still, there was no Sahrawi Emirate or Emir that was building a 
conglomeration of Saharan tribes. 
 
                                                
250 It is important to mention that the Kunta were not always of one mind. “During the same historical moment 
(purportedly ca. 1766-1767) mentioned above, a western branch of the Kunta family claimed ownership of the Ijil 
mine—but reportedly, only after seeking approval from the Moroccan Sultan.” E. Ann McDougall, “On Being 
Saharan,” in James McDougall and Judith Scheele, eds., Saharan Frontiers: Space and Mobility in Northwest Africa, 
(Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2012), 52. 
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Rather, there appear to be several independently flourishing, not just semi-nomadic tribal 
confederations but sedentary principalities in the Western Sahara along the Atlantic coast from 
south of the Sous River Valley to the vicinity of the Senegal River. The Hassaniya language, the 
practice of pastoralism (for those more semi-sedentary), nomadism and semi-nomadism, raiding, 
and Islam were all suitable features of identity that could have facilitated the union among tribes. 
Yet, there was no common bond that tied these tribes together as ‘nation.’ Identity remained 
tribal. In addition, despite disagreements among scholars about Moroccan authority over certain 
groups, tribes were already ‘self-aware.’ Tribal identity was tied to the family of clans, who 
participated in a separate sphere of local body politics distinct from wider ‘Moroccan’ aspirations. 
There is no evidence that these tribal communities were aware of a greater socio-political 
consciousness other than what was locally known to them. Thus, despite the relative 
independence of several tribal confederations, in and around modern Western Sahara, even 
among groups who the POLISARIO claim are ‘pre-Sahrawi,’ this did not feature as part of a 
Sahrawi autonomous identity. 
 
Conclusion 
There does not seem to be cohesive notions of ‘Sahrawiness’ in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century based on the features discussed in the introduction (Hassaniya vernacular, territorial 
affinity, and tribal autonomy) to this historical period. Seeking Sahrawi origins based on these 
elements of identity throughout history remains elusive. These elements of identity provide for 
group consciousness but it does not offer conclusive results for establishing a national identity. 
Rather than searching for the ‘genesis’ of origins as Armstrong refers to, perhaps it would be 
better to seek patterns or the persistence of ethnic attachments (1982, 4).  These are, according to 
his typology, based on latent, conditioned, and framework attachments (ibid., 288). In other 
words, language, a nostalgia for nomadism, or the identification with one’s group genealogy as a 
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persistent feature of identity is key to building a nation. If then, there is no substantive evidence 
for a discernable Sahrawi identity at this time, what can be said is that there are latent attachments 
that have laid the groundwork for an identity.  
For instance, the Jewish, Greek, and possibly Egyptian people can trace their origins to 
antiquity despite today’s modern, re-conceptualized form of national identity. They feel proud of 
their ancient history, take care in restoring their symbols and heritage in spite of the gap in 
thousands of years of history. The same may be warranted for the modern Sahrawi. Underlying or 
layers of ethnic attachments begin to take hold and bond to the Saharan: a genealogical 
framework tied to the clan, then tribe, expanding to the confederation of tribes; a territorial 
affinity also perhaps tied to genealogical history. Group autonomy, not one of Armstrong’s 
underlying attachments, serves to enhance group consciousness through patterns of collective 
management. The Sahrawi also speak a distinct form of Arabic called Hassaniya. These layers of 
identity have taken shape over time. If viewed in this sense, then we may find that origins of 
Sahrawi national identity have been taking shape all along and this period of analysis adds to their 
history. If these layers are viewed as mutually exclusive elements of identity, then one can only 
speak tribal identities at this juncture. 
The constructivist hypothesis sought for socialization and historical forces that would 
combine cultural artifacts with social constructs. Socialization involved commerce exchange, 
conflict (ghazzian raids), political engagement (through agreements and accords with fellow 
Saharan tribes, including the Sultanate, and Europeans), and interactions with each other 
(alliances). These interactions were made by largely independent political entities; tribes that 
were autonomous. These tribes were led by either their shaykhs or emirs. The instrumentalist 
hypothesis, however, does not have much support in this period because no leader or group of 
elites resolved to unify all, or a majority of tribes, in the greater Western Sahara toward a greater 
cause for ‘national’ cohesion. 
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A better conclusion rests in the knowledge that there have been several layers of identity 
developing over time. Social and historical forces have forged independent groups acting in 
opposition to or sometimes in conjunction with Europeans and the Sultanate. The ethno-cultural 
resources for identity have been identified but they have not fully merged with the leaders and 
elites of the disparate tribes. The tribes remain aloof from any ‘national’ objective. Identity 
remains local. The moment for the emergence of the Sahrawi has not yet become apparent but the 
groundwork (latent ethno-cultural elements) has been laid for the next historical period. 
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VII. A NEW POPULATION EMERGES: THE DAWN OF THE SAHRAWI 
(1884 —1973) 
 
This chapter completes the socio-historical analysis through 1973. In 1973, the 
POLISARIO Front became the ‘guardians’ of the Sahrawi movement that today seeks to free the 
Western Sahara from Moroccan control. Initially established in 1973, the Front had garnered the 
support from much, if not all, of the ‘Sahrawi’ population. Its claims, in addition to those of 
scholars who report on the status of the Western Sahara, are based in part on a historical lineage 
of Sahrawi characteristics that fall in line with arguments from primordialism. As researched by 
the author of this work, these claims have been somewhat vague, inconsistent, and only serve to 
argue against the propriety of Moroccan control over the region. Moreover, evidence for a distinct 
group of Saharans that represented the region of the Western Sahara has been difficult to 
demonstrate. In fact, the research shows that there were several distinct groupings that 
represented political entities that inhabited the ‘Greater Western Sahara.’  
The question remains where the origins of Sahrawi identity lie. Primordial claims begin 
to take shape at this time, but they do not support one distinct group, namely the Sahrawi, but 
several independent political entities. The contention, an identity forged from the oppression and 
marginalization by the Moroccan state and/or the subjugation of colonialism, seem only more 
clear at the end of this period. The appropriation of Sahrawi identity by independence-seeking 
groups, such as the POLISARIO, may have been the key development that formalized a 
‘Sahrawi’ identity. However, the constructivist premise that past and present day struggles 
formed the catalyst that helped to coalesce opposition groups will be discussed later in this 
chapter. It also incorporates the end solution created by the major powers at the end of the 
nineteenth century (1884-85 and 1906) that established borders (see map 7.1) and subsequently 
created 'international barriers' that interfered and divided both the long-established nomadic 
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Map  7.1:  The  Spanish  Sahara  in  1903 251 
                                                
251 Map Adapted and taken from Alberto Martin, “Posesiones Españolas en África: Costa Occidental (Sahara Español 
(Rio de Oro) y Sta. Cruz de Mar Pequeña, Golfo Guinea (Islas de Fernando-Póo, Annobón, Corisco y Elobey y Guinea 
Española (Territorio del Muni)), Barcelona, 1903. 
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lifestyle and independence of those residing in the region. Research indicates that all these 
arguments are valid but a sense of group ONLY appealed about twenty years prior to the 
formation of the POLISARIO. 
This chapter argues that ethno-cultural resources have been developing for some time. 
These features of identity, however have not adequately transformed the tribes of the Western 
Sahara into one cohesive national identity. The primordialist hypothesis is weak without more 
support. As the major European powers directly become involved in the colonization of the area, 
resistance begins. The constructivist hypothesis argues that opposition to European intrusion 
catapulted the union of many tribes and reaffirmed tribal independence. It will ask whether 
European colonization stimulated identity formation among the pre-Sahrawi in this last period of 
history. The instrumentalist argument will also be assessed with the account of Ma’ al-‘Aynayn 
and his followers. All three arguments can be examined in light of the dynamics of the period to 
determine of a Sahrawi nation emerges. 
 
The Europeans Move Inland 
If the preceding chapters failed to draw a clear picture of the origins of the Sahrawi, it is due to 
the ambiguous nature of the development of Sahrawi national identity. Moreover, just when 
Saharan history is re-oriented by independent political entities arising in the nineteenth century, 
Morocco’s southern frontier became embroiled in further territorial disputes with Europeans who 
encroached into the interior of northwest Africa. The French had already begun limited 
engagements with the political entities at the southern fringes of the Western Sahara. Spain had at 
various times (January 1873, 1883, July 1885) attempted to gain ports of trade on the Atlantic 
coast of Morocco as compensation for the attacks waged by Rif tribes (supported by the Sultan) 
and against its northern territories (Ceuta, Melilla). The Sultan preferred to negotiate a financial 
settlement with Spain. Sultan Moulay Hassan I decided to move on the independent commercial 
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centers of “Oued Noun and Tazeroualt” off the Atlantic coast in 1882 and 1886,252 “fearing that 
other European interests would gain a foothold on the coast” (Trout 1969, 152). 
These actions conspired to reduce ‘control’ by the Sultan of Morocco over the 
southernmost regions of the Western Sahara, and encouraged stronger feelings of tribal identity 
among Western Saharans beyond the Oued Nun, the Oued Dra’a, indeed into the Oued Sequiet 
el-Hamra. The actions by France, Spain and other powers brings us to the following questions. (1) 
Did European colonization have a crystallizing effect on Sahrawi national identity? Or (2) did the 
anti-colonial opposition movements have a significant effect on Sahrawi national identity? These 
answers are shaped by four developments: A) European commercial ventures in the region; B) the 
1884-1885 Berlin Conference; C) the several treaties between the Sultan and the European 
powers; D) intensification in the power of tribal autonomy.  
First, the colonizers pursued not only commercial ventures on the coast but also 
exploratory missions to the interior of the Sahara (in search of even more marketable resources 
and more navigable transport routes). Various geographical societies of the age sponsored these 
explorations. The British bypassed direct conversations with the Sultan by employing Scottish 
trader, Donald Mackenzie, who only consulted with Shaykh Beyruk for a ‘portion’ of land 
labeled as the ‘Tarfaya Strip.’253 Mackenzie then established the North-West African Company 
(1879) in order to extend British trade in the area. The dispute254 between Morocco and the tribes 
that aided Mackenzie over Cape Juby would go on for twenty years. Shortly before Sultan Hassan 
                                                
252 Trout states that “as a result of these campaigns, as series of Moroccan posts were established to the south of 
Agadir: at Tiznit, Kasbah Ba Amrane, Assaka, and at Goulmine.” Frank E. Trout. Morocco’s Saharan Frontiers, 
(Geneva: Librarie Droz, 1969), 152. 
 
253 The Tarfaya Strip, or ‘Tarfaya,’ “called by the natives” as such, beginning with Cape Juby, was according to (Lt.-
Gen.) Sir Arthur Cotton, “was some 100 miles south of the Wad Draa, which is recognized as the southern boundary of 
the Sultan of Morocco’s territory, and 50 miles north of the river Sakiet el Hamra.” The Story of Cape Juby, (London: 
Waterlow and Sons, 1894), 21, 2. Google Play Books. Accessed September 16 2015. 
 
254 Cotton describes that the area agreed upon with the Shaykh Beyruk “should be remembered that it is in free and 
independent Tekna, occupied by the tribes constituting the Ait al Jamel, and below the Wad Draa, the southern 
boundary of the Sultan’s dominions, that the North-West African Company has settled.” Ibid., 21. 
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I’s death in 1892, the British consented to sell “Mackenzie’s trading station to the Moroccans for 
a sum of £50,000” (Trout 1969, 154).  Subsequently, in a turn of events in favor of Morocco, the 
first clause of the Treaty of 1895 stated, “If this [Moroccan] Government buy the buildings, etc., 
…no one will have any claim to the lands that are between Wad Draa and Cape Bojador, and 
which are called Terfaya… and all the lands behind it, because all this belongs to the territory of 
Morocco” (Herstlet 1909, 970). 
There are two different accounts as to the claim of the southernmost limits of Morocco 
(See Trout 151-152 and Rézette 59-72). Rézette argues that Spain’s ambitions were not only to 
open ports of entry and thereby the exploration of the ‘hinterland’ but also “to prevent other 
powers, especially England from doing so” (1975, 55).  For example, La Sociedad Española de 
Geografía Comercial (SGC), La Sociedad Española de Africanistas y Colonialistas (SAC), and La 
Sociedad Geográfica de Madrid (1876) were able to send various explorers and entrepreneurs to 
southern Morocco on behalf of Spain (Burke III 1972, 178-179).  In an excerpt from Algueró 
Cuervo: 
Spain, via the Canary fishermen, retained, into the nineteenth century, a presence, 
token  if you will, but effective, on the African coast in proximity to the Canary 
Islands. For that reason, when in 1876 ... Mackenzie created a trading post in 
Cape Juby, in a zone—supposedly abandoned—vital for Spain, the indignant 
voices were raised of those who represented the Hispanic version of Africanism 
that was already prevailing in Europe255 (2006, 49). 
 
The Spanish sought to emulate British action by negotiating with the tribes of Ouled Delim. In 
1884, these actions established ports of entry for trade at the Rio de Oro bay in September 1881 
(“bounded by what is now the coast and peninsula of Villa Cisneros”) and other trading stations 
in November and December of 1884 (Rézette 1975, 59).  Moreover, the Spanish, not wanting to 
                                                
255 Translated from the Spanish by the author: “España, a través de los Pescadores canarios, conservaba, entrado el 
siglo XIX, una presencia, testimonial si se quiere, pero efectiva, en la costa Africana próxima a Canarias. Por eso, 
cuando en 1876…Mackenzie creó una factoría comercial en Cabo Juby, en una zona—supuestamente abandonada—
vital para España, se alzaron las indignadas voces de quienes representaban la versión hispana de un africanismo que 
triunfaba ya en la Europa.” José Ignacio Agueró Cuervo, El Sahara y España: Claves du una Descolonización 
Pendiente,  (Las Palmas de Gran Canaria: Ediciones Idea, 2006), 49. 
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get involved in the dispute over Cape Juby (given to Mackenzie by the tribes therein on behalf of 
the British) pushed farther south of Cape Juby. 
Second, in the 1884-1885 Berlin Conference the Great Powers accorded themselves the 
right to take not only coastal emplacements in Africa, but also the interior lands, so long as the 
inhabitants acquiesced to their rule. Needless to say, these decisions were discussed without the 
consent of any African representatives. Spain publicly ‘declared’ to the competing powers (July 
1885)256 that the “Spanish protectorate of the African coast” extended from Cape Blanc to Cape 
Bojador (Rézette, 60; Trout, 151; Agueró Cuervo, 51-52). There were numerous treaties between 
the Spain, France, and Britain and the Emirates in southern Western Sahara, the Sultanate of 
Morocco, and with Algeria. 
At this juncture European fascination with northwest Africa impeded any effort to bring 
about greater western Saharan, much less Sahrawi, unification. Moreover, European exploration 
highlighted disputes over the southern delimitations of the Sultan’s dominion. Trout explains it 
well when he writes that “at the close of the nineteenth century,” when Morocco’s southwestern 
borders were being debated: “It was impossible to give credit to Moroccan pretentions when there 
was no evidence of existence of any Moroccan administrative control either in Mauritania or in 
the Soudan [i.e., modern day Mali]. The issue that arose was instead the question of where lay the 
southern-most limits of the bled-es-siba” (Trout 1969, 144).  The bilad as-siba, or land of 
dissidence, would remain an area of contested control despite the independencies present at the 
time. Although the Sultan laid claim to areas as far as the Senegal, at no point is there evidence 
that did the population acknowledged them, administratively, politically, or even culturally. In 
fact, as the scholarship demonstrates, the only recognition was within the context of spiritual 
authority. The problem was not the existence of a Moroccan Kingdom; Rather, the problem was 
                                                
256 However, this declaration was made on December 26, 1884 to the Great Powers and then later placed in writing on 
January 14, 1885. Robert Rézette, The Western Sahara and the Frontiers of Morocco (Paris: Novelles Edition Latine, 
1975), 60. 
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determining those geographical boundaries, and assessing whether the Kingdom’s physical, 
territorial influence extended up to these ends. Written works on the socio-historical development 
of the northwestern Sahara has thus far not revealed far-reaching support for a (historical) 
‘Greater Morocco’ that dominated lands beyond the Sous and Dra’a River Valleys, much less 
deep into the southwestern Sahara approaching the Senegal.  
Third, several treaties and agreements on behalf of the European powers, diminished the 
Sultan’s power and influence over not only the disputed territory, but also his own. These treaties 
began to fragment any unifying momentum from the time of the Ma’ Al-‘Aynayn-led rebellion. 
For example, the Treaty of Muni (or Paris) signed (27 June 1900) by both Spain and France 
established their possessions on the coast of the Sahara but did not take into account its 
inhabitants. According to Barbier, the treaty, “In fact, [it] only covered the southern and 
southeastern border of the Rio de Oro, la Seguiet el Hamra being ignored [or set aside]. 
Moreover, as they did not know the country very well, that border was essentially based on the 
meridians and parallels, without taking into account its inhabitants” (Barbier 1982, 58).  Again, in 
1902, further negotiations257 between France and Spain delineated “their respective spheres of 
influence in Morocco” (ibid., 59).  Article 3 of the 1902 convention stated that, 
it determined the dividing line between the French and Spanish spheres of 
influence. In particular, it gave Spain a zone in the north ... and another in the 
south, which was located between the Rio de Oro and the Oued Sous and 
included Seguiet al Hamra, the Tarfaya area, the Draâ, the Nun and the Anti-
Atlas. This showed that the Moroccan government did not exercise its authority 
over the region located south of the Oued Sous and neither France nor Spain 
recognized such authority258 [Emphasis added] (ibid.) 
                                                
257 These negotiations resulted in a draft convention on November 8, 1902 but was not ratified. Maurice Barbier, Le 
Conflit du Sahara Occidental, (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1982), 59. 
 
258 Taken from the French and translated by Dr. Maria Antonieta Garcia: En 1902, il y eut de nouvelles négociations 
entre la France et l'Espagne, en vue de délimiter leurs zones d'influence respectives au Maroc. Ces négociations 
aboutirent à un projet de convention le 8 novembre 1902, mais qui ne fut pas ratifié. Dans son article 3, celui-ci 
déterminait la ligne de démarcation entre les sphères d'influence française et espagnole. En particulier, il accordait à 
l'Espagne une zone dans le nord, ... et une autre dans le sud, qui était située entre le Rio de Oro et l'oued Sous et 
comprenait la Seguiet al Hamra, la région de Tarfaya, le Draá, le Noun et l'Anti-Atlas. Cela montrait que le 
gouvernement marocain n'exerçait pas son autorité sur la région se trouvant au sud de l'oued Sous et que ni la France, 
ni l'Espagne ne reconnaissaient une telle autorité. Barbier, Le Conflit du Sahara Occidental, 59. 
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 The secret convention of 1904 in Paris and another in Madrid in 1912 also led to further 
European appropriation of the lands in the northwest Sahara. These conventions confirmed that 
(despite Morocco’s claims to most of the northwest Sahara) the colonial powers did not 
acknowledge any Moroccan authority to the lands adjacent to its peripheral south and southeast. 
In 1904, a clandestine agreement between France and Spain affirmed their rights and interests in 
the region. “The agreement determined the sphere of influence of Spain on the Moroccan 
Mediterranean coast. It also fixed the boundaries of the settlement conceded by Morocco to Spain 
in Santa Cruz de Mar Pequeña, that is to say Ifni, under the treaty of 1860 (Article 4). Finally, it 
completed the Spanish Sahara border (see map 7.1 above) and delimited the sphere of influence 
of the French and Spanish in the south”259 (ibid., 60).  In November of 1911, German ambitions 
in North Africa were made known at the resolution to the Second Moroccan Crisis (or Agadir 
Crisis of July 1911). The resolution included two letters of understanding between France and 
Germany. Barbier stressed what was not found in those letters, “the recognition by France and 
Germany of Morocco 's borders and sovereignty on the Seguiet el Hamra and Mauritania…the 
context clearly shows that it is not so”260 (ibid., 61). 
France and Spain needed to ascertain that they were really free “to exercise their 
influence” within the frontiers of Morocco.  However, this was not possible, because clear limits 
did not exist. They had to indicate the zones of influence (ibid.).  The treaties “recognized Spain’s 
freedom of action in the territories of Saguia al-Hamra and Cape Juby, ‘which are outside the 
borders of Morocco’” (Abi-Mershed and Farrar 2014, 12).  Also, Merry Del Val writes that 
                                                
259 “la convention déterminait la sphère d’influence de l’Espagne sur la côte marocaine de la Méditerranée. Elle fixait 
aussi les limites de l’établissement concédé par le Maroc à l’Espagne à Santa Cruz de Mar Pequeña, c’est-à-dire à Ifni, 
en vertu du traité de 1860 (article 4). Enfin, elle complétait la frontière du Sahara espagnol, délimitait ainsi les sphère 
d’influence française et espagnole dans le sud.” Barbier, Le Conflit du Sahara Occidental, 60. 
 
260 Taken from the French: “une reconnaissance par la France et l’Allemagne des frontières du Maroc et de sa 
souveraineté sur la Seguiet el Hamra et la Mauritanie: “le contexte montre clairement qu’il n’en est rien.” Ibid., 61. 
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Map 7.2:  1912  Territorial  Distribution  of  Western  Sahara261 
                                                
261 The above legend is written in Hungarian and translates as ‘Country’ (Ország), ‘Territory’ (Terület), and ‘Limit’ 
(Határ). Map taken from Attilio Gaudio, “Les Populations du Sahara Occidental: Histoire, Vie, et Culture,” (Paris: 
Karthala, 1993), 48, in János Besenyő, “Western-Sahara under the Spanish Empire,” AARMS (Academic and Applied 
Research in Military and Public Management Science) 9, No. 2 (2010), 201. 
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apart from the northern zones and Sidi Ifni, “From Cape Nun southwards the Spanish zone begins 
once more, extending on the south to Cape Bojador, the northern limit of our colony of Rio de 
Oro, and on the east to meridian 11˚ W. of Paris (see map 7.2 above). The famous Sakiet el 
Hamra marks the extreme limit of the Shereefian Empire, if indeed this realm ever extended so 
far” (411, 1920). By 1913, Spain began deploying troops to its northern territories. It had 
garnered several possessions in the Sahara and across Morocco. However, some of these, 
including Ifni, had still not been occupied due to financial setbacks and other military delays 
caused by the interruption of World War I. 
As agreements indicate, the colonial powers of Europe were cognizant that there was a 
physical Kingdom of Morocco and that it had a prominent role in North African politics. 
However, it also acknowledged that the Sultan’s influence or authority could not have extended 
beyond the disputed areas extending along the coast, in the region of Oued Nun, the Sous, Oued 
Dra’a, or farther south to the Sequiet el-Hamra. Based on this understanding, the Spanish, French, 
and British undertook bilateral diplomatic and commercial exchanges with the independent tribes. 
They viewed these populations as separate political entities distinct from ‘Morocco.’ There was 
even more uncertainty inland, to the south and southwest of Morocco, which was also undefined. 
These developments rapidly gave the independent tribes of the Western Sahara more power to 
maneuver and also gave them a bigger stake in the welfare of the region; in essence, an enhanced 
group awareness. 
With the exception of the account (section below) of Ma’ Al-‘Aynayn’s creation of a 
cohesive force for the purpose of throwing off the colonizers, there was still no evidence of the 
formation of a ‘Sahrawi national identity.’ In fact, these treaties and ‘handshakes’ among the 
powers of Europe only served to fragment the physical boundaries of the tribal inhabitants. The 
bilateral negotiating nature of Britain, France, and Spain with the tribes exploited tribal rivalries 
and fears. It also alarmed the Sultan. Independent tribes, cognizant of European meddling with 
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fellow rival tribes, maneuvered to counter the threat. They either cooperated to gain (economic) 
advantages or resisted to maintain their security with the European powers to offset any 
disadvantages with fellow tribes. Thus, a tribal balance of power developed in the Western Sahara 
that pitted tribes against each other, but enhancing their group consciousness. 
In short, rather than solidify a consensus of ‘national’ resistance, European intrusion only 
served to strengthen tribal rivalries, fragmenting them even more. These agreements merely 
dictated territorial boundaries, not the manner of governance in these possessions. Clearly what is 
observed from these documents and agreements is the recognition of a Kingdom and his 
possessions, of which still had not been defined properly. Distinctions that can be made are those 
of tribal rule versus dynastic rule, territorial domains of the Sultan and those that were not, and 
perhaps a sentiment of opposition against both the Sultan and Europeans. Did these agreements 
influence the identity of the populations that were not under the rule of the Sultan? They did not. 
They merely acknowledged that the populations south of the Kingdom were governed by other 
independent chiefs. These independent confederations of tribes had established tribal identities 
but had not begun to coalesce into a distinctive Western Saharan collectivity. A Sahrawi national 
identity is still not apparent. Below, the fourth development of the period is analyzed. 
 
Tribal Distinctiveness 
Fourth, competing tribal identities was historically the underlying, fundamental obstacle to an 
entire Saharan ‘collective.’ By now, an interesting identity paradox vis-à-vis Moroccan identity 
had developed. On the one hand, a distinct Saharan culture, divided amongst the several nomadic 
and semi-nomadic tribes across the northwestern and southwestern Sahara, had been established. 
These claims have been evident in this work and cited by several other Saharan scholars. They 
exist in yet-to-be studied manuscripts of the greater Western Sahara. The point here is that this 
scholarship highlights the historical, linguistic, and socio-cultural differences between the 
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Saharan tribal nomad/semi-nomad and the sedentary, urban Moroccan. These distinctions are 
extremely subtle. If one were to speak to the ‘Sahrawi,’ they adamantly differentiate themselves 
from their northern neighbors and explicitly re-state how the foods, dress, role of women, and 
even the practice of Islam is different from that of a Moroccan.  
In keeping with this point, the foods, as experienced while visiting the area, were 
somewhat different. These differences reflect an influence by Spanish colonization. At least once 
a day, meals included a Spanish paella, which was then customized to Sahrawi tastes. In terms of 
dress, there is the daraa robe262 worn by men, in contrast to the djellaba worn by both men and 
women in Morocco and Algeria. Sahrawi adult women wear a different outfit that includes a head 
covering, called the malahfa263 (or melhfa). In Morocco, the women wear the hijab or niqab, 
sometimes with the djellaba. Islam, as the writer was told, also has very subtle differences due to 
the urban-nomadic environments. Most of the Arab world, before daily prayers, will complete 
ablution with water. Throughout the centuries, the Muslims of the Sahara, due to water scarcity, 
have used sand to mimic the cleansing before praying. Perhaps the biggest difference of all is 
language. The Sahrawi speak the Arabic dialect of Hassaniya264 (see map 7.3 below) while most 
Moroccans speak Derija (Moroccan dialect). Both are not spoken anywhere else in the Arab 
world except in their respective regions and they exist mostly in oral form. The two versions are  
                                                
262 The Daraa robe a loose gown with two openings on the sides and a pocket on the breast. The gown is usually either 
white or blue. “daraa,” Cultural Website of the Sahara, accessed on January 14, 2016, CORCAS 2016, 
http://www.sahara-culture.com/Default.aspx?tabid=416. 
 
263 This is a four-meter long by one meter and sixty-centimeter-wide piece of fabric/cloth worn by the Sahraoui woman 
wherever she goes. “Al malahfa,” Cultural Website of the Sahara, accessed on January 14, 2016, CORCAS 2016, 
accessed on January 14, 2016, http://www.sahara-culture.com/Default.aspx?tabid=416. “The Melhfa is a tradition that 
is found in Sahrawi culture far back in time. The Melhfa is one of the cultural traditions that make the Sahrawi nation 
distinctive from other peoples.” Silje Rivelsrud, “The Sahrawi Refugees and their National Identity: A Qualitative 
Study of How the Sahrawi Refugees Present their National Identity in Online Blogs,” MA Thesis, Universitete I Olso, 
May 2010, 52. 
 
264 Hassaniya became the dominant language among Saharans in the seventeenth century. Today, it is the national 
language of Mauritania, spoken mostly in oral form. 
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Map 7.3:  Location  of  Majority  Hassaniya  Speakers265 
not entirely mutually unintelligible but differences exist in phonology and syntax.  Although 
some scholars describe each dialect as a different language altogether. 
One of the more surprising differences with respect to language was the adoption of 
Spanish. Many educated Sahrawi today speak Spanish, which is directly tied to the influence of 
Spanish colonization. The author found himself pleasantly surprised when many of the 
POLISARIO interviewed spoke Spanish. However, in the interviews, none made reference to this 
feature as part of their identity. During the author’s stay in Morocco while a Peace Corps 
Volunteer and a diplomatic intern in Rabat, the language of choice was French.266 Even while 
training as a volunteer in Immouzer-Tandar, Morocco, a predominantly Berber-speaking 
                                                
265 “Hassaniya Arabic,” Mediander.com, New York, 2016, accessed August 14, 2016, 
http://www.mediander.com/connects/558481/hassaniya-arabic/#!/p3/topic/-/ . 
 
266 The author was more comfortable with French than with Moroccan Arabic.  
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(Tamazight) city, most of the educated spoke in French. It was peculiar to find that the people did 
not identify with these colonial languages as being part of their respective national identities. 
However, despite their dislike of colonialism, both populations use these languages as tools for 
advancement, education, and activism267 (as in the case of the Sahrawi). 
These apparent, cultural markers seem to differentiate Saharan and Moroccan identity. 
On the other hand, the second point in this paradox has been described sufficiently in the previous 
chapters. Despite claims of distinctiveness from Morocco, far from being of one mind, or of one 
cohesive national identity, the Saharans in this ‘land of the Moors’ “never experienced political 
unity” (Hodges 1983a, 30) .  As mentioned in previous chapters, Saharan society “was made up 
of a number of autonomous, often conflicting emirates, confederations and tribes” (ibid., 30-31).  
The northwestern, western, and even peripheral southwestern Saharan emirates, confederations of 
tribes and sub-tribes traded and intermarried with each other. Nonetheless, they also commonly 
warred with one another, creating deep blood feuds that carried over for hundreds of years. The 
violence could include conflict over cattle, land, trade routes, and personal vendettas. In 
summary, the overall theme seems to be of a certain separateness from others based on important 
socio-cultural characteristics evident to the native Saharan. 
Hodges argues that a Western Saharan’s prime loyalties in the twentieth century were 
first to “tribe (qabila), tribal fraction (fakhd), and family” (Hodges 1983a, 29).  This loyalty, to a 
qabila and below, remained the perennial force behind Saharan society. There was also a certain 
caste system among and within tribes—free or shurfa tribes, then znaga268 (subordinated) or 
lahma), third, the bards and craftsmen, and finally the slaves and ex-slaves (haratin) (ibid., 29).  
                                                
267 Curiously, of the major countries colonized by France, only Algeria, Mauritania, and Mali recognize the SADR, 
mainly for regional security reasons. While the SADR is currently supported by nearly half (9) of all Latin American 
(Spanish-speaking) countries (19). Costa Rica, Colombia, and Paraguay at one point recognized the SADR (pushing the 
total to 12) but diplomatic relations today remain ‘frozen’ or ‘suspended.’ 
 
268 This label is not to be confused with the actual ancient name of the Sanhaja Zenaga subtribe. However, this label has 
been credited by scholars as being derived from the defeat of the Zenaga at the hands of the Arab Beni Hassan tribes in 
the Char Bubba Wars. 
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These “notions of blood loyalty (asabiya)” were very strong before, during, and after the 
‘pacification’ (1934) of most of the Western Sahara by French and Spanish forces. The 
distinguishing features alluded to by Hodges include the following: Hassaniya dialect of Saharan 
Arabic, “an economy based on pastoral nomadism and commerce, the frequent practice of 
raiding;” dress; diet; poetry; and Islamic practice (ibid., 30). These tribal features though 
stretched beyond modern Western Sahara. In other words, these distinctions were part of the 
greater expanse of the northwestern Saharan. Still, these cultural markers apparently had not yet 
created a sense of a regional identity. 
Since such divisions were present among many tribes in the Western Sahara, it would 
have been very difficult for any ruler to bring these groups together for any type of cooperative 
action. For example, the Sultan had sent delegations to many tribes in the region with the hope of 
‘re-establishing’ Moroccan administration. However, these attempts to gain recognition for the 
authority of the Sultanate were thwarted or ignored. According to Hodges, the much bigger tribes 
led by “the emirs of Trarza, Adrar, Tagant, and Brakna” were unwilling “to recognize [the 
Sultan’s] authority” (Hodges 1983b, 35).  Neither the larger, better established (and more 
sedentary) Saharan communities, “[n]or…the Reguibat; and even the main nomadic Tekna tribes 
to the south of the Noun, the Izarguien, Ait Lahsen and Yagout” … submitted to the Sultan 
(Hodges 1983b, 35).  Even when the Sultan or another leader, such as Beyruk controlled parts of 
an area, such power was temporary or nominal. “In 1899,” for instance, “a force of Moroccan and 
Ait Moussa Ou Ali soldiers, sent from Goulimine by Dahman Ould Beyrouk to chastise the 
Izarguien, was routed at Daora…, and when the Ait Oussa, a partly nomadic Tekna tribe centered 
on the oasis of Assa in the Djebel Bani, joined the Reguibat in sacking Tindouf in 1895, nothing 
was done, by either the [S]ultan or Dahman, to aid the Tadjakant or prevent the Ait Oussa from 
aiding the Reguibat” (36). Thus, the area to the southwest of the Sultanate of Morocco was not 
controlled by the Sultan, but neither was the population unified as a social group. 
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These differences became a bit more complicated when direct European meddling into 
the interior of the Sahara began at the beginning of the nineteenth century. At this juncture 
appears the most common and perhaps only thread of unity among the Saharan tribes and the 
Moroccan population: an aversion to European Christian encroachment on ‘Islamic lands.’ Their 
relationship with foreigners had been, since the beginning of early European colonization (1400-
1500s), very reserved to hostile. At specific points in time, if the terms for commerce with the 
Christians were advantageous to a tribe or Sultan, hostilities would cease for the purposes of 
trading (until grievances by competitors forced an end to trading or the foreign trading partner 
was banished from the area). By the 1800s, a time of direct European involvement in the affairs 
of Morocco and the rest of the northwestern Sahara, the first widespread countermoves against 
the French were evident in West Africa among the ancient, southern Saharan Emirates bordering 
the Senegal River Valley. The (Moroccan) Sultan also lobbied against European intrusion and 
positioned his military alongside its ‘domains’ from Spanish, British and French settlements. In 
general, the inhabitants of the greater northwestern Sahara, including the lands throughout 
Morocco, southwest into modern Mauritania, and as far south to the ancient Emirates, approved 
of were united in their rebellious behavior toward European, Christian invaders. 
Nevertheless, these distinctions were not sufficient to unite the tribes or create a regional 
national identity across the whole Morocco/Western Sahara territory. The Spanish explorer, 
Enrique d’Almonte spoke of the mistrust between Moroccan and Saharan guides and translators 
employed by foreign adventurers. In 1926, Antonio Jaén, a Spanish colonizer, 
yet again insisted that the frontier between Morocco and the Sahara was ‘formed 
by the river Draa,’ and six years later, José Guillermo Sánchez clarified that 
‘although [the Sahara tribes] respect the Sultan of Morocco, they do it because he 
is a descendant of the Prophet, not because they have any intention of becoming 
his subjects’; as all the Africanist writings of these decades illustrate, the tribes of 
the Spanish Saharan dominions have always ‘live[d] with a savage independence, 
[and] without a supreme chief’ (San Martín 2010, 25). 
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At the same time that the major European powers discussed the partition of Africa, they 
slowly engaged in a game of territorial gain through diplomatic, and eventually, coercive attrition 
with the Sultanate and the rest of northwest Africa. In light of this threat, the Sultan and finally, 
Ma’ al-‘Aynayn, who is discussed below, “swore to uphold the laws of the sultan in the Western 
Sahara and Mauritania, and in 1895, his warriors seized Port Victoria” (Abi-Mershed and Farrar 
2014, 12).  However, Morocco acquiesced to the Great Powers of Europe despite the ‘rebellion’ 
in secret dealings and treaties negotiated in 1904, with the Sultan in 1906269, and the Treaty of Fes 
in 1912. Nonetheless, territorial reality did not conform to the words written in these documents. 
“Spain obtained the territory of La Hamada and the border was fixed at parallel 27˚40', but the 
territory up to the Draa was left with the uncertain name of Spanish 'zone of influence,' because 
the Tekna270 nation remained without a clear definition of how the word 'influence' should be 
interpreted”271 (Canales Torres and Del Rey Vincente 2010, 37).  The underlying bond was not a 
unification of (Western) ‘Saharans’ but a campaign to dislodge the Christian infidels from the 
lands of Islam and implement the authority (at least in name) of the Sultan. Yet again, there is no 
definitive awakening of a ‘Sahrawi’ national identity. In short, the people of the region did not 
have a common political identity, but they did reject the political control of either the Moroccan 
Sultan or of European colonialists. 
 
                                                
269 The First Moroccan Crisis (1905 — 1906) resulted in the 1906 Algeciras Conference where Sultan Abdelaziz 
ratified the Act of Algeciras. The Act reaffirmed his independence “and the economic equality of the” European 
powers, but it included a program of police ‘reforms’ that provided “French and Spanish police officers be under a 
Swiss inspector general.” Encyclopedia Britannica, s.v., “Algeciras Conference,” Online Edition 2016, accessed 
August 15, 2016, https://www.britannica.com/event/Algeciras-Conference . 
 
270 “Finally in the accords for the establishment of the Hispano-French Protectorate over Morocco, signed 27 
November 1912, the Tekna ‘nation’ became the so-called ‘Protectorate South’ finally granting the territory north of 
27˚40 a definitive legal status.” Carlos Canales Torres and Miguel del Rey Vicente, eds., Breve Historia de la Guerra 
de Ifni-Sáhara, (Madrid: Ediciones Nowtilus, 2010), 37. 
 
271 Taken from the Spanish and translated by the author: España obtenía el territorio de La Hamada y se fijaba la 
frontera en el paralelo 27˚40’, pero dejaba con el inseguro nombre de ‘zona de influencia’ Española el territorio hasta el 
Draa, por lo que el país Tekna quedaba sin que se definiese con claridad cómo se debía de interpretar la palabra 
influencia. Ibid. 
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Ma’ Al-‘Aynayn 
Both parties to the conflict (the POLISARIO and the Kingdom of Morocco) have adopted Shaykh 
Ma’ al-‘Aynayn and his actions as part of the claims to the Western Sahara. The POLISARIO 
have described his exploits as representations of the aspirations of all Western Saharans in terms 
of ‘liberating’ these ‘occupied territories’ from foreign intruders and as a symbol of the 
development of the Sahrawi ‘nation.’ In contrast, Morocco argues he is an important part of their 
national history. The case for either is compelling. Al-‘Aynayn (1830-1910) stands out as one of 
the more remarkable events and personalities in the long-running dispute over the Western 
Sahara. His actions will be evaluated because he was the first figure in documented ‘Western 
Saharan’ history since Nasr al-Din to unite several of the region’s tribes.272 Al-‘Aynayn’s 
exploits, adopted by the Sahrawi as part of their history, led to the formation of a more formal 
Western Saharan identity.  
 Ma’ al-‘Aynayn was born into the Sufi Fadiliyya tariqa (order) as the twelfth son of 
Muhammad Fadil bin Mamin al-Kalkami who founded the order. His father, family, and his son 
claimed Sharifian descent and “lineal relationship to the Lamtuna who were the aristocracy of the 
Almoravid Sanhaja” Dynasty (Norris 1954, 889).  In terms of national origins, al-‘Aynayn and 
his family, are thus direct descendants of the Sanhaja Berbers and therefore ancestors to the 
Sahrawi. Ma’ Al-Aynayn had made the Hajj (1857), settled in Tindouf to study (1860), and lived 
the nomadic life between the Adrar and the Oued Dra’a thereafter. He moved north to the Sequiet 
el-Hamra (1873) but after an unhappy decade, left the region, travelling between the Adrar and 
Tiris region (Désire-Vuillemin 1958, 33).  In 1898, with the blessing and financial support of 
Moulay Abdelaziz, Al-‘Aynayn built the city of Smara, located in Western Sahara. According to 
Miské, “Moulay Abdel Aziz was particularly sensitive to the preaching of the great Sahrawi saint. 
                                                
272 Al-‘Aynayn is sometimes spelled El-‘Aynayn, Al-Ainin, El-Ainin, or Al-Ainine. Ma’ Al-‘Aynayn is actually a 
nickname whose real name is Sidi al-Mustafa Wuld Muhammad Fadil. Glen W. McLaughlin, s.v., “Ma’ al-‘Aynayn,” 
in Kevin Shillington, ed., Encyclopedia of African History Volume 1 A-G, (New York: Fitzroy Dearborn and Taylor 
and Francis), 2005, 869-870. 
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He even sent an emissary, … wearing an expression of solidarity with the Moorish resistance”273 
(1978, 96). 
He had gained a saintly reputation from among the Saharan population including “all the 
Saharan tribes of the great nomads: Regheibat, Lgouassem, Oulad Delim, [revered] him, and he 
[could] count on the support of the majority of the warriors of Adrar” (Désire-Vuillemin 1958, 
39). He was also admired for his pilgrimages to Mecca, charismatic demeanor, and ‘miracles, 
which quickly gained followers to the Fadiliyya order. However, Ma’ Al-‘Aynayn grew 
increasingly troubled and angered at the French and Spanish intrusion of Saharan lands. By 1904, 
he declared a fatwa against the foreigners and thrust his weight against the colonizers with direct 
support, which he embraced, from the Sultan of Morocco. He had already amassed considerable 
support from several Saharan tribes throughout his many nomadic journeys in Mauritania, the 
Western Sahara, and Morocco. Al-‘Aynayn was mostly concerned with “the colonial ambitions of 
the French that really roused [his] fury. 
Cloistered in Villa Cisneros, the Spanish were not very troublesome; but France had 
already conquered Algeria, Tunisia and by 1903 both Trarza and Brakna had fallen to 
Coppolani274” (Hodges 1983b, 57).  He was supported militarily by the Sultan, Spain, and 
Germany (rival to the French for the colonization of northwest Africa), but died in 1910 before he 
could complete the purging of Westerners from Saharan territory. Ahmed al-Hiba, Al-’Aynayn’s 
son, mounted a campaign against the French when Morocco agreed to the treaty of Fes (1910) 
under which the Sultan, Abd al-Hafid, surrendered sovereignty to France. Thereafter, al-Hiba, 
                                                
273 Taken from the French and translated by Dr. Maria Antonieta Gracia: “…Moulay Abdel Aziz fut particulièrement 
sensible à la prédication du grand saint sahraoui. Il alla jusqu'à envoyer un émissaire, … porter l'expression de sa 
solidarité à la résistance maure.” Ahmed Baba Miské, Front POLISARIO: L’Ame d’un Peuple, 1978 96. 
 
274 Xavier Coppolani (1830–1905) was a French colonial leader known as the father of French Mauritania, who was 
responsible for French control of southern Mauritania. Oxford Reference Online, s.v., “Xavier Coppolani,” Oxford 
Index, Oxford University Press, 2016, accessed August 15, 2016, 
http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095638514# . 
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‘the Blue Sultan,’ marched to Marrakesh (1912) and removed the “Sultan of France” for his 
betrayal (Miské 1978, 96). Despite this short triumph, the French army defeated him at the Battle 
of Sidi Bou Othman on 6 September 1912. In summary, as D’Almonte commented, “the Moorish 
forces that acted under the inspiration of Sidi Ma’ al-‘Aynayn included all the tribes of Western 
Sahara who traverse the territories to the north of the parallel that passes by Cabo Blanco. To 
these collection of tribes were added the nomads of the Adrar-er-Tmar, a part of the sedentary 
people of that region and a certain number of Zenagas Moors of the [T]rarza fraction”275 
(D’Almonte 1914,164-165). 
Today, Morocco has declared Al-‘Aynayn a patriot for its Kingdom, while the 
POLISARIO have also claimed him as a hero to the Sahrawi, placing him in Sahrawi folklore 
literature. Supporters that claim him for the Sahrawi argue that Ma’ Al-‘Aynayn was not from 
Morocco proper. San Martín writes that Ma’ Al-‘Aynayn was born in the Hodh (or Hawd) area, 
which is now part of southeastern Mauritania (2010, 31) and D’Almonte stated that “he 
established his residence in Chinguetti, an important population of the mentioned Adrar”276 
(1914, 157). Mundy suggests that “the Shaykh might have been planning on deposing the then 
colonially complicit ‘Alawis to place himself on the throne” (Mundy 2007, 311).  It is unclear, 
though, what his political program was to be after installing himself as Sultan. He was primarily 
concerned with ridding the northwestern Saharan lands of the French invaders and had even 
declared, while on a pilgrimage to Mecca, that “his people knew neither rulers nor money” (ibid., 
311).  Yet, Moroccan arguments state that he was loyal to the Sultan and argue that he accepted 
                                                
275 Taken from the Spanish and translated by the author: “las fuerzas mora que obraban bajo la inspiración de Sid Ma-
el-Ainin comprendían todas las tribus de Sáahara [sic] occidental que recorren los territorios comprendidos al Norte del 
paralelo que pasa por el cabo Blanco. A ese complejo de tribus se agregaron los nómadas del Adrar-et-Tmar, parte de la 
gente sedentaria del mismo y cierto número de moros zenagas de la fracción [T]rarza.” Enrique D’Almonte, Ensayo de 
una Breve Descripción del Sáhara Español, (Madrid: Patronato de Huérfanos de Intendencia e Intervención Militares), 
1914, 164-165. 
 
276 Taken from the Spanish and translated by the author: “instauró su residencia en Xingueti, población importante del 
mencionado Adrar.” D’Almonte, Ensayo de una Breve Descripción del Sáhara Español, 157. 
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the title of khalif of the Sahara on behalf of the Sultan in his quest to oust the French from 
Saharan lands. 
After the rebellion of Ma’ al-‘Aynayn, Sahrawi ‘national’ sentiment became evident in 
limited circumstances. However, post al-Aynayn sentiments have been irregular, unsupported by 
the whole of the population, and vaguely viewed as ‘Sahrawi’ rebellions. For instance, after al-
‘Aynayn’s death, “sporadically, for 30 years, from 1904 to 1934, long-range raiding parties 
would set forth from 'Spanish' territory to attack the French” (Hodges 1984c, 81).  Meanwhile El-
Hiba fought the French from the Anti-Atlas until his death in 1919. “His brother, Mohammed 
Laghdaf, and other Sahrawi resistance leaders, such as Mohammed el-Mamoun and El-Aissawi 
et-Tibari, continued raiding against the French in the desert. However, in 1934, French forces 
from Morocco, Algeria and French West Africa finally 'pacified' the border regions of the north-
western Sahara in a coordinated military campaign.” (Hodges 1984c, 81).  By then, the Spanish 
had already deployed troops, set up and established administrative districts, and included many of 
the tribal associations into their presidios. In 1946, “a decree created the Spanish West Africa 
administration to comprise Ifni, Tarfaya, and Spanish Southern Morocco, together with Seguia el-
Hamra and the Rio de Oro” (Jensen 2005, 12).  Yet in 1958, Francisco Franco ceded Tarfaya and 
Spanish Southern Morocco to the Kingdom of Morocco.  
 
The ‘Sahrawi’ Dawn 
It was not until the rise of militant Moroccan nationalism after 1953 that many of the Western 
Saharans joined the Moroccan Liberation Army (MLA) to fight alongside Moroccan troops 
against Spanish and French control. According to Hodges, “thousands of Sahrawis became part of 
a broad, trans-frontier anti-colonial struggle only as recently as 1957-8, when they responded to 
the insurrectionary appeals of the Moroccan Army of Liberation (Jaich at-Tahrir)” (Hodges1983a, 
30-31).  These San Martín explains that it was at the insistence of some tribal elders “based in the 
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Spanish Sahara” that congratulated the Sultan on his return from exile in 1955 and the 
independence of Morocco. They then asked for his assistance to liberate “the Sahara from 
colonialism, but stressed that they would not wish to offer ‘in exchange the compromise of 
loyalty to the King of Morocco’” (San Martín 2010, 67).  The statement read with respect to the 
Spanish: “although it occupies a part of our land, we so not wish to make war against it, because 
it did not enter by means of force or arms, but through an agreement with the Assembly of the Ait 
Arbain [Assembly of Forty]. Therefore, what we want now is the French to leave; after that, we 
will not have any problem in achieving an accord with the Spanish” (Briones et. al., 2010, 67). 
The key point here is that apparently, an assembly of, or in this case, a group of leaders 
and former Army of Liberation fighters from different tribes had been brought together to 
promote the cause of decolonization in the Spanish Sahara. They explicitly stated to the Sultan 
that they did not want to be incorporated into Morocco upon independence and they would deal 
with the Spanish themselves. Did they, however, consider themselves Sahrawi or as a cooperative 
group of tribes seeking one goal? The answer may still not be evident because more 
documentation is needed to evaluate this event.277 They obviously did believe that a cohesive 
front was necessary. They acted in unison but did not readily incorporate themselves as a 
‘Sahrawi’ nation. 
Many scholars though, such as Hodges, Mercer, Mundy, San Martín, Canales and del 
Rey, who write about this period already make use of ‘Sahrawi’ (or Saharaui) as a national 
marker of identity. These comments are premature. For instance, Hodges narrates a story of a 
rebellion that seems at first glance to suggest a cohesive network of ‘Sahrawi’ guerilla fighters. 
However, the narration actually involves certain tribes of the Reguibat, Tekna, Lebouihat 
(subtribe of the Reguibat), Ait Bu Amaran of Ifni, and other ‘nomads’ who did not have a 
                                                
277 The author was only able to find one reference to this event and that brief comment was quoted in a secondary 
source. Primary source: Felipe Briones, Mohamed Limam Mohamed Ali, and Mahayub Salek. “Luali: ‘Ahora o Nunca, 
La Libertad’,” (Alicante: Universidad de Alicante, 1997), 38-39. Quoted in San Martín, Pablo. Western Sahara: 
Refugee Nation. Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2010. 
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common sense of identity (Hodges, 1983, 73-83). It is not possible to take individual tribes and 
suggest that these select few had considered themselves as a whole ‘Sahrawi’ nation. It was also 
unknown what were the tribe’s (those who sought the assistance of the Sultan) future plans for the 
territory after the possible ouster of the French. How were they to govern the region agreeably 
with the Spanish? In another study about Moroccan identity, these group of rebels actually 
continued fighting “for the complete liberation of what they deemed Moroccan territory, 
particularly the ill-defined Saharan regions in the south that were still under French and Spanish 
control…renaming themselves the Army for the Liberation of the Sahara” (Wyrtzek 2015, 279). 
Nevertheless, the King278 of Morocco later disowned the Spanish Saharan rebels. Divisions arose. 
Subsequently the combined military efforts of the Spanish and French in Operation Ecouvillon 
and Ouragan, eliminated all resistance in 1958.   
In view of the escalating problems in these colonial possessions, the UN began to 
deliberate on procedures for holding a referendum for the “indigenous population” in 1966279 
(UNGA 1966, 4).  Despite these statements, a flurry of Western Saharan groups emerged in the 
late 1960s to challenge colonial (Spanish) control. Some were created to promote unification with 
Morocco; others sought independence from Spain for the Spanish Sahara. In 1967, a group 
supported by and based in Morocco called the Front de Libération du Sahara sous Domination 
Espagnole (FLSDE),280 was created but was largely inactive and swiftly disappeared when the 
King opened diplomatic relations with Mauritania (Hodges 1983a, 39).  At the same time, a pro-
                                                
278 The Sultan became the King of Morocco shortly after he returned from exile and promised a constitutional 
monarchy in 1956. C. R. Pennell, Morocco since 1830: A History, (New York: New York University Press, 2000), 299. 
 
279 The UN General Assembly passed Resolution 2229, which requested Spain, “to determine at the earliest possible 
date, in conformity with the aspirations of the indigenous people of Spanish Sahara and in consultation with the 
Governments of Mauritania and Morocco and any other interested party, the procedures for the holding of a referendum 
under United Nations auspices with a view to enabling the indigenous population of the Territory to exercise freely its 
right to self-determination,’ UN General Assembly, Question of Ifni and Spanish Sahara, 20 December 
1966, A/RES/2229, accessed August 16, 2016,  http://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f1d91c.html . 
 
280 In Spanish as ‘Frente de Liberación del Sahara bajo Dominación Española’ (FLSDE). 
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independence group named the Harakat Tahrir Saguia al-Hamra wa Oued ad-Dahab281 
(Liberation Movement of the Sequiet al-Hamra and Rio de Oro), began to organize peacefully, 
and in secret, but revealed themselves during a demonstration in the city square of el-Ayoun 
(Layounne) in 1970 that went horribly wrong. The rebellion was put down violently by Spanish 
forces. Their leader was captured and was never seen again. The group was subsequently 
eliminated (Besenyo 2009, 65; Mundy 2007, 313-314; Hodges 1983b, 154-155).  The years of 
1972-73 brought opposing resistance movements that divided the Western Sahara population and 
also merited support from opposing political forces. For instance, the Mouvement de Résistance 
“Les Hommes Bleus” (MOREHOB)282 developed in Morocco, but its leader switched sides at 
least twice. This phenomenon was not unique to the disparate groups that proliferated at that time. 
Not only was MOREHOB split between supporters of unification with Morocco and those who 
desired independence, but there were other groups (Mouvement of Aout 21; PUNS) vying for the 
hearts of the Spanish Sahara (Zunes and Mundy 2010, 103).  Finally, in May 1973, the 
POLISARIO appeared (Jensen, 15; Mercer 1976, 504).  According to Mercer, this was the “first 
effective grouping of the nomads” whose purpose was to liberate the lands of the Spanish Sahara 
against foreign domination (ibid., 504).  Mercer explains that “[t]his liberation movement…had 
gradually absorbed the able-bodied men of all tribes except the pro-Morocco Tekna in the north 
and the pro-Mauritania Delim and Barik Allah in the south.” [emphasis included] (ibid.). 
 
SUMMARY REMARKS 
Based on the research into the limited literature on the subject of Sahrawi identity, the author 
finds that in the period beginning in 1913 through 1973, Western Saharan national identity began 
                                                
281 Juan Goytisolo calls this group ‘Munaddamat Muslim’ (Muslim Party or Organization) in El Problema del Sahara, 
(Barcelona: Editorial Anagrama, 1979), 37 and 39. Also in “Cronología de una Descolonización,” Blanco y Negro, 07 
September 1977, (Madrid: Diario ABC, 2009), 24, accessed August 16, 2016, 
http://hemeroteca.abc.es/nav/Navigate.exe/hemeroteca/madrid/blanco.y.negro/1977/09/07/024.html . 
 
282 MOREHOB was created in 1972 by an ex-policeman, Bachir Figuigui also known as Eduardo Moha.  
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to coalesce without the use of a ‘national’ label. Instead of developing a general sense of ‘nation 
awareness’ especially in this sixty-year period, the ‘greater’ Western Sahara was regionally 
divided among its inhabitants. Independent political entities flourished and established 
governments, set rules of engagement against others, and had distinctive avenues of trade. The 
Sultan of Morocco, by deploying messages and messengers to the rulers of these political 
communities, was tacitly acknowledging their autonomy and authority as the leaders of their 
respective populations. Furthermore, it is evident that the emirs of those areas would at times 
recognize the Sultan’s spiritual authority but only out of respect, for the benefit of their 
population (trade, military gain). The development of tribal loyalty and an accompanying tribal or 
confederated tribal identity was evident. They preferred a community of tribes such as the 
Reguibayt, Tekna, Oulad Delim or even Kunta but not identified as ‘Sahrawi.’ 
 Just as the Sultan attempted to extend his influence over Sahrawi tribes at the beginning 
of the twentieth century, the Europeans landed in the area and began to conspire against the 
Sultan’s ambitions. They enacted treaties amongst themselves, with the Sultan, against the Sultan, 
or simply without consulting the Sultan. The inhabitants of the greater Western Sahara were 
completely irrelevant. All powerholders assumed their passive cooperation. For the most part, 
these agreements did recognize the Sultan’s authority, more or less, in Morocco proper. They also 
held that south of the Sous, Oued Dra’a, and farther south in the Sequiet al-Hamra River Valleys, 
his dominion was questionable. The Sultan’s influence was observable in urban socio-political 
environments.  
Farther south among the frontier nomads, especially those of the deep Sahara Desert, 
allegiances to clan, tribe, and then tribal confederations abounded. There was no sense of loyalty 
to the entire population of Spanish Sahara. In addition, the nature of Saharan subsistence differed 
from those sedentary dwellings closer to the coast, in the more populated cities, and in the Atlas 
Mountains. Patterns of subsistence developed differently in more populated areas from those in 
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inhospitable rocky hamadas and dune landscapes. Still, the distinguishing socio-cultural markers: 
the loyalties to the immediate tribal ‘family,’ the appearance of independent political entities, and 
the encroachment of foreigners all combined to keep the Saharans from cultivating a cohesive 
national identity, that which is considered nationhood. 
The notion of any ‘Saharan’ identity became an underlying theme when it encountered 
aggressive foreign intrusion, especially from the French. The French took advantage of the 
European agreements at that time and made their way southwest from Algeria and northeast from 
the Senegal River Valley into Morocco and the Greater Saharan desert. This ‘Saharan 
Awakening’ was short-lived. Subsequent rebellions were eliminated until the emergence of the 
Moroccan independence movement. This movement gave new life to a segment of the Saharan 
population, but leaders who were either supported or based in Morocco guided the group. After 
the departure of the Spanish, the movement changed its political focus to eliminate the remaining 
‘colonizers’—Morocco and Mauritania. Therefore, the rise of anti-colonialism, created by 
grievances against France and Morocco at the critical stages of Moroccan independence, allowed 
for the establishment of the POLISARIO, which in turn, took hold of the effort and appropriated 
the cause. 
Perhaps the only indigenous Saharan movement that may be considered the precursor to 
the current Sahrawi independence movement was the Harakat Tahrir Saguia al-Hamra wa Oued 
ad-Dahab. The remnants of this group would later form the POLISARIO FRONT. In a formal 
declaration, the FRONT claimed it was "a 'unique expression of the masses, opting for 
revolutionary violence and the armed struggle as the means by which the Saharawi Arab African 
people can recover total liberty and foil the maneuvers of Spanish colonialism'" (Mundy 2007, 
317).  Another statement, named the ‘Guelta Zemmour declaration’ followed (November 28, 
1975).  It was signed by several "indigenous leaders, shuyukhs, and notables," and it claimed that 
the POLSARIO Front was "the only legitimate representative of the Sahrawi people" (ibid.). 
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Was this the moment when a real national identity for the inhabitants of the former 
Spanish Sahara forged?  Do written proclamations by ambitious leaders constitute the formation 
of real national groups? Even the term ‘Sahrawi’283 has brought additional confusion. Is it an 
adjectival description of Sahara,284 or a cultural marker of symbolic resistance? The author of this 
work agrees with Mundy when he examines the ambiguity of the origin of the word and responds 
that the "aim is not to deprive Western Sahara nationalism of it dignity, but rather to understand it 
more fully" (ibid., 319).  However, national identity cannot be tied directly to written concepts or 
terminology. Rather, identity has to be viewed in a more holistic manner. National identity 
includes common historical experiences, including colonialism; a common culture—language, 
perhaps in this case the practice of Islam, dress, food; and the realization by the people that there 
is a legitimate enterprise that seeks well-being on their behalf through independence. 
Western Saharan ethno-cultural layers (primordial arguments) of identity developed over 
time. They formed the building blocks of their identity. These, combined with the developments 
of colonialism (constructivist arguments) and leaders of resistance (instrumentalist arguments), 
produced a greater Western Saharan group consciousness in this period. By the time Moroccan 
nationalists began their pursuit for independence, support for a Western Saharan national identity 
was ripe. The critical juncture at which the Sahrawi together made the giant leap toward 'national 
identification' resides during this period and culminated in concrete form with the POLISARIO. 
  
                                                
283 Mundy, Zunes, Castellino and Dominguez-Redondo comment that the meaning for the term ’Sahrawi’ may have 
had different connotations during the 1950s and well after Moroccan independence in 1956. As Castellino and 
Dominguez-Redondo state: “Before colonization, it was not possible to speak about the ‘national identity’ of the 
Sahrawi people. The term ‘Sahrawi’ derives from the Spanish Sahara and would have not existed before the mid-
twentieth century. Meaning ‘Saharan’ in Arabic, the term Sahrawi has a broader literal meaning that the one normally 
conferred. The distinction between ‘Sahrawi’ and ‘indigenous Western Sahara’ is also used or ignored for different 
problematic purposes by Western Saharan nationalists and Morocco.”Joshua Castellino and Elvira Domínguez-
Redondo, “The Identity Question: Who are the Sahrawis and What is their Home,” in Perspectives on Western Sahara: 
Myths, Nationalism, and Geopolitics, edited by Anouar Boukhars and Jacques Roussellier. (New York: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 2014), 38. 
 
284 In Arabic, the form of Saharawi is a nisbah (adjective) that can either be modifying a person or referring to the 
geographical area. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
The Sahrawi are a group of people that currently inhabit Western Sahara proper or reside 
in the ‘liberated zones’ and the Algerian ‘refugee’ camps adjacent to these zones. The Kingdom 
of Morocco administers the Western Sahara except for a small sliver of desert land that the 
POLISARIO has branded as free or ‘liberated zones.’ In the meantime, most of the population 
has made their dwelling as guests of Algeria in the remote western Sahara that borders 
Mauritania, the liberated zones of the Western Sahara, and southern Morocco. Morocco 
appropriated the area, fought the POLISARIO for the land, and continues to negotiate with the 
UN (and POLISARIO). The question over its status of the Western Sahara has centered on the 
identity of the people: Who is a Sahrawi? The debate now surrounds the nature of Sahrawi 
national identity and questions whether one actually exists. 
Although there have been several publications and reports about the political situation, 
there have been few sources detailing the debate over Sahrawi national identity. Of these works, 
only a handful have focused on Sahrawi nationalism and identity. These works highlight the 
problems that plague the definition of Sahrawi identity. They relate the Sahrawi experience in 
modern or constructivist terms and marginalize arguments derived from other theoretical 
frameworks. This work brings these frameworks together and through a Sahrawi socio-historical 
analysis has confirmed many of the findings of previous scholars. This project maintains that 
these conclusions about the roots of national identity can only be fully understood if the results of 
all theoretical frameworks are placed side-by-side. There are three285 major derived: 1) that the 
Sahrawi are a distinct grouping of people separated from neighboring peoples by language, 
territory, and custom; 2) that the Sahrawi struggle is an extension of anti-colonialism; or that 3) 
determined foreign and domestic actors appropriated Saharan identity for their own purposes. 
Each argument seeks answers to the origins of Sahrawi national identity and reflects respectively 
                                                
285 Chapter one introduced a fourth hypothesis that was not discussed extensively in this study based on ideological 
(liberty) arguments. 
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the primordial, instrumental, and constructivist frameworks. Each chapter deals with all three 
perspectives. 
The socio-historical timeline, which is not new to the study of Western Sahara, was used 
to try to pinpoint at what point in time or in which period can one establish the formal 
development of Sahrawi identity. Was there an inciting or landmark moment that could have 
made for the creation of a national identity in the past? Could there have been a proper period of 
growth or sense of national maturity for the Sahrawi at some point in history? And how could this 
identity have been created over time? The author has laid out five full chapters of historical 
analysis from antiquity to the invasion of Islam, from the Reconquista to early European 
encroachment, and finally from direct European colonization until 1973. This segment will offer 
conclusionary remarks for each period written. 
Chapter three sought the origins of Sahrawi national identity from antiquity to 1524 when 
the army of the Sa’adian Dynasty overran a small Portuguese fort in Santa Cruz de Mar Peqeuña. 
Scholarship has not agreed on the original inhabitants of North Africa but lean toward the belief 
that groups of people migrated into the area. These groups were a mix of black from the southern 
regions of the continent, Arabs that traversed the great deserts into the northwest and southwest 
corners of North Africa, and an ‘indigenous’ Berber population. According to a primordialist 
framework any sense of homogeneity in the past may have resulted from social (nomadism), 
religious (Islam), or geographic (desert) factors. However, the territorial, as well as the spiritual 
argument is almost impossible to maintain because it would imply that all those under the banner 
of Islam and living as nomads in this vast expanse were of one mind or one identity. Even if this 
were so, there is no evidence to indicate that the region acted as one nation or that it identified 
itself as a nation. 
As stated in chapter three, many scholars argue that the Sahrawi descend from the 
Berbers. A few authors insist that the genealogical trace goes even further back to the Bafour in 
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5500 BCE. However, there are conflicting debates about the migratory patterns, emergence, and 
settlement of the Bafour in North Africa. The disparate nature of the research does not help in 
identifying these groups as forefathers of the Sahrawi. As to a Berber origin, there are debates as 
to the exact composition of Berbers and thus difficulty in differentiating them from other groups 
in North Africa. Nevertheless, the label has been steadily adopted today to include several 
minority nationalities across the Maghreb. Since the Sahrawi have claimed only the Western 
Sahara and not lands beyond this region, they have narrowed their genealogy to a smaller area of 
North Africa and the Sahara Desert. If only a geographical segment of the Berber population were 
the ancestors to the Sahrawi, the evidence has to show that they were a northwest African group 
directly linked to the modern Sahrawi. Disparate Berber groups even in greater northwest Africa, 
make it difficult to pinpoint continuity of a specific Berber population located in the extreme 
northwest corner of the Sahara. 
Primordial arguments that maintain Sahrawi identity can be traced to antiquity assert that 
despite the hybridization of groups, the ‘essence’ of Sahrawiness (the matrix to their origins) 
develops between 50 BCE and 400 AD. Scholars point to the beginning of the first century when 
independent societies of people distinguished themselves from the Roman-influenced part of the 
Maghreb. Groups, such as the Gaetulians, were outside Roman control and were largely nomadic 
in nature. Some of these independent groups were absorbed (through intermarriage or conflict) by 
the Sanhaja Berber. Most scholars consider the Sanhaja as direct ancestors to the Sahrawi. They 
resided in a vast triangular area of the desert whose sovereignty has been an area of contention for 
many centuries.  
The weight given to these assertions is troubling. First, anthropological and ethnological 
scholarship cannot agree over the nature (the actual gene pool, migration routes) of their identity. 
Second, the Sanhaja were not a monolithic political entity, but rather a conglomeration of tribes. 
They later became the dominant confederation of tribes but the nature of their identity changed 
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over time and makes it quite difficult to prove that the Sanhaja were true ancestors to the Sahrawi. 
The research indicates that from the eleventh through the sixteenth centuries the changes in the 
Sanhaja through invasion, intermarriage, and nomadism deeply fragmented Saharan society. The 
Sanhaja split into northern and southern branches after the rise of the Almoravid and Almohad 
Dynasties. The Sanhaja, already subdivided into several main tribes, became further fragmented 
when the Banu Maqil Arabs encroached on the greater Western Sahara. Dynastic changes began 
to mark differences among those who held affinity or loyalties to shaykhs (tribal chieftains) or 
other head tribesmen, especially in the upper northern areas of Morocco. Dynastic changes, the 
nature of the nomadic lifestyle, Arab intrusion, and disparate tribal affiliations led to a variable 
mix of ethnic identity. Therefore, if the Sanhaja are considered the direct ancestors of the 
Sahrawi, it is almost impossible today to ascertain which genealogical line of Sanhaja to follow 
because eventually the Sanhaja and its main branches faded through intermarriage and conflict. 
Moreover, recent scholarship has moved toward diversity of population origins in the Maghreb.  
Chapter Four continues the search for the sources of Sahrawi national identity in the 
period beginning in 1524 until about 1757. The chapter acknowledges the effect of trade on tribal 
diffusion. This diffusion occurred, not only along the caravan routes of southern Western Sahara, 
but also among those tribes in the southern peripheries of Morocco, or northwestern Sahara. 
Settlements began to arise but these towns undertook sovereign qualities and sought control over 
the immediate southern Moroccan regions through intertribal warfare led by governors or sharifs. 
Domestic infighting, the rise of independent fiefdoms, Arab encroachment, the diminished power 
of the ‘Moroccan’ dynasties, (especially the Merinids) plagued the Western Sahara region. These 
attempted characteristics effectively allowed for several powers to vie for control of the region. 
Any power that attempted consolidating regional control would have been met with many 
opposing power-brokers. As a result, control garnered by any one tribe or conglomeration of 
tribes was temporary at best. 
  229 
The lack of power under one banner and the nomadic lifestyle afforded by the Sahara 
discouraged cohesiveness and allowed for subtle European intrusion. Most of these pockets of 
colonization were located on the coast, and if further inland, usually only along the major 
thoroughfares and points of trade. These small foreign incursions could not have been an obstacle 
to national collectivity. On the contrary, much of the lack of one identity sprang from (1) small 
independencies that broke ranks with other tribal groups; (2) tribal rivalries that fought for control 
of grazing land, trade routes, and blood feuds; (3) the weakness of dynastic and sharifian leaders 
who held only nominal power; (4) the challenge of organizing disparate nomadic tribes that 
preferred to stay clear of any type of subjugation; and (5) (if the claim is to pinpoint the origins of 
Sahrawi identity to the Sanhaja) the multiple divisions of the Sanhaja Berber have obscured the 
possibility of one lineage for the forbears of the Sahrawi. Therefore, primordial arguments do not 
actually fit these findings. Rather, it seems that they can only be explained through a 
constructivist framework. 
Perhaps the only saving grace for primrodial arguments would be through Smith’s 
ethnosymbolic lens. Ethnosymbolism recognizes that there are certain dynamics, influences that 
may not be found in purely primordial theory. Ethnosymbolism asserts that any national identity 
must include or at least allow for ethnic and cultural characteristics. These socio-cultural elements 
may either be contextualized from the past or derived from certain symbols that are deeply rooted 
to group identity. These symbols do not necessarily have to be found in the past but they are 
certainly tied to places or events in history. Dress, food, religion in general and nomadic behavior 
matter less than the appropriation of Ma’ ‘Al-Aynayn as hero, Hassaniya as language, the use of 
sand and not water for the practice of Islam, or even historical events such as the ‘war’ against 
Spain, Mauritania and subsequently Morocco. 
For example, I posed several questions to my interviewees when I visited the Sahrawi 
‘refugee camps' outside of Tindouf, Algeria between 26 September –– 03 October 2014. Among 
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these were: What did they believe the origins of Sahrawi national identity were based upon? 
Where do they believe the origins of their identity came from? The overwhelming majority of 
those interviewed focused on the heterogeneous nature of Sahrawi identity. It was most unusual 
(at least for the author) to hear them explain that this hybridization was unique to Sahrawi 
identity. All three of the representative ‘ambassadors’286 directly would state that their mixed 
heritage was undeniable. The SADR ambassadors to the UN and Spain, confirmed that indeed 
one cannot simply eliminate arguments derived from primordialism. The attachments that are tied 
to Sahrawi identity today may have been with its predecessors all this time but did not fuse to 
achieve the nationalism evident among the population today. The SADR representative to Spain 
asserted that the struggle is mainly a political one but “the political battle is based upon social, 
historical, ethnic, and cultural arguments… otherwise the political [argument] has no right” 
(Beyoun 2014).  Along similar lines, the current SADR representative to the United States 
allowed for six elements that composed Sahrawi identity. He remarked that the Sahrawi are a 
hybrid of Arab, African, Berber, Spanish influence plus geography and a ‘historical trajectory’… 
that “no other nation” had these features but the Sahrawi (Beisat 2013).  However, the SADR 
representative to the UN who agreed with Mr. Beisat’s sentiment, conceded that Sahrawi 
nationalism “was shaped on the battlefield…you cannot resist your…enemies without a clear and 
profound conviction that you are different—you are preserving your identity” (Boukhari 2013). 
The director of the Sahrawi Cultural Museum, an anthropology graduate, responded 
slightly differently when she stated that: “any modern society will want to investigate their roots 
… this is what happens with us, mainly when it involves a Bedouin society that is characterized 
by being in a disperse space, it does not have the notion to construct a very well-organized nation, 
or country…that was one of the questions, one of the concerns that modern Sahrawi society has 
had, is to begin with the historical act… it starts there”  (Malainin 2014).  The composition of the 
                                                
286 Ahmed Boukhari to the UN, Yeslem Beiset to the U.S., and Bouchraya Hamid Beyoun to Spain. Interviews 
conducted by the author, 2013 and 2014. 
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tribes and resistance against invaders are an important part Sahrawi identity. These statements 
underscore how important it is to acknowledge that those arguments derived from primordialism 
because they establish a base of perennial beliefs that sustain an identity. It also demonstrates 
despite these low-level characteristics of identity; more is needed to fuse all these features into a 
nation. These features (territory, autonomy) were considered next. 
While the great powers divided the continent of Africa at the end of the fifteenth century, 
apart from the issues of cohesion and tribal division, the period from the early sixteenth to mid-
seventeenth century, revealed a new battleground over Sahrawi identity. Arguments for Sahrawi 
identity early in history were based on ethnic genealogy. Instead of arguing for certain markers of 
distinction, this period is highlighted by markers from or against certain territorial claims. The 
discussion moves to dissecting at what point there was control over the northwestern Saharan 
region by the political entities of northern Morocco. The Merinid and then Wattasid Dynasties 
were unable to consolidate control over the southern periphery. However, the Sa’adian Dynasty, 
led by Al-Mansur began the drive toward asserting dominion further south than Fes or 
Marrakesh. The now-titled Sultan of Morocco began to counter Portuguese, Spanish, Ottoman, 
and other contenders to the region. Still, the Sa’adians would not completely eradicate the 
Europeans because they were able to negotiate, reservedly, to maintain trade avenues and goods 
from Europe at specific points of entry on its coastline. 
 The Sa’adian rulers would move south, west, and southwest to check tribal rivalry, stop 
Christian incursions, and assert power. Scholarship establishes that these attempts to take territory 
and secure trade routes were temporary, nominal, and evidently unrecognized by other 
confederations of tribes. The most contentious of these areas was, and continues to be, the SARIO 
(Sequiet al-Hamra and Rio de Oro) region. The area ran from the northwestern coastline inland 
and turned southwestward and then even farther south into the Sahara Desert. This are has proven 
to be one of the biggest topics of debate for both parties to the conflict. Thus, the POLISARIO 
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distance themselves from any claim by present-day Morocco that the Kingdom had dominion 
over that part of the territory in question. Several scholars, travelers of the period, and archival 
research surrounding cartographic borders of the period demonstrate that the Sa’adian Dynasty 
and subsequent rulers well into the Alawi Sultanate did not ever fully control these areas. It was 
not until late nineteenth century European colonization that there was ever one power controlling 
the Sous, Dra’a, and Sequiet el-Hamra River Valleys. 
The territorial distinction asserted by the Sahrawi is derived from primordialism 
arguments. However, the territorial argument is complicated by the ethnic nature of the 
inhabitants. In fact, the marker of territory in the case of the Sahrawi is better sustained under 
constructivist arguments. Confederations that included the Reguibayt, Tekna, Tadjakant, Oulad 
Delim, and tributary tribes can only be identified as tribal or clan-like, not Sahrawi or Moroccan. 
The term ‘Morocco,’ based on cartographic archival research, seems to have been used as 
geographical designation rather than a delimitation of a nation. Thus, again, the employment of 
claims derived from primordial arguments is difficult because of identification discrepancies. In 
other words, a nation will usually identify not only with ethnic distinctions (such as religion, 
language, custom) but also with collective memories, and in this case, territorial rights. The only 
conceivable example that may have matched such a disparity were the Hebrews. Other invading 
groups such as the Huns, Goths, Mongols, and perhaps even the Vikings could possibly fit such 
national ‘incongruence.’ However, those groups have either disappeared completely or currently 
have a sovereign territory. 
Nationhood is grounded in an assertion of territorial legitimacy and a socio-cultural 
dimension. Sahrawi have territorial claims and infer that they are distinct from Morocco, but the 
differentiation is not concretely grounded because of ties to a fragmented tribal society. 
Geography did not allow for any one power to control all of Western Sahara because of the vast 
distances and barren terrain. Tribes were small; confederations would number at most in the 
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thousands. Thus, it is very challenging to label these tribes as small ‘nations’ or have them 
designated as part of some bigger cohesive nation. The notion of what constituted a nation would 
have had to be reconstituted to exclude territory at this time. Certainly then, there is no definitive 
national identity that can be defined as a Sahrawi nation in the period ending the seventeenth 
century. The lack of evidence marginalizes arguments from primordial approaches. Still, there 
seems to be no reason for eliminating the ethno-symbolic claim that the Sahrawi had never been 
dominated by ‘Morocco’ or any of its Sultans, especially south of the SARIO. 
Chapter Five follows with the struggles by the Alawite Sultanate to force, coerce, or 
entice the more southerly Saharan tribes to acknowledge his authority from 1758 through 1859. 
As stated previously, the Alawite Sultanate did at one time invade, subjugate, or coerce other 
Saharan political entities to submit to his spiritual authority. However, political authority over 
lands outside of direct Alawite influence was almost never recognized and when it was, it was 
nominal or temporary. In fact, even before the Alawites came to power in Morocco, the weak 
base of power in Marrakesh and Fes unsettled the dynasties especially among the Berber tribes in 
the Atlas Mountains. Power struggles appeared during the Alawite Dynasty. Despite each side 
pointing to the ICJ rulings for justification of their claims, controversy remains. Nevertheless, the 
controversy over territoriality is misplaced in context. The search is for roots of a certain national 
identity—a Sahrawi one—not for territorial control. Certainly this is important in the overall 
conflict but this answers a different question: Does the land belong to the Sahrawi? It does not 
answer at what point or from what point may one find the roots of Sahrawi national identity. 
 In the territorial debate, the question of the type of authority over those peripheral areas 
of Morocco arises. Morocco presently claims that although surrounding tribal entities did not 
thoroughly acknowledge the Sultan’s temporal power, most of these groups recognized his 
spiritual authority. In this sense primordialists will argue that Islam is an objective element or 
innate part of Saharan society (at least after the Arab invasion). The POLISARIO asserts that the 
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opposite is true. The Sultan’s spiritual influence was respected, but it was not the kind of power 
that controlled the socio-political aspects of everyday life in any given political community. 
Morocco had requested that the ICJ allow for their case to be given ‘special status’ as their 
conviction relied upon the nature of the Sharifian state—a state that ruled primarily via spiritual 
consent rather than by coercion. 
Yet, there are weaknesses for holding on to this ‘spiritual’ platform of authority. It may 
be a matter of perspective as to whether Islam was properly utilized as an issue of spiritual 
consent or was it rather a tool for coercion. Religion can influence minds, but it cannot exert 
actual physical force. Any extension of power that includes a ‘spiritual’ component must rely on 
the use of military force to gain ‘real’ dominance—especially territorial gains.  Second, 
argumentation for the case of Morocco was based not on the religion itself but rather on its use 
and conditions of use. Third, it may seem that instead of any religious connotation, the Sultanates 
had exercised this mode of authority to expand and maintain economic interests—the Saharan 
trade routes. If this were the case, if Islam were exposed in its use for the consolidation of 
economic power, then it essentially becomes destitute of objectivism. Islam may have given the 
Sultan the general precepts for morality and a course of conduct for individual behavior but it 
could not have afforded a straight forward blueprint for conduct in war, governance, and 
economic exchange. If a sharif, governor, sultan, or tribal chieftain did so, the leader grounded 
the blueprint on a subjectivity that leads away from arguments derived from primordialism and 
toward those that lie with the framework for constructivism. 
Chapter Five extends the counter-argument by introducing evidence that despite the 
Moroccan claim that most, if not, all of the greater Western Sahara, composed part of the Sultan’s 
domain, it did not. In fact, the period approaching the end of the eighteenth century was one of 
fragmentation and re-composition among the tribal areas of the Western Sahara. Questions 
remained surrounding who controlled the southern peripheries of ‘Morocco’ even in the presence 
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of a strong Alawite Dynasty. Moreover, several independencies arose that not only competed 
amongst each other for power but also ignored both the Sultan’s temporal and spiritual authority. 
Counter-claims against the Moroccan historical precedent to dominion over the land in 
question include the archival evidence and still-to-be fully studied (and translated) Saharan 
documents. European encroachment steadily increased and contributed to more contact with the 
local inhabitants in the greater Western Sahara. Several agreements and treaties between the 
Sultans and the great European powers demonstrated, albeit somewhat ambiguously, that 
Morocco’s frontiers were limited to certain geographical areas. Second, Saharan documentation, 
discovered in the past fifty years, has revealed certain curiosities of Saharan history. These 
Saharan scholars write that there were, in fact, a number of independent societies scattered 
throughout the greater Western Sahara. These documents indicate that there were other power 
brokers, lines of division, and accounts of history that have not been thoroughly analyzed. These 
manuscripts contradict a monolithic state of Moroccan dominion over the Western Sahara. 
None of these arguments indicate a distinct Sahrawi identity. The rise of Independent 
political entities, foreign agreements that indicated the vagueness of the Sultan’s dominion, and 
manuscripts depicting a literary and historical period independent of ‘Moroccan’ dominance 
actually establishes the opposite. Certainly, the European pacts do not prove that there was a 
Sahrawi nation but center on the territorial argument. The seventeenth and eighteenth century 
Saharan manuscripts depict a Sahara that had well-established societies, including trade, an 
Islamic clergy, a flourishing (much to be translated) literature, and a certain hierarchy among its 
inhabitants. However, there is no evidence as yet to suggest there were clans or tribes that 
composed a specific Sahrawi ‘nation.’ In fact, the documents offer a different view. They indicate 
that there were many independent political identities but none (at this point) (either specific 
individuals or groups) that identified themselves as Sahrawi. In general, the research conveys the 
idea that rather than there being one cohesive Saharan identity, there were many. There is an 
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argument for stating that there was one massive Saharan identity which included the environment 
(desert landscape), lifestyle (nomadism) (except for some, more urbanized, southern and northern 
political communities), religion, and raiding. Saharan society, however, consisted of many tribal 
confederations and desert emirates. It is simply difficult to validate, not only the territorial claim 
by Morocco, but also the Sahrawi ‘self-awareness’ claim by the POLISARIO. 
Chapter Six (1860-1883) begins with similar difficulties in terms of seeking the origins of 
Sahrawi identity. Several authors state that Morocco suffered from internal turmoil, that the 
Western Sahara was not under any direct control, and several tribes and tribal confederations 
governed their own state of affairs. The newly-discovered Saharan history has demonstrated that 
there was, in fact, a separate chronicle of Saharan society, different from that of the well-known 
Moroccan record. These documents (at least the ones that have been translated and made 
available) show that there were other political communities living apart from the influences of the 
Sultan and independent of his authority. Based on several writings, it is clear that these tribal 
groups fought amongst each other for resources and rivalries. They conducted raids. The 
overwhelming number of battles fought between and among tribes occurred without the consent 
of the Sultan, and indicated the independent action of each tribe or alliance of tribes. 
Tribal organization, an issue that in a much earlier period was the focus of criticism, was 
also briefly mentioned. Most pro-Moroccan scholars and skeptics of organizational structures in 
Saharan society debate whether there was any semblance of order or tribal accountability. In fact, 
sources claim that the Moroccan Sultan, when given the opportunity, swept through a territory, 
implemented, and subsequently maintained ‘order.’ However, Chapter Six proves that far from 
disorder, there was collective tribal responsibility, dedication to the agricultural cycles of 
farming, a process to suspend battle with each other. Many tribes used mediation to resolve 
differences. In addition, unruliness and disorder within Moroccan lands could have rivaled at 
times the Saharan chaotic lifestyle that some western scholars describe. These issues compounded 
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the governance problem for the Sultan whenever he attempted to advance his authority beyond 
‘Morocco.’ 
Still, the attempt to answer the question of Sahrawi national identity is distant even in this 
period. Sahrawi origins do not begin here. There are no primordialist-derived arguments that can 
sustain a basis for Sahrawi national identity. Arguments that arrive at answering the roots of 
identity via constructivism seem more reasonable but there does not seem to be a strong cohesive, 
viable catalyst bringing together these disparate tribes. Any claims that try to establish Sahrawi 
roots through an instrumentalist justification is just as difficult. The only political entities that 
could have aided in the fusion of a Saharan identity were those directed from Morocco or from 
the Europeans. Yet, direct European control (except perhaps by the French in the extreme south 
in the vicinity of the Senegal River Valley) was not yet significant. Moroccan suzerainty was 
nominal and temporary.  Even a conglomeration of the independent tribal affiliations did not 
converge en masse to ‘claim’ the northwestern Sahara. As such, there is no concrete, viable 
evidence to determine at this stage, as late as the 1850s, that there was a developing Sahrawi 
nation. 
Chapter Seven (1884-1973) details the pressing and more determined efforts by the Great 
Powers of Europe to encroach on the northwestern Sahara. They began from the south, at the 
mouth of the Senegal River, and from the north in northern Morocco. The Spanish had aspirations 
in southern Morocco, certain enclaves in the north, and on the coastal areas of Western Sahara 
proper. The treaties and agreements that would pepper the following years with Morocco and a 
few of the emirates and political communities in and around the Western Sahara demonstrate the 
slow but increasingly more influential European involvement in the region. The European powers 
generally perceived the inherent weakness of the Moroccan Sultan. Revolts from the local 
inhabitants, the attraction of market opportunities via the Saharan trade routes and coastal trading, 
the geo-political and economic importance of the Straits of Gibraltar, and the internecine conflict 
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among and within tribes in and around the Kingdom of Morocco allowed for the encroachment of 
the foreign powers. The beginning of chapter seven highlights the rise of strong independent 
tribal confederations and emirates along with other, smaller, but just as independent, tribal 
groups. These independent tribes and other political communities began to rival the Sultan and 
indeed began to negotiate with the foreign ‘infidels.’ There is ample evidence to support not only 
independent tribal freedom of movement but also negotiated settlements with the foreign 
‘infidels.’ They did not seek approval of the Sultan despite the official arguments against this 
possibility. 
Thus, despite the vast distances and the prevalence of nomadism, the region developed 
political entities acting independently of supposed powers that claimed authority over most of the 
northwest and Western Sahara. Indeed, the evidence strongly suggests that the Sultan, while at 
times moving forces across some of the landscape, congratulating ‘subject’ leaders, granting 
investitures, and warring with competitors, never had complete, sovereign control over these 
autonomous principalities. Moreover, many, if not all, of the groups in question would only 
temporarily, and for political expediency, recognize the Sultan’s authority. Groups such as the 
Tekna, Reguibayt, the Oulad Delim, Oulad Tidrarim, Arosien, the Tadjakant, Walati, Kunta, and 
a surge of smaller groups of tribes, kingdoms in the Sous and Goulimine, and emirates in the 
Adrar, of Brakna, Trarza, and Tagant operated independently. 
The general picture then from the accounts in Chapters Six and Seven reveals that neither 
the Moroccan kingdom nor any Saharan ‘nation’ had proprietary control over these disputed 
regions. Primordial and instrumental interpretations (in the mid-eighteenth to late nineteenth 
centuries) cannot support the development of any one dominating Saharan nation. In fact, 
Saharan history chronicles several large political communities cohabitating, warring, and trading 
with each other. There is not enough support for instrumental and primordial arguments to sustain 
group ancestry with the ancient version of the Sanhaja Berber because of the increasing nature of 
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hybridization via marriage among Berber, Moor, Arab, and Black. There is difficulty in 
establishing Sultanate supremacy over these lands. If one views the dynamic nature of the 
northwestern and Western Sahara through a more constructivist approach, there is also the 
challenge of building one distinct, self-aware Saharan identity that can be identified as ‘Sahrawi.’ 
The economic and socio-cultural fabric of Saharan society might have been very similar but this 
overlay of Saharan civilization was apparently severely divided among the disparate and 
‘roaming’ tribes of the northwestern Sahara. 
Of all the developments explained in Chapter Seven that conspired to reduce the 
assertions that the Sultan had control over the territory, three of the four focus on the interests and 
actions of the European powers. The fourth development, the adherence of these groups to tribal 
identity rather than some type of national identity, deterred the unification of tribes. It is almost 
impossible to argue for a coalescing national Saharan identity. The first three developments aid in 
the development of a sentiment that had been held ever since the intrusion of the early colonizers: 
feelings of irritation against increasing European interference in their daily affairs turned into 
outright hostility. Direct confrontation became inevitable. By 1912, the first revolts targeted the 
major European territorial powerbrokers (France and Spain) and the charismatic personality of 
Ma’ al-‘Aynayn led the uprising. These hostilities led to an enhanced awareness of Saharan 
identity caused by the juxtaposition between the perceived threat of European identity and their 
already established Saharan self. 
The exploits of Ma’ al-‘Aynayn are central to a ‘Saharan’ awakening. On the one hand, 
the Sahrawi have appropriated this historical antecedent as part of their collective memory and a 
primordial feature of their national identity. On the other hand, he can also be considered part of 
the great man concept of history287. If so, then his influence would fall under the instrumentalist 
arguments. Ma’ al-‘Aynayn is the clearest example of an entrepreneur guiding Saharan identity. 
                                                
287 A largely nineteenth century concept that explains how history has been influenced by great men and women, rulers, 
or highly influential individuals  
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His goals, however, were short-sighted. He was angry that Europeans had encroached onto sacred 
lands, and his first objective was to oust them. Later, disgusted with the policies of appeasement 
by the Sultan of Morocco, he decided to take the throne. It is not clear, though, whether his 
ambition included the building of a nation for the whole of Western Sahara. Scholars note that he 
was not Moroccan born but from the deep south. He settled south of the Dra’a River Valley, and 
founded the city of Smara. Clearly he a catalyst of Saharan awareness and brought together 
disparate tribes against the colonial powers, but his untimely death stopped what could have been 
a Sahrawi nation. This struggle, however, as Ambassador Boukhari suggests was a key moment 
in Sahrawi history because it began to shape the notion of a Sahrawi identity ‘on the battlefield’ 
(Boukhari, 2014). The struggle continued for more than three decades after his death but was 
overcome decisively. 
The liberation of Morocco from the French brought together many of the tribes of the 
Spanish Sahara. The tribes believed that, in turn, that the Sultan would help them against the 
French and Spanish in what was already considered Spanish territory. However, the awaited 
reciprocity never came. Although not all tribes had acquiesced to liberating the territory, Sahrawi 
awareness had arrived. The moment this confederation of tribes collaborated in a concerted effort 
to free themselves from the Europeans in 1954-1956, they had created an identity rooted in 
opposition. Not all tribes had formally asked the Sultan for help, but the major tribes within the 
Spanish Sahara were present. By organizing themselves as a group, they had adopted the territory 
of the Spanish Sahara and all of its history. Divisions did surface eventually because of group 
interests, but with the formation of the POLISARIO Sahrawi identity crystalized. 
At the beginning of the search, the author believed that the origins of Sahrawi national 
identity lay deep in history. Their origins must have included certain features unique to the 
Sahrawi or adopted by them sometime in history. However, Sahrawi ‘history’ is a mélange of 
elements. In addition, to the author’s surprise, almost all the interviewees admitted that the roots 
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of Sahrawi identity were historically numerous. In other words, although there are various 
features of identity, the primordial hypothesis did not help in pinpointing when the Sahrawi fused 
as a nation. Still, a Sahrawi nation would not have been possible without these basic elements of 
identity. For precisely this reason, primordial arguments cannot be discarded. What this study has 
presented is a prolonged search via primordial (historical and socio-cultural), instrumental (the 
leadership of Ma al-‘Aynayn and the development of autonomous tribes), and constructivist 
arguments (territorial boundaries set by the French and Spanish) for the origins of Sahrawi 
national identity. This author has found their origins belong in the period of history beginning 
with the leadership of Ma al-’Aynayn (1904) and culminating with the creation of the 
POLISARIO (1973). 
This study acknowledges that constructivist accounts of identity formation are a great 
tool for understanding national identity. Its arguments can produce evidence which, placed in 
context, can generate a picture of national identity. However, constructivism needs refinement 
when pieces of evidence, as in the case of the Sahrawi, come from different segments of history. 
History is an assortment of events and socio-cultural markers. These markers are ethno-cultural 
resources adopted by groups that developed over time and by themselves may be insignificant. 
The sum of these distinguishing resources, socio-historical features and experiences must all be 
included, accounted for, and then evaluated for an end result. This study places the moment of 
Sahrawi national identity in the twentieth century but adds that this conclusion utilizes essential 
markers of differentiations that persist over time; they are the building blocks of any national 
identity. 
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